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In microeconomics, preferences play a crucial role in explaining choices (Bowles 2006). But 
where do preferences come from? In addition to institutions and incentives (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2005), individual characteristics such as personality (Almlund et al. 
2011), knowledge (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014), and intellectual virtues shape preferences 
(Peterson and Seligman 2004).   
We investigate the associations between personality, knowledge, and intellectual virtue with 
economic decision making, including risk-taking, investment, and mortgage decisions. While 
personality and knowledge are well-known concepts, intellectual virtues are perhaps less 
familiar. Roughly, intellectual virtues are acquired character traits that support gaining 
knowledge and understanding (Zagzebski 1996). In contrast to personality, intellectual virtues 
specifically capture traits supporting knowledge acquisition (Baehr 2013).  
The focus of this thesis is on the measurement of personality, knowledge, and intellectual 
virtue. Empirical studies rely on good instruments to measure the constructs they seek to 
investigate. Each chapter deals with the problem of measurement, if in different ways. Chapter 
2 uses an existing and well-studied measure of personality based on the Big Five personality 
traits, but applies it in a new context, namely a developing country (Maples et al. 2014). While 
we rely on an existing instrument, administering the instrument in a very different cultural 
context yields new insights. Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between knowledge and 
mortgage decisions through the lens of a newly developed instrument, the Mortgage Literacy 
Questionnaire. The Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire is the first instrument to measure 
  2 
financial literacy that includes questions on different mortgage types, including their fiscal and 
legal implications (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011b). Chapter 4 develops and validates 
the Intellectual Virtue Scale, a new instrument to measure intellectual virtue (Fairweather and 
Zagzebski 2001). In chapter 5, we use the Intellectual Virtue Scale to inquire into the 
associations of intellectual virtue with financial literacy, as well as diligent financial decision 
making. 
While each chapter stands on its own, the crosscutting theme of the economic consequences of 
individual characteristics deserves attention. Individual characteristics were long neglected 
among the factors influencing economic decision making. The long dominant approach in 
economics regarded people as rational agents on a quest to maximize utility (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green 1995). People’s utility function was determined by a stable, complete, 
and transitive preference ordering over all available choices. It was not the place of economics 
to further inquire into the origin of these preferences. Within this paradigm, economists derived 
general predictions about economic behaviour based on given preferences and prices, which 
themselves were the results of supply and demand on clearing markets. Individual 
characteristics such as personality, knowledge, and other cognitive characteristics were 
excluded from the analysis. This thesis contributes to putting these individual characteristics, 
always at play in economic decision making, into the study of economic decision making.  
1.2  Personality 
Research on personality has a long tradition in psychology (for a review, see Robins, Fraley, 
and Krueger 2009). The dominant model to assess personality measures the ‘Big Five’ 
personality traits: agreeableness, extroversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and 
neuroticism (Donnellan et al. 2006). Prior studies have demonstrated that personality is 
associated with socioeconomic outcomes (Borghans et al. 2008; Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 
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2001). Personality traits are a powerful predictor of leadership abilities, job performance, 
longevity, and college grades  (Barrick and Mount 1991). But these studies have been 
conducted almost exclusively in a developed country context (Almlund et al. 2011).  
Our contribution is to study the relationship between personality and economic decision 
making in a developing country context, namely among rural farmers in Meru County, Kenya. 
Taking the research on personality to a developing country context contributes to our 
understanding of how personality shapes investment decisions and risk taking in a poor rural 
context.  
1.3  Knowledge 
Economists have also begun to investigate the relationship between knowledge and economic 
decision making. The literature on financial literacy has specifically explored the relationship 
between financial knowledge and financial decision making (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011b; 
2014). People scoring higher on financial literacy are more likely to manage wealth effectively 
(Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly 2003), invest in the stock market (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and 
Alessie 2011b), select mutual funds with lower fees (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton 2008), and 
plan ahead for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a).  
An important next step is to investigate a broader range of economic outcomes that may be 
associated with financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). We study the effects of financial 
literacy on mortgage decisions (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011b). But existing measures 
of financial literature focus exclusively on general concepts such as the time value of money 
or inflation. A more targeted measure specific to mortgages is important because we cannot 
take for granted that people with a good general understanding of financial concepts also 
understand the legal and fiscal repercussions of different types of mortgages. Our contribution 
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is to develop a new instrument to measure mortgage literacy specifically. Mortgage literacy 
focuses on the knowledge relevant to selecting a mortgage and managing risks emerging from 
mortgages. The mortgage literacy questionnaire allows us to elicit specific competencies 
required in selecting a mortgage and managing mortgage risk. In particular, we consider legal 
and fiscal aspects of mortgage decisions. Understanding what people know – and do not know 
– about mortgages and to what extent such knowledge matters for making mortgage decisions 
can inform policy decisions in areas ranging from financial stability to customer protection.   
1.4  Intellectual Virtues  
Intellectual virtues are qualities of individuals that support processing information and dealing 
with information conscientiously (Morton 2012). The relationship between intellectual virtues 
and economic decisions has received little attention to date (Peterson and Seligman 2004). We 
take up this task by developing and applying the Intellectual Virtue Scale, a new instrument to 
measure intellectual virtue.  
We focus on five intellectual virtues: Love of Knowledge or curiosity is the disposition to 
actively and purposefully seek knowledge and understanding. Open-mindedness in gathering 
information is the disposition to take up different standpoints and perspectives in seeking out 
evidence and being impartial in appraising the reliability of sources of information. 
Conscientiousness in evaluating information is the disposition to evaluate evidence 
methodically, thoroughly, and carefully. Humility in belief formation is the disposition to 
proportion the strength of your beliefs to the strength of your evidence. Intellectual Courage 
is the disposition to pursue knowledge and understanding even if this may negatively affect 
your wellbeing.  
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How are intellectual virtues relevant to economic decision making? The Intellectual Virtue 
Scale evaluates traits related to motivating people to learn relevant information, and to be more 
competent in dealing with information. Therefore, we expect intellectually virtuous people to 
have more financial knowledge and understand economic concepts better. Moreover, we 
expect intellectually virtuous people to be more aware of the limits of their knowledge and to 
be more reflective in making financial decisions. For instance, we expect intellectually virtuous 
people to score higher on traditional measures of financial literacy and to display higher self-
awareness of the extent of their financial knowledge. Moreover, we expect financially literate 
people to make financial decisions more diligently. 
We study the relationship between intellectual virtue and the acquisition of financial 
knowledge and diligence in financial decision making. Applying the Intellectual Virtue Scale 
to mortgage decisions yields new insights into what shapes economic decision making. 
Understanding to what extent intellectual virtue matters for economic decision making is also 
important for policy making, including for targeting financial education programmes and 
designing teaching curricula.  
1.5 Methodology 
Economists once assumed that people act on the far-sighted evaluation of the consequences of 
their actions in light of exogenously determined rational preferences (Walras 2013; Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green 1995). But this Walrasian approach has been enriched and complemented 
by alternative approaches (Bowles 2006). The assumption of a rational set of preferences 
makes way for insights from behavioural economics (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Mullainathan and Thaler 2001; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The assumption that people 
evaluate consequences far-sightedly is replaced by the notion that people are rational only 
within bounds, relying on ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics in evaluating actions (Simon 1982; 
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Gigerenzer and Selten 2002; Kahneman 2003). The assumption of exogenously given 
preferences has been challenged as well: new approaches model the interactions between 
economic institutions and values and preferences, showing how preferences are shaped by 
economic interaction (Leibenstein 1950; Gerber and Jackson 1993; Bowles 1998).  
By abstracting from the specifics of institutions, and the cognitive characteristics of people, the 
Walrasian approach yielded general predictions about economic outcomes based on general 
equilibrium modelling. Taking into account behavioural biases and heuristics, limited 
cognitive capacities, and endogenous preference formation requires a more empirical approach, 
which casts doubt on the generality of many of the predictions yielded by the Walrasian 
paradigm (Bowles 2006).  
This thesis contributes to a departure from the Walrasian approach along three dimensions. 
First, the research questions and methodology are informed by neighbouring disciplines, 
particularly psychology, law, and philosophy. From psychology, we have learned about the 
crucial role personality plays for decision making (Borghans et al. 2008; Barrick and Mount 
1991; Brown and Taylor 2014). From philosophy, we draw inspiration for the Intellectual 
Virtue Scale (Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011; Montmarquet 1993). We adopt psychometric scale 
development methodology to construct and validate the Intellectual Virtue Scale (DeVellis 
2016; Hinkin 1995). We have learned from law that the legal and fiscal context is of central 
importance for economic decisions (Deakin et al. 2017), which inspired us to develop the 
Mortgage Risk Questionnaire.  
Second, this thesis is very much focused on the empirical details of the phenomena we seek to 
measure. Theory is the backbone of economics. Yet general hypotheses need to be tested by 
empirical case studies. In particular, we emphasize the task of getting good measures of the 
constructs we seek to study in the first place. We collect various types of data from different 
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sources depending on the task at hand. To obtain the data we use in chapter 2, we conduct a 
large-scale field experiment with farmers from Meru County, Kenya. The field experiment 
involves a ‘lab-in-field experiment’ in the form of a risk game to uncover the risk preferences 
of participants (Gerber and Green 2012). We also administer questionnaires to participants to 
assess personality and elicit economic choices (Levitt and List 2009).  For validating the 
Intellectual Virtue scale in chapter 4, we administer candidate items to participants recruited 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace (Buhrmester, Kwang, and 
Gosling 2011). For the studies presented in chapters 2 and 5, we gather data on mortgage 
literacy and the associations between intellectual virtue and financial literacy through an online 
questionnaire administered to the participants of a Dutch household panel (Teppa and Vis 
2012). In each chapter except for chapter 2, we invent new instruments to measure the 
individual characteristics the impact of which on economic decision making we seek to 
understand.  
Third, we challenge the generalizability of previous studies. In chapter 2, we take the research 
on the relationship between personality and economic decision making to a developing 
country. We find associations between personality and economic decision making in our field 
study different from previous studies undertaken in developed countries. We also challenge 
generalizability by introducing a domain-specific measure of financial literacy. In chapter 3, 
we show that general measures of financial literacy do not find significant associations between 
financial literacy and perceived mortgage risk as well as the likelihood to fix mortgage interest 
rates. Our new domain-specific measure of mortgage literacy, however, does show significant 
associations with mortgage risk and rate-fixing behaviour. These results suggest that how we 
measure constructs of interest and where we measure is crucial for economic decision making.  
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1.6 Outline 
The overarching research question of the thesis is whether and to what extent individual 
characteristics affect economic decision making. The chapters separately address the following 
research questions: 
Chapter 2: Does personality affect risk taking, investment decisions, and desire for credit? 
Chapter 3: Does knowledge about mortgages affect the riskiness of mortgages taken? 
Chapter 4: How can intellectual virtue be measured? 
Chapter 5: Does intellectual virtue improve knowledge about finance and financial diligence? 
In chapter 2, we investigate how personality influences economic decision making, with a lab-
in-the-field experiment as well as observational data from rural Kenya. Our sample is 
composed of smallholders with an income of less than $1 per day, from 40 farmer communities 
in Meru County. More than 90% in our sample are women. We find that particular personality 
profiles are associated with the risk propensity of farmers, their investment decisions, their 
desire for credit, and the amount of formal and informal credit they obtain. Interestingly, we 
find that other traits than those suggested by the existing literature matter. We find no 
correlation with the traits of neuroticism and extroversion, which have been identified as 
important in developed country studies. By contrast, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
intellect are significantly correlated with our outcome measures. These results shed new light 
on the relationship between personality traits and economic decisions, and contribute to the 
understanding of how personality shapes investment decisions and risk taking in a poor rural 
context. 
In chapter 3, we study the relationship between mortgage literacy and mortgage risks with a 
newly designed Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire using Dutch household data. The Mortgage 
Literacy Questionnaire evaluates the domain-specific knowledge of households about 
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mortgages, including the legal and fiscal implications of different types of mortgages. We find 
that mortgage literacy is distinct from basic and advanced financial literacy. A significant 
number of households is financially literate but mortgage illiterate. We demonstrate that 
mortgage literacy is associated with lower perceived mortgage risk, and with how well 
households hedge mortgage risk. Our results suggest that knowledge about mortgage products 
and their legal and fiscal environment matters considerably for financial choices regarding 
mortgages.  
In chapter 4, we develop and validate the Intellectual Virtue Scale, a new measure of 
intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are acquired character traits that support gaining 
knowledge and understanding. We develop a 20-item scale, measuring five intellectual virtues 
with four items each: love of knowledge, openness in gathering information, conscientiousness 
in processing information, humility in belief formation, and intellectual courage. The validation 
studies include an exploratory and a confirmatory factor analysis with almost 1,000 participants 
each, demonstrating that the Intellectual Virtue Scale has a stable factor structure and is 
internally reliable. We also demonstrate that intellectual virtue is distinct from related 
constructs such as personality, moral virtue, critical thinking, and professional scepticism. 
In chapter 5, we study the relationship between the Intellectual Virtue Scale and financial 
knowledge and diligent financial decision making. A substantial body of literature suggests 
that people who are more financially literate make better financial decisions. We study the 
intellectual qualities supporting financial literacy. In particular, we investigate whether 
intellectual virtue is associated with greater financial literacy and with a more reflective and 
conscientious approach to financial decision making. We measure the extent to which 
participants in a representative Dutch household panel display intellectual virtue using the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale. We find that intellectually virtuous people are more financially 
  10 
literate, display greater self-awareness about their financial knowledge, and are more likely to 
compare financial advisors. 
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2 Personality Traits and Economic Decisions in 
Rural Kenya 
2.1 Introduction 
Personality affects investment decisions of households, which in turn influence income and 
consumption (Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli 2002; S. Brown and Taylor 2008; S. Brown et al. 
2005; Crook and Hochguertel 2007). In rural areas this often means deciding how and how 
much to invest in farming (Bingen, Serrano, and Howard 2003; Reardon and Vosti 1995; 
Reardon et al. 2000; Rodrik 1991). Aversion to risk may trigger lower investments in risky 
farming projects, even when their expected outcome is very appealing, on average. This 
“investment gap” – or the suboptimal level of investments in agriculture – hinders overall 
economic growth, especially in developing countries. FAO estimates the gap between current 
global investments in agriculture and required annual gross investments to be around 50% of 
the former (FAO 2009). Economic literature identifies several reasons underpinning this gap, 
including financial, physical and human capital bottle-necks. Psychological literature instead 
has a longstanding interest in the role of personality in determining life choices, including 
economic choices (Snyder and Deaux 2012; Almlund et al. 2011; Borghans et al. 2008). Within 
this framework, the Big Five personality traits have shown to be unrelated to life events and 
stable across time (Cobb-Clark and Schurer 2012).  
This study focuses on the role of personality in guiding economic decisions in a developing 
country context. We study the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and 
economic decision making among poor smallholders in rural Kenya. The main contribution of 
this study is to investigate whether and how personality predicts economic decision-making 
concerning risk taking, investment decisions, and the desire and capacity to obtain credit. To 
our knowledge, we conduct the first large scale study of personality of Kenyan smallholders 
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and relate their personality profiles to economic outcomes. We also describe the challenges 
and limitations of applying standard measurement instruments of personality in rural Kenya.  
Prior studies of the role of personality traits for socioeconomic outcomes have been conducted 
almost exclusively in a developed country context (S. Brown and Taylor 2014; Bucciol and 
Zarri 2017; Almlund et al. 2011; Borghans et al. 2008; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos 2012; 
Heineck and Anger 2010; Snyder and Deaux 2012; Mayfield, Perdue, and Wooten 2008). 
While these studies provide ample evidence that personality traits are a powerful predictor of 
socioeconomic outcomes – including leadership abilities, job performance, longevity, and 
college grades – the influence of personality specifically on economic outcomes has hardly 
been studied in developing country contexts. An exception is a private sector initiative using 
measurements of personality to predict creditworthiness in developing countries. A pilot study 
in Peru conducted by one of these initiatives indicates that measures of personality traits may 
be predictive of creditworthiness (EFL 2014). Nonetheless, overall little work has been done 
on the relationship of personality and economic decision making in developing countries. 
But understanding the determinants of investment decisions and risk taking is critical in 
developing countries. For the smallholders in our sample, a wrong decision can force the 
household to go hungry for long stretches of time. By contrast, a lucrative investment may lift 
a household out of poverty. We focus on the influence of personality on risk attitudes, 
investment decisions, and the desire and capacity to take out credit. Our study is based on a 
lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Kenya with smallholders, as well as observational data on 
their farming investments and bank loans. The majority of participants have an income of less 
than $1 per day. More than 90% of the farmers in our sample are women, in line with the 
gender balance in the population for smallholders in Kenya.  
Similar to the literature based on samples from developed countries, we find significant 
associations between personality and economic decision making. But there are important 
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differences concerning which personality traits are associated with economic decisions, and the 
direction of the impact of personality traits on economic decisions.  Prior research has found 
that agreeableness and neuroticism are negatively correlated with risk taking behaviour in risk 
games (Borghans et al. 2009). By contrast, we find a significant positive association between 
agreeableness and risk taking and a significant negative association between intellect and risk 
taking in the risk game we conducted. Importantly, neuroticism makes no significant 
contribution. We also find individuals who are more agreeable and more conscientious invest 
more in farming activities, while extroversion, neuroticism, and intellect are once more not 
significantly correlated. Concerning household debt, prior research on developed countries has 
shown that extroversion is associated with higher debt levels (S. Brown and Taylor 2014). By 
contrast, we find that higher levels of agreeableness are associated with a desire to hold larger 
amounts of debt. This is in some tension with findings from the US according to which 
agreeableness is associated with lower levels of risky financial assets (Bucciol and Zarri 2017). 
We also find that intellect is positively related to the total amount of formal and informal credit 
that people manage to obtain throughout the farming season. 
As we discuss in detail in Appendix 4, measurement challenges in particular for the traits of 
conscientiousness and intellect may account for some of the differences we find with studies 
in developed countries. Note as well that we need to drop a large part of the sample, because it 
turns out that many older and less educated farmers may not have fully grasped the nature of 
the exercise. But our findings concerning the traits of agreeableness, extroversion, and 
neuroticism are not easily explained away by measurement problems, as these subscales pass 
typical psychometric standards. Taken together, our findings challenge the generalizability of 
studies of the impact of personality on economic decision making conducted in developed 
countries. They shed new light on the relationship between personality traits and economic 
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decisions, and contribute to the understanding of how personality shapes investment decisions 
and risk taking in a poor rural context. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the experiment 
we have conducted and describes the farmers. Section 2.3 describes how we measure 
personality and the dependent variables. Section 2.4 presents and discusses regression results. 
Section 2.5 discusses strengths and limitations of the current investigation, and points to 
opportunities for further research.   
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2.2 Context, sample and experiment 
We collected personality data and data about economic decision making from 803 farmers, a 
randomly selected subset of farmers from 40 farmer communities in Meru county, Kenya. 
Table 2.1 shows the demographic characteristics of the sample. Participants have a median 
yearly income from farming of 15,000 Kenyan Shilling (USD 145). Hence the typical farmer 
in our sample lives well below the poverty line of $1/day. In Kenya, 38% of the population live 
below the poverty line (Wiesmann, Kiteme, and Mwangi 2015). It is notable that 91% of our 
sample are female. A typical participant is 45 years old, lives in a household with five members, 
and has seven years of education. Our survey participants are older than the population average 
in Meru. In the general population, only 25% are older than 34. (Katindi Sivi Njonjo 2013) The 
household size is at the upper end of the population average in Meru county, where 42% of 
households have more than 3 members (Katindi Sivi Njonjo 2013). Educational attainment is 
roughly in line with the county average. In our sample, 12% received no formal education at 
all, which is lower than the county average of 21% (Katindi Sivi Njonjo 2013). However, 41% 
of respondents in our sample have less than 7 years of education, the length of primary school 
in Kenya. Less than 10% have completed secondary education, which is less than the county 
average of 18% (Katindi Sivi Njonjo 2013).  
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Age 46.21 45 13.94 15 90 
Household size 5.67 5 1.99 1 15 
Years of Education 6.3 7 3.7 0 16 
Total Land (Acres) 2.57 2 2.47 0 20 
Average Income from Farming/yr (Ksh) 25,007 15,000 33,949 0 350,000 
Maize Production (kg) 212.26 90 455.99 0 6,200 
Sorghum production (kg) 10.15 0 68.7 0 990 
Soy production (kg) 0.42 0 5.44 0 90 
Sunflower production (kg) 1.38 0 9.18 0 100 
Bean production (kg) 57.68 20 112.32 0 1,500 
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Our sample consists of farmers, who represent the bulk of the Kenyan population: In 2006, 
almost 75% of working Kenyans worked as farmers (Library of Congress 2007). The staple 
crop is maize, with a median production of 90 kg in our sample. The second most popular 
produce in our sample is beans, with a median production of 20 kg. Sorghum, Soy, and 
Sunflower are produced by a minority of farmers in comparatively small quantities. This is all 
in line with production in Kenya generally. In addition, other smallholders in Kenya also grow 
bananas, potatoes, and peas.  
2.3 Data  
We gathered data about the economic and financial situation of participants, their risk-
propensity and investment decisions, their expectations of the future, and their personality. The 
present study uses the personality data as an independent variable. The variables collected on 
risk-propensity, investment decisions, and the desire to take out credit as well as the amount of 
credit obtained serve as dependent variables.  
2.3.1 Measuring Personality 
We use a version of the Big Five personality test drawn from the International Personality Item 
Pool to measure the personality of participants (Johnson 2014; Donnellan et al. 2006). Our 
measures capture the personality of participants along five traits: intellect, extroversion, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Donnellan et al. 2006).  
Intellect is a personality trait that ranges from curious to cautious. Intellect should not be 
confused with intelligence. Rather than measuring IQ, intellect measures an intellectual style. 
Intellectual people appreciate art, adventure, new and curious ideas, and are open to a wide 
range of experiences.  
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Extroversion ranges from energetic to reserved. Extroverted people are sociable, assertive, and 
seek stimulation in the company of others. People low on extroversion have more reflective 
and reserved personalities.  
Conscientiousness ranges from organized to careless. Conscientious people are dependable, 
dutiful, and self-disciplined. People low in conscientiousness are highly flexible and 
spontaneous. 
Agreeableness ranges from friendly to detached. Agreeable people are cooperative and 
compassionate, and tend to trust other people. People low in agreeableness tend to be 
competitive and argumentative.  
Neuroticism ranges from sensitive to confident. Neurotic people experience unpleasant 
emotions such as anxiety, anger and vulnerability easily. People low in neuroticism are 
emotionally stable, but can be seen as unconcerned or uninspiring.   
We used a 25-item questionnaire to assess these five major personality traits. The questions are 
listed in Appendix 1. Each of these traits can be broken down into six facets, which can be 
measured individually as well. For instance, the trait of agreeableness breaks down into the 
following six facets: trust, morality, altruism, cooperation, modesty, and sympathy. We do not 
measure all traits at facet level to limit the cognitive load on participants. Focussing on selected 
facets reduces survey fatigue by keeping the survey at a manageable length. We select the 
following facets that may be relevant to economic decision making: adventure, altruism, 
anxiety, assertiveness, caution, dutifulness, excitement seeking, morality, motivation, self-
consciousness, and trust. We map these facets to their respective traits in Appendix 1. 
Excluding facets seems warranted in the light of the hypotheses we are seeking to test. It is 
difficult to see how, for instance, the facet of artistic interest would explain economic or 
financial outcomes. The questions we use to measure the facets are listed in Appendix 1.  
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The items we selected to measure personality traits and facets are from a pool of questions 
which have been shown to be applicable across a wide range of countries and cultural contexts 
(McCrae and Allik 2002). However, no translation of the items into Kimeru, the language of 
the target population, was available. We prepared our own translation in three steps. First, we 
asked a translator whose native language is Kimeru to translate the items from English to 
Kimeru. Second, we asked a different native Kimeru translator to translate the Kimeru items 
back into English. We asked both translators to decide on a common translation based on our 
comments where issues came up in the back translation, which was the case in about a quarter 
of cases. In a third step, we validated problematic items with two native Kimeru speakers, 
which led to another substantial revision of the questionnaire.  
Despite the intercultural success of the items reported in other studies, about 10% of items 
proved very difficult to translate into Kimeru in a way that is meaningful to farmers. For 
instance, the item “I am not interested in abstract ideas” proved problematic. The initial 
translation translated back into English as “I am not interested in ghosts”. It proved very 
difficult to hone in on the concept of “abstract ideas” when we refined the translation into 
Kimeru. Similarly, “I easily get stressed” proved challenging to translate. It was difficult to 
find a translation for “stressed” that situates the feeling in the middle ground between 
“overwhelmed” and simply “working”. 
These two examples illustrate that despite the robust translation process, problems with the 
translation are a possible source of bias in the data. In Appendix 4 we show that some of the 
questions in the personality survey were probably misunderstood by the respondents. Problems 
with the translation are one of the likely sources of these problems. However, the appendix 
also shows that a subsample of the population, in particular younger and better educated people, 
did understand the questions better than older or less educated participants. 
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As discussed in detail in the appendix, some traits and facets fall short of psychometric 
standards for the whole sample. We address these shortcomings by excluding three of the 
eleven facets with unacceptably low internal consistency from the analysis (morality, 
motivation, and self-consciousness). Moreover, we exclude from the analysis all respondents 
who are older than 34, unless they have more than 11 years of formal education. This severe 
restriction of the survey sample is partly motivated by a difference that emerged during the 
data gathering between younger and, for Kenyan standards, older farmers (only 25% of Kenyan 
population is older than 34). Whereas older and less educated farmers struggled to make sense 
of the exercise we put them through, the younger generation was more amenable to personality 
testing. Moreover, as discussed in appendix 4, the psychometric properties of the responses 
from this subgroup are much better than for the sample as a whole. With the exception of the 
three problematic facets mentioned above, the responses to the questionnaire meet 
psychometric standards. As a result, our final sample has 245 responses. As we show in the 
appendix, these respondents are similar to the whole sample with respect to all demographic 
characteristics other than age and educational background. In Appendix 5, we show that our 
qualitative results are quite robust for different specifications of the subsample.   
In what follows, we describe the personality profiles of the final sample. Let us first consider 
the Big Five personality traits. Figure 2.1 shows histograms of the five personality traits as 
measured in our sample. Note that we have scored all traits and facets on a five-point scale, 
consistent with the answer options ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” 
(5).   
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Figure 2.1: Histograms of personality traits. 
 Table 2.2 shows means and standard deviations for the sample and a benchmark. The results 
for the benchmark sample are drawn from the validation study of the items we used to assess 
the Big Five traits. The survey was administered to 2,663 freshman undergraduate students 
across 10 colleges and universities in the United States (Donnellan et al. 2006, 194).  
Table 2.2: Means and standard deviations of personality traits. 
  Sample Benchmark 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Agreeableness 4.31 0.47 4.01 0.69 
Conscientiousness 4.17 0.45 3.42 0.78 
Intellect 4.07 0.45 3.74 0.76 
Extroversion 3.91 0.70 3.28 0.90 
Neuroticism 2.82 0.87 2.62 0.83 
 
Differences between our sample and the benchmark sample are considerable: Agreeableness 
0.74 SD, Conscientiousness 1.75 SD, Intellect, 0.67 SD, Extroversion 0.97 SD, and 
Neuroticism 0.35 SD. For all traits, our sample shows higher means than the benchmark 
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sample. Moreover, for all traits except neuroticism, the standard deviation in our sample is 
considerably smaller than in the benchmark sample. Note that the means have an almost 
identical order in our sample and the benchmark sample, with the exception of the order of 
conscientiousness and intellect, which is reversed. 
A possible explanation for these results is that respondents in our sample were more likely to 
select socially desirable answers. This hypothesis explains why our sample shows higher 
means and lower standard deviations for the socially desirable traits agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, intellect, and extroversion, but a similar mean and standard deviation for 
neuroticism. 
Let us now turn to the facets in our sample. Figure 2.2 shows histograms of the personality 
facets for our sample.  
 
Figure 2.2: Histograms of personality facets 
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Table 2.3 shows means and standard deviations for the personality facets of the sample and a 
benchmark. The benchmark consists of 23,994 participants (8,764 male, 15,229 female) who 
completed an online version of the IPIP personality questionnaire, mainly in the US. The mean 
age in the benchmark is 26.2, with an SD of 10.8 years (Johnson 2005).  
Table 2.3: Means and standard deviations of personality facets for sample and benchmark 
  Sample Benchmark 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Excitement 4.31 0.42 4.08 0.71 
Altruism 4.25 0.37 3.31 0.94 
Dutifulness 4.22 0.40 3.20 1.04 
Assertiveness 4.10 0.56 4.00 0.69 
Adventure 3.88 0.54 3.57 0.91 
Trust 3.68 0.57 3.36 0.91 
Anxiety 3.14 0.68 3.12 0.96 
Caution 1.95 0.47 3.22 0.84 
 
With the exception of caution, mean scores in our sample are considerably higher than in the 
benchmark, as in the case of traits. Altruism and dutifulness show the strongest deviations from 
then benchmark sample, with a difference of more than two standard deviations. For the 
remaining facets, the means in our sample are between 0.1 and 0.7 standard deviations larger 
than in the benchmark sample. Standard deviations are also larger in the benchmark than in our 
sample. For most facets, standard deviations in our sample are between 50% and 80% smaller 
than in the benchmark sample. Dutifulness and altruism are outliers, with SDs that are more 
than 140% larger in the benchmark sample. The irregularities in means and standard deviations 
raises a red flag concerning data quality with dutifulness and altruism, something to watch out 
for when interpreting regression results.  
Caution is a clear outlier. Its low mean score indicates a potential problem with data quality. A 
possible reason is that the items pertaining to caution are all reverse scored. Participants may 
have failed to pick up on the reverse keyed nature of the questions. But this explanation for the 
low mean value of caution needs to grapple with the fact that the facet of adventure is also 
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entirely reverse scored without showing low mean values. Another possible explanation is that 
there is a problem with the translation. This explanation faces the challenge that all four items 
equally contribute to the low mean scores. It does not seem likely that a translation issue affects 
four different items in a row, while affecting far fewer items pertaining to other facets. Still, 
the fact remains that mean values for caution are much lower than values for all other facets, 
and much lower than in the benchmark sample. This suggests that we should be very careful 
in interpreting results from the regression analysis with respect to caution.  
These challenges to data quality should not distract from the observation that the order of means 
is almost identical in our sample and the benchmark sample. To recreate the exact order in the 
benchmark, altruism and dutifulness would need to move two ranks down, and caution needs 
to move one rank up. Since there are 40,320 possible ways in which eight elements can be 
ordered, it is remarkable that the ordering of the eight facts in our sample follows the ordering 
in the benchmark sample closely.  
2.3.2 The Risk Game 
We study the association of personality with the risk propensity of participants elicited by a 
risk game. We hypothesize based on existing literature that agreeableness and neuroticism are 
negatively correlated with risk taking behaviour in risk games (Borghans et al. 2009).  
The setup of the risk game is as follows. Each participant is given 200 Kenyan Shilling ($2). 
Participants are asked to choose how much, if anything, they want to enter into a lottery. The 
outcome of the lottery depends on a coin flip. If participants win, they receive double the 
amount they entered into the lottery. If they lose, they receive half the amount they entered. 
Because the expected return on money entered into the lottery is positive, risk neutral rational 
players would enter the maximum amount of 200 Kenyan Shilling.  
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Given the positive expected return of the risk game, there is an argument to expect that intellect 
will be positively correlated with risk taking in the risk game. The reason is that intellect is 
positively correlated with intelligence (Dohmen et al. 2010). More intelligent participants 
should be more likely to understand the structure of the risk game, including the fact that the 
risk game has positive expected return. We expect that understanding the structure of the game 
should make participants more likely to gamble, holding other things equal. Call this the 
understanding effect of intellect on risk taking.  
But there is also reason to expect a negative association between intellect and risk taking in our 
risk game. People scoring higher on intellect have been shown to be more vulnerable to stress, 
as measured by changes in cortisol levels before and after taking a stress-test (Oswald et al. 
2006). Higher cortisol levels have in turn been shown to lead to higher risk aversion 
(Kandasamy et al. 2014). Thus, there is reason to expect a negative relationship between 
intellect and risk taking in the risk game due to the mediating role of stress. Call this the stress-
effect of intellect on risk taking. It is an empirical question whether the understanding-effect 
or the stress-effect of intellect on risk taking dominate.   
In fact, as Table 2.4 shows, many participants do not enter the lottery at all, and of those who 
do, the vast majority puts less than the maximum amount at risk. We use the proportion of 
money entered into the game as dependent variable to test our hypothesis.  
Table 2.4: Tabulation of amounts entered into the risk game 
Amount Proportion Frequency Percent 
0 0 45 18% 
20 0.1 47 19% 
40 0.2 36 15% 
60 0.3 20 8% 
80 0.4 5 2% 
100 0.5 54 22% 
120 0.6 2 1% 
140 0.7 1 0% 
160 0.8 2 1% 
200 1 33 13% 
Total - 245 100% 
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2.3.3 Investment Decisions 
We study the relationship between personality and investment decisions by using the total 
value of investment for farming that participants made during the season as dependent variable. 
The total value of investment is the sum of the value of the seeds and non-seed inputs. Non-
seed inputs consist of labour, fertilizer, rent for mechanical aids, pesticides and other 
chemicals. In line with previous research, we expect investment volume to be associated with 
higher levels of intellect (Mayfield, Perdue, and Wooten 2008). 
As the summary statistics in Appendix 2 show, the median total investment by farmers is 
11,350 Kenyan Shilling ($100), or two thirds of their annual income from farming. Only about 
5% of the total investment volume concerns seeds, with 95% concerning non-seed investments. 
45% of non-seed investment concerns labour cost for help with planting, weeding, and 
harvesting. 37% of non-seed-investments are spent on fertilizer and other chemicals. Farmers 
spent 18% of non-seed investment on renting mechanical farming aids.  
2.3.4 Credit  
We ask participants about the amount of credit they would like to obtain for this season’s 
farming activities. We expect that more extroverted people will desire more credit, based on 
research on household debt (S. Brown and Taylor 2014). 
The reason to work with desired amounts of credit rather than the volume of credit obtained is 
that farmers in our sample are severely constrained from the supply side, as summary statistics 
in Appendix 2 show. 60% would have wanted to take out more credit than they obtained. The 
mean credit volume farmers in our sample desired to take out was 15,000 K.Sh. ($150). By 
contrast, farmers obtained on average only about one third of the desired sum. Poorly 
functioning credit markets are likely to interfere in the relationship between personality and 
the willingness of respondents to take out credit. As a result, the role of personality in 
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determining credit actually obtained, which we also report, must be the result of a combination 
of personality effects, including desired credit but also capacity to convince lenders to lend. 
2.4 Results 
In this section, we test whether the expectations derived from the literature pertaining to 
developed countries are fulfilled in our developing country context. We focus here on 
personality traits as independent variables. Including personality facets in addition to 
personality traits as independent variables would amount to double counting, because 
personality traits are constituted by personality facets. 
We draw on the existing literature to specify controls (S. Brown and Taylor 2014, 200). We 
control for sex, age, age squared, years of schooling completed, the number of children below 
15 in the household, the total household size, the agricultural income in an average year, a score 
for material assets,1 a score of food insecurity, a measure of the likelihood of crops being 
affected by pest, and the total land farmed.  
2.4.1 Personality and Risk Propensity 
To test whether personality predicts risk propensity, we regress personality traits and facets on 
the share of money invested in the risk game.  In Table 2.5, we first show the results for each 
separate trait (Columns 1-5) and then show all personality traits together in one regression 
(Column 6). Contrary to our expectation, neuroticism and agreeableness are not negatively 
associated with risk taking in the risk game. Instead, intellect and conscientiousness are 
negatively associated with risk taking when taken separately, even though conscientiousness 
turns insignificant in the full regression. Agreeableness in turn becomes significantly positive. 
                                               
1 To measure material assets, we construct a wealth factor score based in the questions in Table 
2.15 in Appendix 2 
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A possible explanation for the negative association of conscientiousness with risk taking is that 
respondents consider it reckless to gamble with money, even if there is a positive expected 
return regardless of the amount invested. This explanation is consistent with the negative 
association of dutifulness, one of the facets of conscientiousness, with the share of money 
invested in the risk game (Appendix 3). The association with gambling is plausible, because 
we know that insurance is often framed as gambling in developing countries (Karlan et al. 
2014). There is no obvious explanation based on the facet analysis for why intellect is 
negatively associated with risk taking in the risk game. Adventure is the one personality facet 
we evaluated that belongs to intellect. As Appendix 3 shows, adventure is positively, if not 
significantly, associated with the share of money invested in the risk game. In the case of 
agreeableness, it is possible that the facets of cooperation and sympathy which we have not 
assessed drive higher investment spending. The significant negative correlation of intellect 
with the share invested is robust to changing the outcome variable to a dummy which is 1 if 
any money has been invested at all, and zero otherwise (Appendix 6). The robust negative 
association between intellect and risk taking in the risk game can be explained by the stress-
effect of intellect on risk taking we discussed in section 3.  
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Table 2.5: Personality traits and share invested in risk game 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Agreeableness 0.012     0.054** 
 (0.019)     (0.024) 
Extroversion  -0.024    -0.012 
  (0.017)    (0.020) 
Neuroticism   0.014   0.004 
   (0.023)   (0.025) 
Intellect    -0.055***  -0.063*** 
    (0.017)  (0.022) 
Conscientiousness     -0.038** -0.025 
     (0.018) (0.024) 
Age 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.010 -0.000 -0.011 0.001 -0.014 0.006 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) 
Years of education -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Number of children -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.010 -0.017 -0.009 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Household size -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.017 -0.015 -0.019 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Food insecurity index 0.056** 0.050* 0.052* 0.046* 0.050* 0.053** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Asset index -0.032 -0.032 -0.030 -0.026 -0.030 -0.026 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Pest likelihood -0.151*** -0.156*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.152*** -0.161*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Total land farmed 0.015* 0.015** 0.015** 0.014* 0.012 0.016** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Average income 0.022* 0.023* 0.023* 0.024* 0.022* 0.022* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.198 0.171 0.166 0.215 0.224 0.296 
 (0.173) (0.172) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.191) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.16 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
2.4.2 Personality and investment decisions 
To test whether personality predicts investment decisions, we regress personality traits and 
facets on the amount of money invested in this farming season on seeds, chemicals, fertilizer, 
mechanization, as well as hired labour during planting, weeding, and harvesting. In other 
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words, we are interested in looking at how much people invest given a certain amount of land, 
or how intensely they invest in their farm. We seem to be able to explain almost 50% of the 
variation in farm investments (R-squared). 
Table 2.6: Regression of personality traits on farm investments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Agreeableness 1768.8**     2532.5*** 
 (728.7)     (907.0) 
Extroversion  -34.5    -208.3 
  (534.2)    (555.7) 
Neuroticism   -581.4   -448.6 
   (600.5)   (505.5) 
Intellect    444.9  439.6 
    (655.1)  (867.5) 
Conscientiousness     -1332.3* -2593.3** 
     (786.0) (1076.3) 
Age 870.5*** 955.7** 936.3** 968.3*** 912.5** 758.9** 
 (314.3) (355.2) (350.4) (355.2) (368.3) (309.3) 
Age2 -13.1*** -14.0*** -13.7*** -14.2*** -13.1*** -11.2*** 
 (4.2) (4.6) (4.6) (4.6) (4.7) (3.8) 
Male 5343.5* 5324.8 5349.9 5223.5 5174.4 5122.2 
 (3105.7) (3377.6) (3402.5) (3370.1) (3481.1) (3148.6) 
Years of education 110.4 64.3 45.7 69.6 -6.1 -22.4 
 (186.4) (183.5) (183.4) (183.6) (184.3) (184.3) 
Number of children -191.0 -207.6 -226.0 -252.6 -250.1 -314.5 
 (516.9) (513.8) (504.8) (513.3) (519.3) (502.4) 
Household size -399.9 -370.1 -357.5 -346.3 -385.7 -411.7 
 (292.8) (307.7) (308.2) (302.4) (310.7) (292.9) 
Food insecurity index 2018.0** 1582.5* 1640.4* 1646.6* 1467.2* 2038.0** 
 (930.3) (905.6) (890.6) (903.9) (847.6) (908.6) 
Asset index 2979.2*** 3035.3*** 2979.3*** 2994.5*** 3082.7*** 2954.5*** 
 (1006.1) (1015.2) (1002.3) (1025.0) (977.3) (938.1) 
Pest likelihood 505.0 806.6 704.8 799.7 686.9 -54.2 
 (1445.0) (1435.2) (1472.4) (1459.3) (1439.4) (1301.2) 
Total land farmed 2624.7*** 2535.0*** 2513.0*** 2535.3*** 2462.5*** 2515.9*** 
 (556.2) (620.0) (623.2) (611.4) (606.0) (535.4) 
Average income 1133.9*** 1200.5*** 1173.1*** 1190.3*** 1188.2*** 1055.0** 
 (402.7) (424.9) (426.1) (419.3) (430.6) (393.4) 
Constant -10499.8* -12560.3** -11829.5* -12797.3** -11147.2* -6718.1 
 (5330.2) (6206.9) (6123.1) (6208.9) (6324.2) (5134.5) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.51 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Agreeableness is positively, and conscientiousness is negatively, associated with the value of 
investments. The first is significant at the 1% level, in the full model including all traits. This 
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result is contrary to expectations based on results from developed countries. Based on the 
literature, we expected people scoring higher on intellect to invest more. While the coefficient 
of intellect is positive, it is not significant. The facet analysis in Appendix 3 does not suggest 
an explanation for the results pertaining to intellect or conscientiousness. However, two facets 
pertaining to agreeableness are related to farm investments. Altruism is significantly positively 
related, while trust is significantly negatively related. The effects are of roughly equal size. 
This suggests that the facets of cooperation and sympathy which we have not assessed drive 
higher investment spending. In the case of conscientiousness, the facets of self-efficacy and 
self-discipline which we have not assessed may conceivably explain the negative association 
with the value of investment.  
2.4.3 Personality and credit 
To test whether personality predicts desire to take out credit, we regress personality traits and 
facets on the amount of credit participants wanted to take out.  
We find a positive association between agreeableness and the desire to take out more credit, 
significant at a 5% level. Based on the literature, we expected in contrast that more extroverted 
people would desire more credit. Extroversion has a positive sign as expected, but is not 
significant. The facet analysis in Appendix 3 shows that the analysed facets pertaining to 
agreeableness do not explain the result. This raises the possibility that omitted facets such as 
cooperation and sympathy determine the result. 
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Table 2.7: Regression of personality traits on amount of desired credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Agreeableness 1753.4*     2112.1** 
 (956.9)     (1021.9) 
Extroversion  720.2    370.0 
  (798.0)    (947.3) 
Neuroticism   95.0   480.6 
   (752.5)   (745.5) 
Intellect    200.8  -792.8 
    (960.9)  (989.6) 
Conscientiousness     434.2 -108.2 
     (841.3) (1028.3) 
Age -949.2 -890.7 -862.9 -859.6 -852.1 -991.9 
 (843.0) (846.4) (837.6) (868.1) (851.6) (820.6) 
Age2 11.2 10.7 10.4 10.3 10.1 11.8 
 (10.8) (10.8) (10.7) (11.1) (10.9) (10.6) 
Male 5244.9* 4917.2 5205.9 5173.0 5256.7 5211.7 
 (3018.8) (3140.8) (3131.0) (3125.4) (3155.0) (3138.3) 
Years of education 816.8** 785.6** 774.9* 773.9** 794.9** 834.9** 
 (379.1) (373.5) (384.3) (373.9) (375.9) (400.2) 
Number of children 395.0 355.9 380.3 357.7 391.0 476.7 
 (1107.2) (1115.8) (1112.6) (1128.5) (1099.9) (1164.5) 
Household size 86.8 119.7 114.6 127.2 121.7 28.8 
 (440.8) (449.6) (438.8) (427.9) (443.2) (430.3) 
Food insecurity index 498.9 177.8 63.6 98.8 111.4 481.8 
 (1086.1) (1093.2) (1129.0) (1098.0) (1101.2) (1100.0) 
Asset index 1331.1 1406.5 1396.9 1368.8 1372.4 1454.4 
 (1258.9) (1265.7) (1281.0) (1297.1) (1271.8) (1264.0) 
Pest likelihood 597.7 1133.9 925.9 899.5 950.1 764.9 
 (1696.6) (1719.7) (1716.0) (1738.9) (1733.1) (1671.9) 
Total land farmed 1659.6** 1548.7** 1573.1** 1570.3** 1593.0** 1676.4** 
 (656.6) (686.2) (696.4) (691.8) (698.5) (666.1) 
Average income 350.6 405.9 420.6 411.8 420.0 370.5 
 (421.0) (457.5) (466.4) (453.4) (452.3) (442.2) 
Constant 16734.0 15095.8 14593.3 14594.4 14255.3 17326.1 
 (13301.2) (13217.7) (12971.5) (13688.2) (13426.2) (12662.8) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Finally, we look at the amount of credit actually obtained (Table 2.8). In this case, we find that 
intellect is the sole driver of the amount of credit obtained from formal and informal sources. 
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Table 2.8: Regression of personality traits on amount of credit obtained 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Agreeableness 742.1     -161.6 
 (599.6)     (631.2) 
Extroversion  552.6    -122.3 
  (814.3)    (864.0) 
Neuroticism   345.5   941.0 
   (925.0)   (922.6) 
Intellect    2130.9*  2216.3** 
    (1082.9)  (1086.8) 
Conscientiousness     1278.4 561.0 
     (760.4) (740.0) 
Age 167.3 183.5 213.4 268.5 242.9 330.3 
 (409.5) (409.9) (401.5) (419.9) (409.8) (398.0) 
Age2 -0.9 -1.0 -1.4 -2.2 -2.1 -3.1 
 (5.5) (5.5) (5.4) (5.7) (5.4) (5.4) 
Male 5696.2 5456.0 5659.1 5265.2 5813.1 5289.4 
 (4097.8) (3972.6) (4028.8) (3988.7) (4051.6) (4009.5) 
Years of education 526.4 518.0 518.8* 529.8 575.5* 585.2* 
 (316.3) (317.0) (303.5) (335.9) (316.6) (334.9) 
Number of children -1135.8 -1159.8 -1132.9 -1353.4 -1103.4 -1314.3 
 (868.6) (864.3) (885.9) (918.8) (879.3) (928.8) 
Household size 119.3 134.3 124.6 244.9 147.1 238.2 
 (512.7) (526.8) (527.9) (557.1) (529.6) (565.3) 
Food insecurity index 2982.7** 2883.1** 2770.7** 3084.8** 2917.6** 3004.0** 
 (1185.9) (1185.5) (1128.2) (1165.5) (1157.2) (1198.1) 
Asset index 1023.1 1061.6 1080.8 847.3 1002.4 913.7 
 (1206.6) (1205.9) (1176.0) (1206.7) (1195.7) (1181.4) 
Pest likelihood 1971.5 2276.3 2169.6 2017.4 2228.0 2241.5 
 (1520.9) (1421.3) (1568.8) (1473.9) (1489.7) (1477.8) 
Total land farmed -716.1 -770.3 -741.7 -747.6 -685.6 -688.0 
 (489.9) (476.7) (474.8) (474.6) (468.1) (478.3) 
Average income 881.3** 901.2** 925.0** 862.5* 920.4** 917.0* 
 (428.9) (431.9) (440.0) (452.8) (439.3) (474.2) 
Constant -6294.9 -6855.5 -7575.1 -8375.4 -8489.9 -10416.7 
 (8671.3) (8752.3) (8593.3) (9066.2) (8786.6) (8587.4) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.15 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
We study whether and how personality influences economic decision making in a developing 
country. Our main contribution is to show that results from developed countries may not hold 
in developing countries. Based on experiments in developed countries, we formed hypotheses 
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concerning the relationships between personality traits and economic decision making. None 
of our expectations have been supported by the data. Instead, we found unexpected significant 
associations between personality traits and economic decision making. In particular, we found 
an unanticipated negative association between intellect and conscientiousness with risk taking 
in the risk game; a large positive association between agreeableness and the volume of 
investment as well as the desire to take out credit; and a large negative association between 
conscientiousness and investment. 
There are a number of different possible explanations for these results. We cannot rule out that 
we fail to find some of the expected associations because of issues with data quality. The 
validity of most personality traits and facets we measured is low for the greater part of 
participants. This led us to the exclusion of some facets from the analysis and the restriction of 
our final sample to a subgroup of farmers for which validity measures pass critical thresholds. 
Whether data quality even in this subsample obscures results can only be explored in further 
research. Issues with data quality notwithstanding, we find highly statistically significant and 
unexpected relationships between personality and economic decision making.  
A possible explanation for why we see different personality traits at play in our study than in 
studies reviewed from developed countries is that the superficial similarity between the 
respective economic decisions in developed and developing countries masks important 
differences. Differences may be of one of two kinds: on the one hand, the benchmark studies 
we considered from developed countries may tap into a different aspect of the economic 
decision we are considering. For instance, differences in the way risk games are set up may 
well activate different personality traits. Another example are investment decisions. The 
investment decisions our benchmark studies consider are rather different from the farming 
decisions farmers in our study need to make.  
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On the other hand, differences can arise in the significance or meaning of the same economic 
decision if placed in a different context. Consider for instance the risk game. In developed 
countries, participation in the risk game will likely be framed by participants as a trade-off 
between risk and reward. By contrast, some participants in our study may well have framed the 
risk game as involving a moral issue. The negative association with conscientiousness is not 
surprising in a culture in which investing money in the risk game is framed as gambling. 
It should be noted that our study design does not preclude reverse causality: perhaps economic 
decisions influence personality, rather than the other way around. One reason to expect a causal 
impact of personality on economic investment decisions is that such a link has been established 
in numerous other studies that addressed reverse causality (Almund et al. 2011). While 
personality can be changed by experience and investment, other studies find the main direction 
of causation to run from personality to economic outcomes (Borghans et al. 2008). Big-Five 
personality traits are found to be stable for working-age adults over a four-decade period. 
Generally, intra-individual differences are unrelated to adverse life events and are not 
economically meaningful (Cobb-Clark and Schurer 2012). 
The main implication for policy making we draw from our results is that personality traits 
matter in economic decision making, but we should not take the relationships observed in 
developed countries for granted in a developing country context. 
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Appendix 1 Survey Questions 
Table 2.9: Survey Questions for the general Big Five trait assessment 
Code Item Key Trait 
A1 I sympathize with others’ feelings. + Agreeableness 
A2 I suffer from others’ sorrows. + Agreeableness 
A3 I am not interested in other people’s problems. - Agreeableness 
A4 I am not really interested in others. - Agreeableness 
C1 I start tasks right away. + Conscientiousness 
C2 I like order. + Conscientiousness 
C3 I often forget to put things back in their proper place. - Conscientiousness 
C4 I make a mess of things. - Conscientiousness 
C5 I neglect my duties - Conscientiousness 
E1 I am the life of the party. + Extroversion 
E2 I talk to a lot of different people at parties. + Extroversion 
E3 I don't talk a lot. - Extroversion 
E4 I keep in the background. - Extroversion 
I1 I have a vivid imagination. + Intellect 
I2 I'm full of ideas + Intellect 
I3 I am quick to understand things. + Intellect 
I4 I am not interested in theoretical discussions. - Intellect 
I5 I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. - Intellect 
I6 I've difficulty imagining things - Intellect 
I7 I do not have a good imagination. - Intellect 
I8 I am not interested in abstract ideas. - Intellect 
N1 I have frequent mood swings. + Neuroticism 
N2 I get upset easily. + Neuroticism 
N3 I am relaxed most of the time. - Neuroticism 
N4 I seldom feel blue. - Neuroticism 
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Table 2.11: Survey Questions Facet Assessment 
Code Item Key Facet 
Ad1 I prefer to stick with things that I know. - Adventurousness 
Ad2 I dislike changes. - Adventurousness 
Ad3 I don’t like the idea of change. - Adventurousness 
Ad4 I am attached to conventional ways. - Adventurousness 
Al1 I make people feel welcome. + Altruism 
Al2 I love to help others. + Altruism 
Al3 I am concerned about others. + Altruism 
Al4 I turn my back on others. - Altruism 
An1 I worry about things. + Anxiety 
An2 I fear for the worst. + Anxiety 
An3 I am afraid of many things. + Anxiety 
An4 I get stressed out easily. + Anxiety 
As1 I take charge. + Assertiveness 
As2 I try to lead others. + Assertiveness 
As3 I take control of things. + Assertiveness 
As4 I wait for others to lead the way. - Assertiveness 
Cau1 I jump into things without thinking. - Cautiousness 
Cau2 I make rash decisions. - Cautiousness 
Cau3 I rush into things. - Cautiousness 
Cau4 I act without thinking. - Cautiousness 
Du1 I keep my promises. + Dutifulness 
Du2 I tell the truth. + Dutifulness 
Du3 I break my promises. - Dutifulness 
Du4 I get others to do my duties. - Dutifulness 
Ex1 I love excitement. + Excitement-seeking 
Ex2 I seek adventure. + Excitement-seeking 
Ex3 I love action. + Excitement-seeking 
Ex4 I enjoy being reckless. + Excitement-seeking 
Mor1 I use flattery to get ahead. - Morality 
Mor2 I know how to get around the rules. - Morality 
Mor3 I cheat to get ahead. - Morality 
Mor4 I take advantage of others. - Morality 
Mot1 I work hard. + Motivation 
Mot2 I do more than what’s expected of me. + Motivation 
Mot3 I set high standards for myself and others. + Motivation 
Mot4 I am not highly motivated to succeed. - Motivation 
S1 I find it difficult to approach others. + Self-Consciousness 
S2 I am easily intimidated. + Self-Consciousness 
S3 I am not embarrassed easily. - Self-Consciousness 
S4 I am able to stand up for myself. - Self-Consciousness 
T1 I trust others. + Trust 
T2 I believe that others have good intentions. + Trust 
T3 I trust what people say. + Trust 
T4 I distrust people. - Trust 
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Appendix 2 Summary statistics  
Table 2.12: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max 
Traits           
Agreeableness  4.31   0.47   4.00   3.00   5.00  
Extroversion  3.91   0.70   4.00   1.50   5.00  
Neuroticism  2.82   0.87   3.00   1.00   5.00  
Intellect  4.07   0.45   4.00   2.67   5.00  
Conscientiousness  4.17   0.45   4.00   2.50   5.00  
Facets           
Altruism  4.25   0.37   4.00   3.33   5.00  
Trust  3.68   0.57   3.67   1.33   5.00  
Caution  1.95   0.47   2.00   1.00   4.00  
Dutifulness  4.22   0.40   4.00   3.00   5.00  
Assertiveness  4.10   0.56   4.00   2.00   5.00  
Excitement-
Seeking  4.31   0.42   4.00   3.00   5.00  
Adventure  3.88   0.54   4.00   2.00   5.00  
Anxiety  3.14   0.68   3.33   1.33   5.00  
Dependent 
Variables           
Share Invested 0.34 0.32 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Total Investment 13,906.07 11,821.08 11,350.00 0.00 88,000.00 
Credit Desired 14,057.14 12,758.11 10,000.00 0.00 100,000.00 
Credit Obtained 5,904.16 12,932.50 0.00 0.00 80,000.00 
Controls           
Age  33.64   9.94   32.00   15.00   70.00  
Male  0.08   0.27  0.00 0.00  1.00  
Education  9.15   3.20   8.00  0.00  16.00  
Children   1.75   1.18   2.00  0.00  7.00  
Household Size 5.31 1.68 2.00 0.00 1.00 
Asset Index  0.01   0.85  -0.23 -0.99  2.34  
Food Insecurity 
Index -0.14 0.77 -0.09 -1.44 2.24 
Average Income 284.02 429.08 150.00 0.00 3,500.00 
Pest Likelihood 0.67 0.47 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Farmland (acres)  2.38   2.33   1.50  0.00  15.00  
 
Table 2.13: Correlation between traits 
  Ag Ex Ne In Co 
Agreeableness 1         
Extroversion 0.3453 1       
Neuroticism -0.2309 -0.1499 1     
Intellect 0.4554 0.3553 -0.2518 1   
Conscientiousness 0.3877 0.3646 -0.1613 0.4716 1 
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Table 2.14: Correlation between facets 
  Al Tr Cau Du Ass Ex Ad An 
Altruism 1               
Trust 0.3575 1             
Caution -0.3926 -0.0831 1           
Dutifulness 0.629 0.3547 -0.3887 1         
Assertiveness 0.5823 0.3557 -0.2922 0.4645 1       
Excitement-Seeking 0.593 0.1935 -0.3194 0.4577 0.4189 1     
Adventure 0.2553 0.2266 0.0137 0.2033 0.216 0.3454 1   
Anxiety -0.0491 0.0017 0.3092 -0.0938 -0.0613 -0.0805 0.06 1 
 
Table 2.15: Scoring coefficients for the asset factor score 
Variable Scoring coefficient Description 
wheelbarrow  0.25 Is there a wheelbarrow on the farm? 
pipe  0.23 Does the farm have a hose pipe? 
floor    0.22 Is there flooring in the house on the farm? 
water  0.20 Is the farm attached to the water grid? 
tank  0.15 Does the farm have a rain water reservoir/tank? 
electricity  0.14 Is the farm attached to the electricity grid? 
sprayer  0.13 Does the farm have a knapsack sprayer? 
solar 0.08 Does the farm have a solar panel? 
car  0.07 Is there a car/motorbike/truck/matatu on the farm? 
plough  0.07 Is there a plough on the farm? 
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Appendix 3 Regression Results Personality Facets 
Table 2.16: Regression of personality facets on share invested in risk game 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Agreeableness Extroversion Neuroticism Intellect Conscientiousness All traits 
Altruism -0.025     0.006 
 (0.019)     (0.030) 
Trust -0.010     -0.001 
 (0.017)     (0.020) 
Assertiveness  -0.005    0.018 
  (0.022)    (0.025) 
Excitement  -0.016    -0.002 
  (0.022)    (0.023) 
Anxiety   0.006   0.005 
   (0.017)   (0.019) 
Adventure    0.017  0.032 
    (0.024)  (0.026) 
Caution     -0.025 -0.028 
     (0.020) (0.023) 
Dutifulness     -0.085*** -0.104** 
     (0.028) (0.040) 
Age 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.006  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.011 -0.016 -0.005 -0.009 -0.017 -0.016  
(0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074) (0.073) (0.076) 
Years of education -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.002  
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Number of 
children -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.019 -0.023  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Household size -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.021 -0.021  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Food insecurity 
index 0.047
* 0.050* 0.053** 0.055** 0.046* 0.049* 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Asset index -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.032 -0.029 -0.030*  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) 
Pest likelihood -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.149*** -0.142*** -0.152*** -0.137**  
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) 
Total land farmed 0.014* 0.015* 0.014* 0.015* 0.016** 0.017**  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Average income 0.023* 0.023* 0.023* 0.022* 0.022* 0.021*  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.197 0.174 0.190 0.198 0.272 0.349* 
 (0.180) (0.175) (0.173) (0.179) (0.192) (0.205) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.17 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2.17: Regression of personality facets on investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Agreeableness Extroversion Neuroticism Intellect Conscientiousness All traits 
Altruism 1314.168*     371.409 
 (711.182)     (971.827) 
Trust -1439.098**     -1408.933*** 
 (541.236)     (488.047) 
Assertiveness  -554.932    -640.465 
  (520.942)    (455.346) 
Excitement  1261.986*    871.101 
  (652.472)    (645.967) 
Anxiety   690.910   1088.324* 
   (583.730)   (598.147) 
Adventure    -239.032  -451.693 
    (401.392)  (404.612) 
Caution     -709.039 -787.610 
     (645.590) (737.134) 
Dutifulness     768.858 1171.805 
     (624.450) (811.776) 
Age 1014.939*** 996.857*** 919.324** 970.649*** 1003.901*** 1088.884***  
(352.668) (345.845) (379.324) (352.542) (338.447) (362.972) 
Age2 -14.714*** -14.466*** -13.546*** -14.147*** -14.607*** -15.670***  
(4.575) (4.508) (4.867) (4.580) (4.456) (4.636) 
Male 5653.734* 5898.756* 5824.085* 5298.684 5304.886 6781.420*  
(3315.527) (3478.163) (3330.677) (3399.719) (3418.837) (3425.189) 
Years of 
education 6.648 65.193 91.238 54.030 68.830 22.970  
(176.800) (168.656) (187.686) (185.426) (178.348) (166.983) 
Number of 
children -158.699 -267.363 -166.028 -192.232 -188.013 -32.050  
(542.592) (514.032) (548.373) (518.735) (506.261) (565.492) 
Household size -360.581 -403.527 -410.997 -372.337 -329.101 -425.485  
(281.519) (292.284) (320.152) (306.644) (292.223) (292.626) 
Food insecurity 
index 1785.369
** 1718.650* 1564.058* 1565.635* 1764.228* 1809.416** 
 
(835.344) (909.196) (891.869) (881.785) (890.903) (867.387) 
Asset index 3109.880*** 3044.286*** 3148.183*** 3050.150*** 2952.530*** 3236.740***  
(1040.452) (1005.750) (1040.302) (1000.799) (996.126) (1043.688) 
Pest likelihood 511.363 1055.350 790.718 729.031 588.542 121.679  
(1402.316) (1456.371) (1501.989) (1454.451) (1467.283) (1525.355) 
Total land 
farmed 2569.007
*** 2564.488*** 2526.522*** 2532.785*** 2506.498*** 2528.220*** 
 
(603.384) (594.730) (616.880) (616.224) (604.656) (601.921) 
Average 
income 1217.567
*** 1197.542*** 1189.968*** 1206.536*** 1226.005*** 1245.943*** 
 
(393.101) (426.829) (413.021) (423.855) (428.835) (385.857) 
Constant -13263.330** -13197.504** -11845.234* -12746.511** -13700.401** -14510.381** 
 (6036.527) (6051.016) (6796.960) (6182.728) (5657.965) (6263.736) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.48 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2.18: Regression of personality facets on amount of desired credit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Agreeableness Extroversion Neuroticism Intellect Conscientiousness All traits 
Altruism 371.522     -953.164 
 (1105.466)     (1196.767) 
Trust -681.621     -1147.785 
 (656.678)     (728.359) 
Assertiveness  1284.576    2022.420* 
  (813.441)    (1129.904) 
Excitement  -28.372    202.056 
  (1035.881)    (920.162) 
Anxiety   -9.506   -106.152 
   (690.808)   (679.166) 
Adventure    629.132  559.659 
    (896.610)  (834.487) 
Caution     545.961 759.322 
     (956.557) (1071.621) 
Dutifulness     669.407 677.504 
     (983.585) (1052.808) 
Age -841.790 -981.177 -865.352 -908.240 -865.388 -1076.541  
(848.732) (875.252) (858.659) (862.964) (873.965) (915.889) 
Age2 10.128 11.696 10.415 10.940 10.349 12.795  
(10.814) (10.962) (10.925) (10.952) (11.050) (11.284) 
Male 5348.022 5068.835 5205.252 5243.722 5297.844 5201.814  
(3224.258) (3226.660) (3286.985) (3192.681) (3156.748) (3585.341) 
Years of 
education 740.497
** 791.464** 771.375** 800.433** 796.550** 779.460** 
 
(365.635) (389.983) (368.385) (368.206) (380.538) (374.683) 
Number of 
children 406.961 311.862 376.905 334.222 410.494 334.122  
(1125.841) (1119.853) (1090.890) (1132.232) (1124.697) (1179.129) 
Household size 114.382 196.690 117.156 122.977 175.266 272.968  
(435.887) (465.598) (436.166) (450.325) (434.150) (438.050) 
Food insecurity 
index 114.030 213.376 72.527 130.028 88.642 123.910  
(1081.017) (1078.620) (1141.123) (1108.034) (1107.920) (1123.401) 
Asset index 1428.121 1355.516 1386.057 1350.818 1396.246 1412.806  
(1287.469) (1265.832) (1259.884) (1273.065) (1292.766) (1268.538) 
Pest likelihood 754.447 1166.242 907.873 1140.357 1029.195 1466.927  
(1720.553) (1624.492) (1757.640) (1591.902) (1699.025) (1625.092) 
Total land 
farmed 1581.399
** 1521.461** 1569.791** 1572.842** 1557.547** 1478.457** 
 
(696.212) (693.635) (688.920) (693.496) (688.260) (702.123) 
Average 
income 423.856 403.010 416.297 399.036 414.860 383.731  
(443.851) (448.290) (457.486) (444.595) (454.120) (417.939) 
Constant 14504.759 16521.077 14700.185 15248.464 14139.764 17974.739 
 (13549.854) (13638.681) (13625.524) (13516.502) (13612.113) (14565.309) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2.19: Regression of personality facets on amount of desired credit obtained 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Agreeableness Extroversion Neuroticism Intellect Conscientiousness All traits 
Altruism 1066.443     -437.677 
 (889.154)     (831.000) 
Trust 1005.105     1198.309* 
 (630.579)     (695.143) 
Assertiveness  1021.459    725.339 
  (731.892)    (600.393) 
Excitement  1503.018*    1663.861* 
  (791.450)    (870.492) 
Anxiety   895.708   1636.549** 
   (669.986)   (752.955) 
Adventure    405.622  -242.539 
    (1014.753)  (907.057) 
Caution     -2000.336** -2251.706** 
     (779.586) (850.509) 
Dutifulness     315.534 -1045.683 
     (945.745) (1082.320) 
Age 196.454 101.678 156.907 175.220 285.312 72.362  
(417.237) (398.470) (403.541) (447.640) (457.024) (430.875) 
Age2 -1.255 -0.186 -0.718 -0.907 -2.248 0.245  
(5.577) (5.341) (5.426) (5.954) (6.045) (5.861) 
Male 5654.784 6210.605 6348.075 5702.652 5547.048 7054.786*  
(3982.544) (4114.458) (3937.855) (4003.242) (4050.364) (4044.438) 
Years of 
education 576.793
* 533.752* 541.447* 525.846 477.471 575.060 
 
(338.121) (313.462) (300.528) (321.134) (329.054) (364.177) 
Number of 
children -1223.956 -1301.632 -1087.906 -1171.087 -1156.776 -1305.957  
(864.734) (894.742) (862.882) (892.219) (864.924) (791.386) 
Household 
size 177.830 196.835 78.673 136.055 114.676 -31.205  




3073.954** 3148.787** 2771.587** 2839.394** 3076.405** 3172.344** 
 
(1207.717) (1208.420) (1124.779) (1161.883) (1189.783) (1220.880) 
Asset index 951.175 1014.505 1192.243 1023.321 892.988 1113.141  
(1240.985) (1200.491) (1175.984) (1187.769) (1193.132) (1212.629) 
Pest likelihood 2380.154 2735.159* 2067.903 2252.752 1536.931 2265.336  
(1450.080) (1574.956) (1563.245) (1518.610) (1476.204) (1680.087) 
Total land 
farmed -740.074 -780.730 -763.859 -752.153 -782.788 -798.918
* 
 
(463.278) (473.051) (464.782) (470.591) (492.142) (448.233) 
Average 
income 901.601
** 888.613** 895.996** 898.001** 954.840** 891.177** 
 
(424.204) (432.142) (432.913) (443.492) (436.330) (432.357) 
Constant -7728.951 -5556.602 -6248.617 -6804.394 -8271.802 -3910.233 
 (8909.884) (8591.037) (8665.094) (9191.434) (9562.968) (8838.125) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.18 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 4 Discussion of Personality Data 
A close look at the psychometric properties of the personality data for the whole sample reveals 
problems with data quality. From experiences in developed countries, one would expect factor 
analysis of the 25 questions measuring the Big Five traits to replicate the five-factor structure, 
with items belonging to the same trait loading on the same factor. Note that the factor analysis 
is confirmatory in nature – we seek to confirm a five-factor structure based on prior validation 
studies for the instrument, with items associated with each trait clustering on the appropriate 
factors. Moreover, both trait and facet subscales should have high internal consistency, with 
Cronbach’s alpha typically greater than 0.70 (Maples et al. 2014). As we’ll see in the following 
tables, the data for the whole sample does not measure up to this standard. We address these 
problems in two ways. First, we exclude certain facets from the analysis that do not pass 
minimal standards for psychometric adequacy. Second, we restrict the sample to respondents 
aged 34 or younger, or respondents with more than eleven years of formal education. 
Comparing the psychometric properties of personality traits of the whole sample with this 
subgroup reveals that data quality is higher for the subgroup and passes critical thresholds. This 
section explains our decisions in depth.  
Personality Traits 
First, we analyse the 25 items assessing the five personality traits: agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, intellect, and neuroticism. Table 2.20 shows the result of a 
confirmatory factor analysis for all items. We impose the extraction of five factors, as 
suggested by the model. Without this constraint, parallel analysis suggests the extraction of 
eleven factors. We have used an oblique oblimin factor rotation method, to allow for correlation 
between factors, as is standard in the literature (DeVellis 2016).  
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Table 2.20: Factor analysis Big Five traits all items  
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A1 0.65         
A2 0.67         
A3   0.48       
A4   0.36     -0.39 
C1 0.28 -0.26       
C2 0.51         
C3       0.35   
C4       0.49   
C5       0.32   
E1 0.25 -0.31       
E2 0.29 -0.24       
E3           
E4         0.24 
I1     0.54     
I2 0.34 -0.23       
I3   -0.33       
I4         0.59 
I5         0.52 
I6     0.62     
I7   -0.22 -0.44     
I8         0.64 
N1       -0.44   
N2       -0.45   
N3 -0.23 0.31       
N4 -0.21 0.29       
 Blanks represent abs(loading)<.2 
The results in Table 2.20 show an almost erratic factor structure. Items load positively on 
several factors, and items belonging to a common trait load on various factors.  
What is striking is that the analysis does not show negative loadings for the negatively keyed 
items, whose scoring we have not reversed here. As Table 2.9 shows, except for intellect, the 
first two items pertaining to each trait are positively keyed, the others negatively; in the case 
of intellect, the first three items are positively keyed. This suggests removing the negatively 
keyed items from the analysis, to test the hypothesis that these items have caused confusion.  
Table 2.21 shows the results of a factor analysis focussing exclusively on the positively keyed 
items, again using an oblique oblimin rotation. This time, parallel analysis suggests a five-
factor solution. 
  45 
Table 2.21: Factor analysis big Five traits all positively keyed items 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A1 0.63     
A2 0.62     
C1  0.24    
C2 0.50     
E1  0.44    
E2  0.51    
I1      
I2      
I3  0.43    
N1     0.41 
N2     0.37 
Blanks represent abs(loading)<.2 
The results from this factor analysis are already more in line with expectations for three traits: 
agreeableness, extroversion, and neuroticism. However, none of the items cluster on factors 
three and four, and items pertaining to conscientiousness and intellect cluster on the wrong 
factor.  
There are three potential reasons explaining the remaining problems with the factor analysis. 
First, the instrument we used might be faulty, i.e., the items we use may not tap into their 
respective personality traits. Given the extensive research on the item pool we draw on, it is 
reasonable to assume that the items are at least valid in a developed country context. But 
perhaps the items are unsuitable to a developing country context. Second, the translation we 
made may have obscured the item’s meanings. Third, participants may have misunderstood 
the nature of the test or for other reasons not have provided answers to the items reflecting their 
personality. 
Insofar as instrument and translation error are at play, one would expect problems with the 
factor structure to persist among subgroups in the sample. By contrast, insofar as a lack of 
familiarity with personality tests or understanding of the questions is at issue, one would expect 
problems with the factor structure to diminish in better educated and younger participants, who 
are more likely to be familiar and at ease with personality tests.  
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To test which kind of error is at play, we singled out a subsample that we suspect to be 
particularly likely to grasp the personality test. The subsample is composed of all participants 
below the age of 35 (N=167), and of participants above the age of 35 if they have more than 
10 years of education (N=78). 
Limiting the analysis to the subsample improves the factor structure of the traits once again, as 
shown in Table 2.22. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.81, a 
meritorious value (Kaiser 1974). The main remaining issue is that two of the items pertaining 
to intellect load on factor 2, the factor associated with conscientiousness.  
Table 2.22: Factor analysis big Five traits all positively keyed items for subsample  
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
A1 0.64     
A2 0.67     
C1  0.52    
C2 0.33 0.31    
E1   0.50   
E2   0.46   
I1    0.37  
I2  0.23    
I3  0.44    
N1     0.43 
N2     0.37 
Blanks represent abs(loading)<.2 
Table 2.23 shows that the subsample is similar to the overall sample in terms of their median 
household size, the size of their farm land, and the size of their production of maize and beans 
(cp. Table 2.1). There is only a very small gender effect: 92% of respondents are female (91% 
in whole sample). 
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Table 2.23: Descriptive statistics for subsample with age below 35 or more than 10 years of 
schooling  
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Age 33.6 32.0 9.9 15 70 
Household size 5.3 5.0 1.7 2 15 
Years of Education 9.2 8.0 3.2 0 16 
Total Land (Acres) 2.4 1.5 2.3 0 15 
Average Income from Farming/yr (K. Sh) 28,402 15,000 42,908.5 0 350,000 
Maize production (kg) 210 90 324.7 0 2,000 
Sorghum production (kg) 14 0 76.3 0 800 
Soy production (kg) 1 0 9.6 0 90 
Sunflower production (kg) 2 0 9.3 0 90 
Bean production (kg) 69 20 121.6 0 900 
Observations: 245           
 
Table 2.24 shows Cronbach’s alphas and the average inter-item correlations for the five 
personality traits, both for the full sample and for the subsample. Alphas below 0.6 are usually 
deemed insufficient in psychometric research (DeVellis 2016). Only the agreeableness items 
meet this threshold. However, we should note that Cronbach’s alpha tends to be lower for 
scales with fewer items. The alphas on our construct are achieved with only two, or, in the case 
of intellect, three items. For short scales, an alternative test is to look at average inter-item 
correlations directly. In general, psychometricians prefer scales with an average inter-item 
correlation above 0.3, but values as low as 0.2 are accepted in practice (DeVellis 2016). For 
the whole sample, only agreeableness meets the strict criterion. However, all other scales have 
average inter-item correlations of between 0.2 and 0.3. In the high understanding subsample, 
agreeableness, extroversion, and conscientiousness meet the 0.3 threshold, with neuroticism 
and intellect still above 0.2.  
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Table 2.24: Cronbach’s Alphas and average inter-item correlations for personality traits for 
full sample and sample with high understanding 












Agreeableness 0.63 0.46 0.71 0.56 
Extroversion 0.45 0.29 0.52 0.35 
Neuroticism 0.36 0.22 0.39 0.24 
Intellect 0.46 0.22 0.44 0.21 
Conscientiousness 0.41 0.25 0.49 0.32 
 
In sum, factor analysis of the 25 items in the subsample measuring the Big Five traits suggests 
that the positively keyed items measuring agreeableness, extroversion, neuroticism and 
conscientiousness measure distinct constructs for the selected subsample. These results warrant 
using these four traits in further analysis. Two of the three items measuring intellect load on 
the wrong factor. However, the factor analysis is close enough to expectations to warrant 
further analysis of all traits. Concerning internal consistency, inter-item correlations are high 
enough to merit further analysis of all traits in the subsample. Based on these results, we have 
decided to focus on the selected subsample including all traits, focussing on the positively 
keyed items, in further analysis. In interpreting results, however, it is important to keep in mind 
that some items, particularly those pertaining to intellect, may have failed to appropriately tap 
into their respective personality traits. 
Personality Facets 
We turn to the subscales measuring specific facets. As Table 2.25 shows, the internal 
consistency of the subscales as measured by Cronbach’s alpha is below the cut-off point of 0.6 
for a number of facets.  
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Use for further 
analysis 
Altruism Agreeableness 0.57   
Altruism only Al1-Al3 Agreeableness 0.63 yes 
Morality Agreeableness 0.34   
Trust Agreeableness 0.58   
Trust T1-T3 Agreeableness 0.63 yes 
Caution Conscientiousness 0.63 yes 
Dutifulness Conscientiousness 0.37   
Dutifulness only Du1-Du2 Conscientiousness 0.43 yes 
Motivation Conscientiousness 0.40   
Self-consciousness Conscientiousness 0.33   
Assertiveness Extroversion 0.74   
Assertiveness without As4 Extroversion 0.82 yes 
Excitement Seeking Extroversion 0.46   
Ex. S. only Ex1 and Ex3 Extroversion 0.60 yes 
Adventure Intellect 0.59 yes 
Anxiety Neuroticism 0.45   
Anxiety without An2 Neuroticism 0.59 yes 
Average   0.54   
 
Considering only the full subscales, the mean alpha is 0.54, well below the value of 0.64 found 
in the validation study of the instrument (Johnson 2014). In the validation study, the lowest 
alpha is 0.47, for dutifulness. All other alphas are well above 0.6. By contrast, in our sample 
only assertiveness, caution, and altruism (excluding the negatively keyed item) exceed the 
threshold of 0.6 in the full sample. This suggests that some of the items may not have been 
properly understood by participants. For this reason, we remove items from the subscales with 
suspiciously low item-rest correlations. This approach suggests excluding one item for the 
facets altruism, anxiety, assertiveness, and trust, as well as two items for dutifulness and 
excitement seeking. 
For a number of the shortened subscales, internal consistency increases to tolerable levels once 
we consider the high understanding subsample. The subscales that particularly benefit are trust, 
excitement seeking, and anxiety. For three facets, none of the methods described suffices to 
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yield subscales with alphas above 0.4. The problematic facets are morality, motivation, and 
self-consciousness. We have excluded these subscales from further analysis.   
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Appendix 5 Robustness Analysis subsample 
In this section, we present the regression results for varying subsamples to show the robustness 
of the results reported in the main section of the text. In each of the regression tables, Column 
1 repeats the full regression from the main text for the subsample of participants younger than 
35 or with more than 11 years of education. All other columns report results from models 
running the same regression for alternative subsamples. Column 2 includes all participants 
from the sample. It is noteworthy that with the exception of agreeableness in the second 
regression, all significant associations between personality traits and outcome variables turn 
insignificant for the whole sample, although the sign stays constant in all cases. This result 
supports the assumption that data quality is low in the whole sample. Column 3 differs from 
column 1 in that we consider a more restricted age group, focussing on participants younger 
than 32 rather than younger than 34. With few exceptions, the results from this model are 
qualitatively the same as in the main regressions, in that the same personality traits remain 
significant without other personality traits becoming significant. An exception is that 
agreeableness turns insignificant in the first regression. The robustness of the qualitative results 
show that our findings are not a mere fluke of the exact specification of the subgroup. Column 
4 reports results for a slightly larger age group with participants up to 40 years old. With the 
exception of agreeableness in the third regression, which turns insignificant, the results are 
qualitatively the same. This result is in line with expectations: while the sign and even 
significance levels for most results do not change, some results are obscured by the lower data 
quality for older participants. Column 5 considers only the small group of respondents with 
more than 11 years of schooling (N=76). All but three results from the high understanding 
sample can be replicated with this small group alone. The exceptions are agreeableness in the 
first, second and third regression, which turn insignificant. Overall, we find that our qualitative 
results are quite robust for different specifications of the subsample.   
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Personality and risk propensity 
Table 2.26: Regression of personality traits on share invested in risk game for different 
subsamples 
 






Participants < 32 
years or > 11 years 
of education 
Participants < 40 
years or > 11 years 
of education 
Participants with 
> 11 years of 
education 
Agreeableness 0.054** 0.008 0.052 0.040* 0.070  
(0.024) (0.014) (0.032) (0.023) (0.049) 
Extroversion -0.012 0.007 -0.019 -0.007 -0.055  
(0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.049) 
Neuroticism 0.004 0.016 -0.002 0.007 0.026  
(0.025) (0.011) (0.028) (0.022) (0.042) 
Intellect -0.063*** -0.005 -0.073*** -0.039* -0.096***  
(0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.031) 
Conscientiousness -0.025 -0.017 -0.023 -0.030* 0.041  
(0.024) (0.015) (0.028) (0.016) (0.029) 
Age 0.007 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.004  
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.006 0.059 -0.082 0.080 -0.021  
(0.075) (0.068) (0.102) (0.084) (0.121) 
Years of education -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.050  
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.035) 
Number of children -0.009 0.004 -0.021 0.001 0.027  
(0.016) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
Household size -0.019 -0.010 -0.012 -0.017 -0.012  
(0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) 
Food insecurity index 0.053** 0.005 0.063** 0.053** 0.015  
(0.025) (0.013) (0.023) (0.025) (0.044) 
Asset index -0.026 -0.023 -0.029 0.008 -0.050*  
(0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) 
Pest likelihood -0.161*** -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.152*** -0.140**  
(0.048) (0.023) (0.045) (0.038) (0.063) 
Total land farmed 0.016** 0.006 0.018** 0.007 0.009  
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) 
Average income 0.022* 0.017** 0.039** 0.018 0.055*  
(0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.030) 
Constant 0.296 0.452*** 0.307* 0.390** 0.801  
(0.191) (0.128) (0.178) (0.178) (0.672) 
Observations 237 780 177 315 76 
R-squared 0.16 0.059 0.19 0.12 0.26 
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Personality and farm investment decisions 
Table 2.27: Regression of personality traits on investment for different subsamples 







Participants < 32 
years or > 11 years 
of education 
Participants < 40 
years or > 11 years 
of education 
Participants with 
> 11 years of 
education 
Agreeableness 2532.544*** 1196.976*** 2698.671*** 2023.275** 1499.553 
 (906.993) (356.517) (945.182) (772.665) (1397.309) 
Extroversion -208.273 254.690 -729.522 -501.696 101.790 
 (555.662) (434.469) (574.778) (547.609) (1272.299) 
Neuroticism -448.614 -511.570* -229.854 -717.032 -980.451 
 (505.518) (302.059) (465.560) (457.950) (1158.021) 
Intellect 439.605 90.127 414.187 243.110 2455.737* 
 (867.550) (411.077) (734.393) (749.854) (1335.942) 
Conscientiousness -2593.257** -655.981 -2770.166** -1602.257** -4694.837** 
 (1076.334) (453.857) (1269.926) (738.597) (1972.509) 
Age 758.940** 35.075 788.780** 715.332** 1710.228***  
(309.307) (141.799) (310.417) (315.841) (393.964) 
Age2 -11.208*** -1.097 -11.096*** -10.998*** -22.740***  
(3.811) (1.467) (3.945) (3.730) (4.993) 
Male 5122.174 670.728 6551.474* 6659.738* 8625.573**  
(3148.552) (2002.615) (3783.491) (3541.635) (3779.673) 
Years of education -22.439 72.416 -102.527 82.964 504.271  
(184.331) (113.085) (193.837) (154.537) (1332.270) 
Number of children -314.491 460.572 -15.013 443.279 -672.196  
(502.406) (284.377) (576.947) (578.550) (1133.894) 
Household size -411.705 57.863 -722.087** -294.923 -968.079  
(292.880) (188.057) (312.073) (267.573) (925.545) 
Food insecurity index 2038.022** 1366.723*** 1859.117* 1255.685 1577.501  
(908.593) (436.012) (1026.969) (858.123) (1432.214) 
Asset index 2954.491*** 2095.320*** 2988.172*** 2660.757*** 3203.830*  
(938.079) (488.098) (1097.055) (864.605) (1665.580) 
Pest likelihood -54.246 -12.584 148.914 -847.381 -3119.562  
(1301.209) (722.616) (1527.934) (1210.259) (2392.752) 
Total land farmed 2515.896*** 2204.570*** 2306.080*** 2742.980*** 3690.388***  
(535.359) (359.202) (539.378) (463.118) (645.024) 
Average income 1055.010** 871.179*** 1596.792*** 904.854** -995.669  
(393.426) (182.794) (419.297) (351.220) (1007.702) 
Constant -6718.052 2714.693 -8286.943 -7605.554 -18682.755 
 (5134.472) (3652.347) (5108.702) (6235.499) (20351.041) 
Observations 237 780 177 315 76 
R-squared 0.51 0.39 0.53 0.49 0.69 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Personality and desire for credit 
Table 2.28: Regression of personality traits on amount of desired credit for different 
subsamples 





All participants Participants < 








> 11 years of 
education 
Agreeableness 2112.085** 552.881 2569.052* 1393.644 2682.387 
 (1021.861) (357.236) (1407.570) (866.344) (2126.463) 
Extroversion 369.978 -30.850 -218.076 356.594 1691.283 
 (947.284) (433.714) (1267.656) (742.467) (3165.308) 
Neuroticism 480.615 2.090 936.144 291.361 2403.001 
 (745.521) (331.976) (814.343) (547.247) (1619.234) 
Intellect -792.839 -284.024 -970.691 -409.266 1294.750 
 (989.648) (347.988) (1204.049) (608.339) (2120.371) 
Conscientiousness -108.199 185.523 703.119 151.588 527.579 
 (1028.272) (463.933) (1366.461) (800.493) (2729.189) 
Age -991.871 164.088 -1339.023 -1088.198 -1118.099  
(820.642) (180.738) (996.544) (824.764) (1339.957) 
Age2 11.819 -2.194 16.430 15.066 13.719  
(10.565) (1.806) (13.053) (11.556) (17.450) 
Male 5211.686 2719.802* 8466.602** 4421.670* 8243.267*  
(3138.339) (1422.691) (3245.971) (2469.531) (4339.362) 
Years of education 834.875** 456.150*** 875.082* 554.258* 4352.479*  
(400.218) (138.306) (461.455) (307.852) (2420.086) 
Number of children 476.719 401.249 1268.120 812.657 1828.393  
(1164.466) (268.961) (1314.730) (813.362) (2369.260) 
Household size 28.779 238.136 -497.369 155.847 -2570.814  
(430.337) (195.770) (488.650) (423.051) (1518.202) 
Food insecurity index 481.761 363.163 -719.304 678.439 -2139.051  
(1099.967) (541.495) (1486.073) (887.830) (2074.106) 
Asset index 1454.374 456.326 2402.207 992.883 3246.837  
(1263.980) (534.858) (1525.216) (1060.309) (1934.977) 
Pest likelihood 764.932 390.298 -578.680 172.679 -2303.353  
(1671.889) (856.380) (2009.935) (1245.099) (3736.584) 
Total land farmed 1676.385** 1280.013*** 1730.064** 1817.820*** 2242.779***  
(666.077) (331.744) (654.634) (438.705) (758.234) 
Average income 370.549 423.981* 916.127* 435.217 956.947  
(442.174) (220.847) (521.838) (369.745) (1938.253) 
Constant 17326.080 -1102.856 21960.262 18083.070 -17493.546 
 (12662.767) (3945.609) (15522.622) (13697.679) (35940.283) 
Observations 237 780 177 315 76 
R-squared 0.24 0.20 0.33 0.29 0.47 
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Table 2.29: Regression of personality traits on amount of credit obtained for different 
subsamples 





All participants Participants < 








> 11 years of 
education 
Agreeableness -161.565 -319.128 -1627.727** -459.985 -1879.973 
 (631.221) (399.455) (655.251) (605.396) (1124.707) 
Extroversion -122.278 -73.954 -509.231 -121.369 -524.078 
 (864.037) (501.445) (1343.493) (752.719) (1716.361) 
Neuroticism 941.024 11.047 836.619 548.375 -992.657 
 (922.585) (344.433) (1115.151) (856.533) (2693.806) 
Intellect 2216.288** 452.390 3570.646** 1329.473* 4155.008** 
 (1086.774) (404.928) (1553.910) (729.841) (2011.317) 
Conscientiousness 560.966 754.839** 1138.592 843.377 910.287 
 (740.037) (353.866) (903.503) (583.584) (1647.993) 
Age 330.277 252.180 321.283 98.472 -142.395  
(397.968) (182.581) (565.065) (357.920) (1141.763) 
Age2 -3.089 -2.530 -3.990 -0.586 3.320  
(5.398) (1.803) (7.121) (5.491) (12.326) 
Male 5289.377 3513.483** 10898.989 7230.406* 12874.020*  
(4009.520) (1714.317) (6581.757) (4183.316) (7465.174) 
Years of education 585.188* 569.694*** 522.432 604.171** -1053.579  
(334.912) (142.619) (410.472) (280.621) (2135.953) 
Number of children -1314.292 -159.492 -1162.219 -799.642 677.143  
(928.841) (309.128) (944.157) (707.117) (1713.819) 
Household size 238.249 199.986 469.011 427.384 131.062  
(565.324) (213.002) (919.281) (435.758) (1844.411) 
Food insecurity index 3004.026** 2120.112*** 1656.446 2324.389** 2783.004  
(1198.107) (685.696) (1444.558) (875.056) (2478.101) 
Asset index 913.710 1863.572*** 1750.198 1675.904* -13.263  
(1181.421) (587.235) (1165.064) (838.620) (1532.870) 
Pest likelihood 2241.545 1237.967 1224.263 1801.039 -752.451  
(1477.755) (1000.563) (1602.679) (1296.489) (3867.374) 
Total land farmed -687.986 -135.357 -849.193 -753.938** -1907.209**  
(478.337) (195.508) (536.934) (323.166) (884.357) 
Average income 916.981* 325.627* 611.583 621.377 1361.080  
(474.190) (184.773) (567.486) (380.115) (1474.104) 
Constant -10416.732 -7330.140 -7705.838 -5846.735 16906.502 
 (8587.415) (4450.419) (8830.520) (6804.341) (34239.689) 
Observations 237 780 177 315 76 
R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.25 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 6 Robustness Analysis Risk Game 
In this section, we test the robustness of the regression result for the risk game by changing the 
outcome variable. Column 1 repeats the final regression from the main text, using the share 
invested in the risk game as outcome variable. Column 2 uses a categorical variable that is 0 if 
people have not invested any money at all, 1 if people invested more than nothing but less than 
half, and 2 if respondents have invested more than half. In column 3, we use a dummy variable 
as outcome variable that is 0 if no money was invested, and 1 if any money was invested. The 
motivation for these alternative outcome variables is that understanding of the risk game rather 
than personality may have influenced the amount people invest.  
Even though the alternative outcome variables in columns 2 and 3 are cruder outcome measures 
in that they do not make use of some of the available data, the signs of the significant traits 
agreeableness and neuroticism remain constant. Neuroticism, but not agreeableness, remain 
significant as well.   
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Table 2.30: Regression of personality traits on amount of share of money invested / dummy 
for whether money was invested 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Agreeableness 0.056** 0.072 0.131  
(0.026) (0.058) (0.246) 
Extroversion -0.013 0.047 0.084  
(0.021) (0.045) (0.192) 
Neuroticism 0.005 -0.006 -0.041  
(0.025) (0.058) (0.208) 
Intellect -0.061*** -0.166*** -0.506**  
(0.021) (0.050) (0.239) 
Conscientiousness -0.025 -0.065 -0.310  
(0.024) (0.044) (0.219) 
Age 0.007 0.029 0.215*  
(0.010) (0.027) (0.116) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Male 0.006 -0.137 -0.519  
(0.075) (0.189) (0.822) 
Years of education -0.001 0.014 0.048  
(0.007) (0.016) (0.068) 
Number of children -0.009 -0.014 -0.084  
(0.016) (0.036) (0.146) 
Household size -0.019 -0.043 -0.201  
(0.015) (0.032) (0.122) 
Food insecurity index 0.053** 0.108 0.179  
(0.025) (0.072) (0.267) 
Asset index -0.026 -0.130** -0.544**  
(0.019) (0.058) (0.218) 
Pest likelihood -0.161*** -0.290*** -0.994**  
(0.048) (0.098) (0.417) 
Total land farmed 0.016** 0.045** 0.192  
(0.007) (0.020) (0.134) 
Average income 0.022* 0.054* 0.055  
(0.012) (0.028) (0.132) 
Constant 0.290 0.580 -1.805  
(0.192) (0.447) (1.957) 
Observations 237 237 237 
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.16 0.18 0.14 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 7 Robustness analysis  
This appendix scrutinizes whether the main results of the paper are robust to different 
specifications of controls. Table 2.31 shows the main regressions with and without controls. 
Note that all results that all coefficients that are significant in the version with controls have 
the same sign in the version without any controls and are of the same order of magnitude. As 
is to be expected, many results that are significant with controls are not significant in the 
version without controls. Also note that even without any controls, personality traits explain 
up to 12% of variability in the outcome variables, in the case of investment decisions.  
Table 2.31: Comparison of main regressions with and without controls  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Share invested risk game Investment Credit desired 
Agreeableness 0.0407 0.0565** 1913.9* 2659.5*** 1193.4 2217.9** 
 (0.0258) (0.0257) (1011.5) (952.5) (936.0) (1073.1) 
Extroversion 0.000843 -0.0130 645.2 -219.5 851.6 390.0 
 (0.0178) (0.0209) (887.4) (585.7) (1028.4) (998.6) 
Neuroticism 0.00352 0.00453 -1620.0** -454.3 -999.8 486.7 
 (0.0235) (0.0250) (672.4) (511.9) (832.1) (755.0) 
Intellect -0.0645** -0.0613*** 1406.3 428.0 166.0 -771.9 
 (0.0241) (0.0214) (1156.9) (844.7) (804.8) (963.5) 
Conscientiousness -0.0222 -0.0255 -4230.3** -2602.9** -1213.4 -108.6 
 (0.0240) (0.0237) (1588.3) (1080.3) (1077.7) (1032.1) 
Age  0.00731  758.9**  -991.9 
  (0.00987)  (309.3)  (820.6) 
Age2  -0.0000942  -11.21***  11.82 
  (0.000120)  (3.811)  (10.57) 
Male  0.00557  5122.2  5211.7 
  (0.0747)  (3148.6)  (3138.3) 
Years of education  -0.00141  -22.44  834.9** 
  (0.00713)  (184.3)  (400.2) 
Number of children  -0.00941  -314.5  476.7 
  (0.0156)  (502.4)  (1164.5) 
Household size  -0.0188  -411.7  28.78 
  (0.0150)  (292.9)  (430.3) 
Food insecurity index  0.0533**  2038.0**  481.8 
  (0.0252)  (908.6)  (1100.0) 
Asset index  -0.0259  2954.5***  1454.4 
  (0.0186)  (938.1)  (1264.0) 
Pest likelihood  -0.161***  -54.25  764.9 
  (0.0482)  (1301.2)  (1671.9) 
Total land farmed  0.0162**  2515.9***  1676.4** 
  (0.00722)  (535.4)  (666.1) 
Average income  0.0222*  1055.0**  370.5 
  (0.0124)  (393.4)  (442.2) 
Constant 0.340*** 0.290 13906.1*** -6656.4 14057.1*** 17062.4 
 (0.0278) (0.192) (972.6) (5103.7) (1370.0) (12588.0) 
Observations 245 237 245 237 245 237 
R-squared 0.045 0.16 0.12 0.51 0.025 0.24 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (40). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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3 Mortgage Literacy and Mortgage Risks 
3.1 Introduction 
Buying a flat or house is a common and one of the most consequential financial decisions 
households face (Campbell and Cocco 2003). In the last decades, innovation and deregulation 
of mortgage markets have opened up access to mortgages to a bigger share of the population, 
and increased the complexity of mortgage decisions for households (Gerardi, Rosen, and 
Willen 2010). Moreover, a number of households makes mistakes in selecting a mortgage 
(Campbell 2006). If households over-borrow, a spell of unemployment or a rise in interest rates 
can put a severe strain on their budgets. On a systemic level, mortgage debt has played a key 
role in triggering and amplifying the financial crisis of 2007/8 (International Monetary Fund 
2011). Lusardi and Mitchell suggest more research is needed to study the impact of financial 
literacy on hitherto underexplored economic outcomes (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
We answer Lusardi and Mitchell’s call by studying the relationship between mortgage literacy 
and mortgage risks. We assess how much households know about their mortgages, and the 
impact of this knowledge on the riskiness of their mortgage. The main contribution of this 
chapter is to introduce a new measure of mortgage literacy, the Mortgage Literacy 
Questionnaire. The Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire evaluates the domain-specific knowledge 
of households about mortgages. Mortgage literacy is an aspect of financial literacy. Traditional 
measures of financial and debt literacy focus on numeracy skills and the understanding of basic 
financial concepts (Van Ooijen and Van Rooij 2016; Alessie, Rooij, and Lusardi 2011; Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2011a; Lusardi and Tufano 2015). But studies of risk attitudes have shown risk-
taking behaviour is domain-specific (Dohmen et al. 2011). This raises the question whether 
financial literacy is domain-specific as well. The Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire captures the 
domain-specific knowledge people need to make sound decisions in selecting a mortgage and 
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manage risks associated with their mortgage. This knowledge includes differences between 
mortgage products, as well as the legal and fiscal implications of different types of mortgages.  
We administered the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire to a representative sample of more than 
2,000 Dutch households. We find that mortgage literacy is indeed distinct from basic and 
advanced financial literacy. A significant group of households is financially literate but 
mortgage illiterate. We demonstrate that mortgage literacy is associated with lower perceived 
mortgage risk, and with how well households hedge mortgage risk.  
Our results suggest that efforts to promote financial literacy should not be limited to teaching 
financial numeracy and basic financial concepts. Instead, acquiring detailed knowledge about 
mortgage products and their legal and fiscal environment matter considerably for financial 
choices regarding mortgages. These results suggest more emphasis should be placed on these 
domains of knowledge in financial education.    
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 situates our approach in the literature on 
financial literacy. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the Dutch mortgage market. Section 3.4 
gives an overview of the data.  Section 3.5 introduces the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire and 
the key dependent variables. Section 3.6 presents regression results. Section 3.7 discusses the 
strengths and limitations of the current investigation, and points to opportunities for further 
research.  
3.2 Contribution and Related Literature 
Research on financial literacy investigates to what extent households have the required 
knowledge to make good decisions in selecting financial products and managing risks 
associated with these products (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011a; Lusardi 2012; Duca 
and Kumar 2014). 
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The dominant approach to measuring financial literacy is to ask people a number of questions 
eliciting their basic numeracy skills as well as their knowledge about finance (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2011b). Commonly used questions cover proficiency with respect to interest rates, 
compounded interest, and the time value of money (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2012). 
We will refer to these questions as basic financial literacy questions. In addition, a further 
questionnaire covers distinctions between bonds and stocks and the functioning of financial 
markets (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2012). We will refer to these questions as advanced 
financial literacy questions.  
Basic and advanced financial literacy questionnaires have been used in numerous studies 
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2011b). These studies show robustly that financial literacy is low among 
households (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). A study of 1,500 Dutch households is indicative of 
the broader trend: only 40% of respondents answered all five basic financial literacy questions 
correctly, and only 5% of respondents answered all 11 advanced financial literacy questions 
correctly (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2012).  
Financial literacy matters because it is strongly associated with financial outcomes. People 
scoring higher on financial literacy are more likely to build up wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell 
2007), manage wealth effectively (Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly 2003), invest in the stock 
market (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011b), select mutual funds with lower fees (Hastings 
and Tejeda-Ashton 2008), and plan ahead for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a).  
We contribute to the financial literacy literature by answering Mitchell and Lusardi’s call to 
address understudied outcome measures by investigating the relationship between financial 
literacy and mortgage outcomes. There have been relatively few studies looking at household 
debt to date. One study finds that people with low financial literacy are more likely to take out 
consumer credit and have larger shares of high cost credit such as payday loans (Disney and 
Gathergood 2013).  
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Concerning the link between financial literacy and mortgage outcomes, one study finds that 
households with higher financial literacy are more likely to opt for interest-only mortgages if 
they also report lower risk aversion (Cox, Brounen, and Neuteboom 2015). Another study 
shows that financial literacy does not seem to be correlated with financial advice seeking 
(Kramer 2016).  
Alternative measures of financial literacy emphasising saving and borrowing are the 
questionnaires developed by Van Ooijen and Van Rooij as well as Gathergood and Weber 
(Gathergood and Weber 2017; Van Ooijen and Van Rooij 2016). Both measures are very 
similar to basic financial literacy by focussing on basic numeracy and the ability to apply basic 
financial concepts. In particular, they test familiarity with interest compounding and the time 
value of money. The difference to basic financial literacy is that these questionnaires are asked 
in the context of borrowing and saving decisions. These questions have been used with the 
Dutch DNB Household panel by Van Ooijen et al. (2014) in the Netherlands. Disney and 
Gathergood (2013) have administered the questions in panels in the UK. The studies show that 
people with higher debt literacy tend to avoid high-cost consumer borrowing and banking fees. 
Van Ooijen et al. study the relationship of debt literacy on mortgage choice explicitly. They 
find that home owners with higher debt literacy are more likely to take out non-traditional and 
riskier mortgages. Gathergood and Weber show that higher scores on their measure of 
mortgage financial literacy are associated with a higher likelihood of choosing an interest-only 
mortgage (Gathergood and Weber 2017).  
What is missing from the existing literature is a measure of mortgage literacy that emphasises 
the knowledge required to selecting a mortgage and managing risks emerging from mortgages. 
Our main contribution is to introduce a new measure of mortgage literacy. Mortgage literacy 
addresses the gap in the literature by focusing on the knowledge relevant to selecting a 
mortgage and managing risks emerging from mortgages. In particular, we include questions on 
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legal and fiscal aspects of mortgage borrowing. Including these aspects ties our questionnaire 
to the Dutch environment, as legal and fiscal implications of different mortgage products differ 
between jurisdictions. In the following section, we provide some background to the Dutch 
mortgage market, before describing the results of the mortgage risk questionnaire in detail.  
3.3 The Dutch Mortgage Market 
In 2015, 56% of Dutch households owned their home (The European Commission 2017, 24f). 
Middle income households often enter the owner-occupied housing markets at an early age, 
because the private rental market is small in many areas. This is partly due to a large subsidized 
social housing sector, which 30% of the Dutch relied on in 2015 (The European Commission 
2017), and a generous interest deductibility for mortgages. In the Netherlands, interest 
payments on mortgages are fully tax deductible for up to 30 years. In effect, many areas in the 
Netherlands do not offer attractive rental options to middle income households ineligible for 
social housing. A result of the early entry into the mortgage market is high payment-to-income 
ratios, because the income of young borrowers tends to be lower than for people more advanced 
in their careers. 75% of households in our sample have taken out a mortgage at some point in 
their life.  
The sharp fall in house prices in the Netherlands during the financial crisis of 2007/08 of 20% 
on average had a lasting impact on household finance (Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 2017). In 
effect of the price drop, in 2015 17.6% of homeowners in the Netherlands had higher mortgages 
than the current value of their house. Household debt-to-GDP stands at 118%, almost twice as 
much as the EU-28 average (The European Commission 2017, 25). As a result, the European 
Systemic Risk board issued a warning to the Netherlands in 2016.  
Against this backdrop, it is all the more important that households make informed decisions on 
whether to take out a mortgage, and how to hedge risks associated with mortgages. In our 
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analysis, we evaluate to what extent households are in a position to assess and manage 
mortgage risks, taking the specific legal and fiscal situation of mortgage borrowers in the 
Netherlands into account.  
A couple of features of the Dutch housing market deserve to be mentioned, because they 
provide the background to the questions in the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire.  
Starting in 2013, the Dutch government has begun putting a number of policies in place to 
improve the functioning of the owner-occupied housing market. Loan-to-income and loan-to-
value ratios have been tightened, requiring house buyers to put up more equity and limiting 
their mortgage payments to a smaller share of their disposable income (Dutch Authority for 
the Financial Markets 2017c). In particular, banks are required to limit new mortgages to 104% 
of the value of the mortgaged property.  
Moreover, the government mandated a change in the remuneration regime for mortgage 
advisors. The most important element of this change is the commission ban (Dutch Authority 
for the Financial Markets 2017d). Mortgage advisors may no longer accept kickbacks from 
mortgage providers or charge a mark-up on the interest rate of the mortgage. Instead, customers 
pay advisors a fee for their service, regardless of whether customers take out a mortgage.  
As a result, so-called “execution-only mortgages” have become more widespread (Dutch 
Authority for the Financial Markets 2017a). Customers save the advice fee, paying instead a 
much lower execution fee. However, customers are required to select their mortgage terms and 
do the required paperwork by themselves, without the help of a financial advisor.  
The new regulation exempts interest-only mortgages taken out after January 2013 from tax 
deduction. Mortgage types that qualify for tax benefits now are annuity mortgages and linear 
mortgages. Annuity mortgages repay the principal over the course of the mortgage contract, 
keeping monthly payments consisting of interest and repayment stable. Annuity mortgages are 
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the most common type of new mortgage. Linear mortgages are less commonly chosen. 
Borrowers who take out a linear mortgage repay a fixed proportion of their remaining loan 
each month, leading to decreasing payments over time.  
Partly due to these regulatory changes, mortgage borrowers in the Netherlands commonly have 
several types of mortgage on the same property. In our sample, 32% of mortgage borrowers 
have more than one mortgage on their property.  
Fixing mortgage rates is common, with 87% of respondents in our sample having fixed the 
interest rate of their mortgage. On average, borrowers fix their mortgage rate for 11 years.   
A unique feature of the Dutch mortgage market is the National Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, 
an institution to protect mortgage lenders against losses and protect borrowers from spiralling 
penalty fees if they cannot meet mortgage payments (National Mortgage Guarantee 2017). 
While the scheme helps borrowers with mortgage payments in circumstances beyond their 
control, it does not allow borrowers to keep their house if they consistently cannot meet 
mortgage payments.  
3.4 The Data 
We have designed a questionnaire on mortgage literacy, which was fielded in the CentERpanel 
over two weeks in June 2017. The CentERpanel is an Internet based panel of over 2,000 
households administrated by CentERdata at Tilburg University and sponsored by the Dutch 
Central Bank. The panel is representative of the Dutch population. Questionnaires are 
administered online. Panel members without internet access receive equipment that enables 
them to participate through their television. Both the head of the household and any partner 
aged 20 or above are interviewed. 2,126 people completed the survey (1,746 households). 68% 
of respondents have a residential mortgage on their property (1,443 respondents).  
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Our questionnaire is combined with background information from the 2016 Dutch Household 
Survey (DHS). The DHS is an annual study of Dutch households which collects detailed 
information on wealth holdings, earnings, socio-demographic information and psychological 
traits. The DHS consists of six modules. The module on accommodation and mortgages is 
answered by the household member managing the household finances only. Our final sample 
consists of the heads of households that could be matched to the accommodation module of the 
DHS 2016 as well as modules on income and wealth to obtain controls (N=1,174). Note that 
outcome variables are only available for households that have a mortgage. Hence the analysis 
is performed only on the part of the population that has a mortgage (N=872).  
Table 3.1: Sample size 
Sample Size 
All individuals who answered our questionnaire 2,126 
Individuals from different households who answered our questionnaire 1,746 
Heads of households that matched accommodation data from the DHS 2016 1,174 
       Of those: has a mortgage 872 
 
Table 3.2 contains the summary statistics of the variables we use in the analysis. In the 
following subsections, we explore the key variables we use in the regression analysis.  
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Literacy Scores           
Mortgage Literacy 872 3.65 1.58 0 6 
Basic Financial Literacy 872 4.27 0.84 1 5 
Advanced Financial Literacy 872 7.07 2.95 0 11 
Dependent Variables           
R1: Self-assessed general mortgage risk  872 1.76 0.78 0 4 
R2: Self-assessed income risk dummy 872 1.98 0.40 1 3 
R3: Self-assessed wealth risk dummy 872 2.01 0.38 1 3 
Fixed: Interest rate fixing dummy 562 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Duration of fix in years 491 11.72 6.54 1 30 
Controls           
Male 872 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Age 872 58.60 14.88 27 92 
Household Net Income 872 3,060 1,389 0 12,617 
Household Wealth 872 56,173 159,000 1 2,870,000 
Socio Economic Status 872 3.71 1.02 1 5 
School Degree 872 0.33 0.48 0 1 
Vocational Degree 872 0.49 0.50 0 1 
University Degree 872 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Married 872 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Divorced 872 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Number of Children in Household 872 0.57 0.98 0 5 
Self-employed 872 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Retired 872 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Unemployed 872 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Government employee 872 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Risk proneness2 824 0.05 0.83 -1.22 2.23 
OLTV: Original Loan to Value Ratio 487 0.98 0.37 0.13 2 
CLTV: Current Loan to Value Ratio 478 0.55 0.35 -0.05 2.61 
PTI: Payment to Income Ratio 498 0.19 0.15 0 1.84 
Yfix: Year of Mortgage Origination 492 2,010.58 4.79 1,981 2,016 
 
  
                                               
2 The variable is based on the answers to six questions on attitudes to saving behaviour from 
the DNB household survey. To arrive at a single measure, I work with a weighted combination 
of the answers to the six questions, with weights coming from a factor analysis of the six 
questions. 
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3.5 Mortgage Literacy  
3.5.1 The Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire  
The Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire is designed to capture salient differences between 
different types of mortgages, the understanding of the legal rules and protections pertaining to 
mortgages, as well as the fiscal implications of mortgages. Since our respondents are from the 
Netherlands, we tailored the questionnaire to the Dutch situation. Hence some of the questions 
would need to be adapted to employ the questionnaire in other countries. But the results of this 
study have implications that extend far beyond the Netherlands. While the questions we ask 
are specific to the Netherlands, knowledge about mortgage types, tax deductibility, and legal 
protection in the case of default matter in most jurisdictions. Table 3.3 lists the questions and 
answer options. Correct answers are marked in bold.   
We took inspiration from the knowledge quiz developed by the “Dutch Authority for the 
Financial Markets” for customers as well as from questionnaires that Dutch banks use with 
customers to help them decide whether they have the knowledge required to opt for a 
“execution-only” mortgage (Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets 2017b). We discussed 
the questions with several experts, aiming at covering different common mortgage products in 
the Netherlands, as well as legal and fiscal issues that can make a major difference to the 
financial risks created by mortgages.  
Participants’ answers to the questions elicit whether respondents are aware of the risks 
associated with different types of mortgage, as well as whether they are aware of the strategies 
to manage these risks. Question 1 asks respondents about the advantages of fixing mortgage 
rates. Fixing mortgage rates is a way of managing potential financial vulnerabilities generated 
by mortgages, i.e. by hedging the risk of a rise in mortgage rates.  
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Questions 2 and 3 concern the workings of annuity mortgages. Question 2 asks about the 
evolution of interest payments for an annuity mortgage, and question 3 about the fiscal 
implications of annuity mortgages.  
Question 4 concerns the evolution of outstanding debt for a household with two mortgages, an 
annuity and an interest-only mortgage. To answer this question correctly, respondents need to 
combine their knowledge of the workings of annuity and interest-only mortgages.  
Question 5 concerns knowledge about the National Mortgage Guarantee Scheme. We test 
whether borrowers understand the limitations of the help this institution offers in case 
borrowers are unable to continue to pay their mortgage rates.  
Finally, question 6 concerns the difference between taxable income and the amount by which 
taxes are reduced.  
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Table 3.3: Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire 
1 What is the advantage of fixing the interest rate of your mortgage for longer? (select all 
that apply) i) You will not run the risk that interest rates go up unexpectedly. ii) A longer 
fixing period is cheaper over the duration. iii) The interest rate is lower in a long interest 
period. iv) You repay less each month. v) I don't know. 
2 An annuity mortgage is a mortgage that keeps gross mortgage payments stable over the 
term of the mortgage. How does the share of interest you pay each month develop over the 
term of the annuity mortgage? i) The share of the interest decreases, and the share of 
your monthly repayment increases. ii) The share of the interest increases, and the share of 
your monthly repayment decreases. iii) The share of interest stays stable over the period. 
v) I don't know. 
3 An annuity mortgage is a mortgage that keeps gross mortgage payments stable over the 
term of the mortgage. How does the amount that you can deduct from your income tax 
evolve over the term of the mortgage? i) You can deduct a higher amount at the 
beginning of the term. ii) You can deduct a higher amount at the end of the term. iii) The 
amount you can deduct stays stable during the term. iv) I don't know. 
4 Suppose that you have a mortgage loan that consists of two parts: 1) An annuity 
mortgage loan part of € 50,000; 2) an interest-only mortgage loan part of € 150,000. 
You don't make any unscheduled repayments during the term. How big is your outstanding 
debt at the end of the term of your mortgage? i) 0 EUR ii) 50.000 EUR iii) 100.000 EUR 
iv) 150.000 EUR iv) 200.000 EUR v) I don't know. 
5 During the term of the mortgage things can happen that lower your income. Think of 
disability or unemployment. Does the National Mortgage Guarantee scheme allow you to 
continue living in your house if you cannot pay the mortgage by yourself? i) yes 
ii) no iii) I don't know. 
6 You live in your own house. Last year, you paid EUR 10.000 in interest for your 
mortgage. Your income tax rate in the relevant bracket is 42%. How much of your 
mortgage interest payments can you deduct from your taxable income? i) Less than 4.200 
EUR ii) 4.200 EUR iii) 10.000 EUR iv) I don't know. 
 
How is mortgage literacy conceptually related to financial literacy? Mortgage literate 
borrowers are financially literate in one specific domain, the domain of mortgages. On the 
conceptual level, mortgage literacy is therefore an aspect of financial literacy. Since mortgage 
literacy is an aspect of financial literacy, we expect a positive correlation between our measure 
of mortgage literacy and existing measures of financial literacy.  
However, our measure of mortgage literacy covers financial literacy concerning mortgages in 
considerably more depth than existing measures of financial literacy. In particular, mortgage 
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literacy emphasises legal and fiscal issues as well as differences between mortgage types not 
covered by existing general measures of financial literacy. The interest in developing a new 
measure of mortgage literacy lies precisely in the fact that people who know about the general 
financial concepts captured by the basic and advanced financial literacy questionnaires may 
not always know about the specifics relevant in making mortgage decisions, and vice versa. 
Therefore, we expect that a sizable group of respondents scores high on financial literacy while 
scoring low on mortgage literacy, and vice versa.  
The regression analysis in section 3.6 focuses on the association between mortgage literacy 
and perceived mortgage risk, and the management of mortgage risk. 
Concerning the relationship between mortgage literacy and perceived mortgage risk, we expect 
mortgage literate people to be more aware of potential risks associated with their mortgage. 
We expect that this awareness puts them in a better position to avoid and offset the risks 
associated with a mortgage. This is in line with the theory by Lusardi and Mitchell, according 
to which mortgage literacy is a form of human capital (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). They note 
that the conventional microeconomic approach to saving and borrowing decisions assumes 
fully rational and well-informed individuals who are capable of optimizing their spending over 
their life-cycle, in the light of their preferences, expectations about the evolution of the 
economic environment, including returns on investment and liquidity constraints. Formulating 
and executing the required saving and spend-down plans to optimize spending over the life 
cycle involves complex economic calculations and requires expertise in dealing with financial 
markets. Mortgage decisions are an important element of a saving plan for many Dutch 
households. Acquiring the required knowledge comes at a cost. Individuals who acquire the 
skills and knowledge to make complex financial decisions, including mortgage decisions, can 
therefore be seen as having a form of human capital that yields returns in the financial planning 
process.  
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Mortgage literacy can thus be seen as a form of human capital whose benefit consists in more 
appropriate mortgage decisions, including the avoidance of excessive risk. Hence, we expect 
mortgage literate borrowers to report their mortgages to be less risky. There are three channels 
that are likely to link mortgage literacy with lower mortgage risk. First, mortgage literate 
borrowers know more about the risks associated with mortgages (Huston 2010). This stock of 
knowledge will often be directly helpful in avoiding or managing excessive mortgage risks. 
Moreover, the knowledge covered by the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire also puts their 
bearers in a better position to acquire new knowledge relevant to their mortgage choice. Having 
a basic understanding of mortgage products makes it easier to compare alternative offers along 
relevant dimensions.    
Second, mortgage literate people are more likely to be aware of their knowledge about 
mortgages and the limitations of that knowledge. Improved self-awareness allows mortgage 
literate people to avoid mistakes in mortgage decisions. By contrast, people with low mortgage 
literacy are vulnerable to the “Dunning–Kruger effect,” according to which people of low 
ability tend to overestimate their ability. This effect can be explained by the inability of people 
with low ability in some domain, such as mortgage literacy, to realize their lack of ability 
(Kruger and Dunning 1999).  
Third, mortgage literate borrowers are likely to be able to deal with mortgage advice more 
productively. First, they are in a better position to judge the quality of the advice. This involves 
placing trust in advisors intelligently, by screening out bad advice, and acting on the 
recommendations of trustworthy advisors (Gaudecker 2015).  
For these three reasons, we expect that mortgage literate people are better able to avoid 
excessively risky mortgage choices that might put their household finances in jeopardy. In 
particular, we expect people with higher mortgage literacy to report that servicing their 
mortgage is less threatened by income and wealth shocks. 
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We expect that the human capital that mortgage literacy affords will make mortgage literate 
borrowers also more able to manage the risks originating from their mortgages. Specifically, 
we investigate whether households fix interest rates. Mortgages with fixed rates are ex ante 
more expensive than mortgages with floating rates, as households need to pay creditors for 
assuming the risk of rate hikes (Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai 2017). At the same time, 
however, fixing interest rates is an effective means of managing some of the risks originating 
from a mortgage by hedging the downside risk of rate increases (Campbell 2006). While the 
added costs of fixing interest rates are transparent for borrowers regardless of how mortgage 
literate they are, the benefits are more likely to be apparent to mortgage literate borrowers. We 
therefore expect that mortgage literate people are more likely to fix their interest rates.  
3.5.2 Mortgage Literacy and Financial Literacy  
Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics for the responses to the Mortgage Literacy 
Questionnaire. Panel A reports the proportion of correct and incorrect answers for each of the 
six mortgage literacy questions individually. The share of correct answers ranges between over 
four fifths for question 1 to just above one quarter for question 6. Question 1 on the benefits of 
fixing interest rates is answered correctly by 85% of respondents. Questions 2 and 4 on 
differences between mortgage products receive 70% and 76% correct answers, indicating that 
about three quarters of respondents understand these differences. The remaining three 
questions concern the fiscal and legal aspects of mortgages. Question 3 asks about the fiscal 
implications of annuity mortgages. 67% of respondents answer this question correctly. Less 
than four out of ten answer question 5 on the National Guarantee Scheme correctly. Only 28% 
of respondents answered the most difficult question 6 on tax benefits of mortgages correctly.  
Panel B looks at the proportion of people who achieved a particular score on the entire 
questionnaire. Only 9% of respondents answered all six mortgage literacy questions correctly. 
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These results indicate that many Dutch households have difficulties answering questions about 
differences between mortgage products, as well as their legal and fiscal implications. These are 
precisely the aspects of mortgage decisions not covered in established measures of financial 
literacy. 
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics Mortgage Literacy (N=872) 
Panel A: Respondents who answered individual questions correctly / incorrectly / don't know 
  Questions 
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Panel B: Respondents with respective number of correct answers 
  
  Number of correct answers 


















We have included the basic and advanced financial literacy questionnaires in our survey to 
enable comparison with the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire. Appendix 3 shows the results of 
the basic and advanced financial literacy surveys, respectively. Our results are very similar to 
the results collected by Van Rooij et al. (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011a) in 2011. The 
share of correct answers ranges from three quarters to nine out of ten for the basic literacy 
questions, and from three out of ten to eight out of ten for advanced financial literacy. Question 
four about the time value of money remains the most difficult basic literacy question (68% 
correct); for advanced literacy, question 11 about what happens to bond prices if interest rates 
fall remains the most difficult question (31% correct). The share of do not know answers is 
lower for basic literacy questions (2%-7%) than for advanced literacy questions (9%-38%), 
consistent with the 2011 data. Similar to six years ago, 48% of respondents answer all five 
  75 
basic literacy questions correctly. Just 11% of respondents got all advanced literacy questions 
right. Financial literacy in the Netherlands has not changed in the seven years since 2010. 
Comparing the mortgage literacy scores with the financial literacy scores shows that 
respondents find mortgage literacy questions more difficult than the basic and advanced 
literacy questionnaires. While only 9% of respondents answered all six mortgage literacy 
questions correctly, 48% answered all five basic financial literacy questions correctly. 27% 
answered the first six advanced literacy questions correctly, more than three times as many as 
in the case of mortgage literacy. Nonetheless, respondents are more confident about their 
knowledge about mortgages than about advanced financial literacy. On average, 13% say that 
they don’t know the right answer to the mortgage debt literacy questions, in contrast to 19% 
for advanced financial literacy. The difference between these means is statistically significant 
(p=0.00). 
Mortgage literacy is not just a more difficult version of the financial literacy questionnaires. 
Rather, mortgage literacy gets at a distinct domain of knowledge, which is only moderately 
correlated with financial literacy scores.3 The correlations between the three measures are all 
positive, indicating that mortgage literacy is related to financial literacy. The correlation 
coefficient between basic financial literacy and mortgage literacy is 0.34. Mortgage literacy is 
more strongly correlated to advanced financial literacy, with a correlation coefficient of 0.63. 
It is not surprising that advanced financial literacy is more strongly correlated with mortgage 
literacy than basic financial literacy, because the former tests knowledge about specific 
financial products such as stocks and bonds, whereas the latter focuses on numeracy. The 
Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire emphasises knowledge about specific financial products as 
well, albeit with a focus on mortgages, rather than investment products.  
                                               
3 Correlations between the literacy scores are reported in Appendix 2. 
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Nonetheless, the correlation between mortgage literacy and advanced financial literacy implies 
that advanced financial literacy captures just 40% of the variance in mortgage literacy. Hence 
60% of variance in mortgage literacy is unaccounted for by advanced financial literacy. 35% 
of respondents (N=282) are in matching quintiles for advanced literacy and mortgage literacy. 
This leaves almost two thirds of respondents who score in a higher or lower quintile for 
mortgage literacy than for advanced financial literacy. 11% of respondents (N=96) score in the 
lowest two quintiles for financial literacy and the highest two quintiles for mortgage literacy 
or vice versa. These results support the assumption that mortgage literacy measures a distinct 
construct from financial literacy. 
3.5.3 Mortgage Risks  
We included three questions to measure whether respondents perceive their mortgage as being 
risky. The first question asks about whether respondents perceive having a mortgage as a 
financial risk for them in general. The second question asks whether becoming unemployed 
would put servicing the mortgage in jeopardy. The third question asks whether a drop in 
housing prices would put pressure on the financial planning of the household. These questions 
follow a similar structure to the questions van Ooijen et al. use to measure perceived mortgage 
risk (Van Ooijen and Van Rooij 2016). 0 reports the wording of the questions and gives an 
overview of the results. Note that we gathered only 872 responses to these questions because 
we only asked respondents who have a mortgage. 
The results show that 14% of respondents think that taking out a mortgage is a very high or a 
high-risk decision (R1). By contrast, more than a third consider taking out a mortgage to be no 
risk at all.  
Almost one in ten respondents believe that six months of unemployment would cause 
difficulties with servicing their mortgage (8% don’t know) (R2).  
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Almost 7% believe that a 20% price drop in the value of their house would cause them financial 
distress (8% don’t know) (R3). Our results seem to be lower than the results reported by Van 
Ooijen et al. with respect to related questions administered to the same panel (2016, 11). Their 
study found that almost two thirds of respondents expect to run into problems with repaying 
their mortgage in case of an adverse income shock. They find that a quarter of respondents are 
convinced that a drop in housing prices would lead to serious financial problems. However, we 
cannot directly compare results because the authors do not report the exact wording of the 
questions they posed in the study.  
3.5.4 Loan-to-value and Payment-to-income ratios 
To put perceived mortgage risks into perspective, we include objective measures of mortgage 
riskiness as controls. We measure objective mortgage riskiness by computing the original loan 
to value ratio and the payment to income ratio from the household statistics.  
Including these objective measures as controls is important because we expect mortgage 
literacy to have two effects on the perceived riskiness of mortgages running contrary to one 
another. On the one hand, we expect mortgage literate borrowers to anticipate and manage 
mortgage risks better. We call this the cautionary effect of mortgage literacy. On the other 
hand, mortgage literate borrowers are more sensitive to the risks associated with their 
mortgages than less literate borrowers. We call this the sensitivity effect of mortgage literacy.  
Taking into account loan-to-value and payment-to-income ratios allows us to study the impact 
of mortgage literacy on perceived mortgage riskiness while controlling for the volume of a 
mortgage relative to income and equity of the borrower. To the extent that the cautionary effect 
determines perceived mortgage risks, mortgage literate respondents should tend to report their 
mortgages to be less risky, because they will have taken steps to manage income and wealth 
risk, such as fixing interest rates. In contrast, to the extent that the sensitivity effect determines 
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perceived mortgage risks, mortgage literate borrowers should report their mortgages to be 
riskier, because they would be more keenly aware of risks. 
Following the methodology developed by Van Ooijen et al., and in line with the literature on 
mortgage defaults, we characterize the riskiness of mortgages in terms of the relationship 
between the mortgage value and the value of the house (loan-to-value ratio), as well as between 
monthly mortgage payments and monthly household income (payment-to-income ratio) (Van 
Ooijen and Van Rooij 2016, 8). High loan-to-value and payment-to-income ratios were a major 
cause of personal bankruptcy during the financial crisis. In the case of loan-to-value ratios, the 
reason is that if borrowers have little equity in their house, the amount of their mortgage debt 
quickly exceeds the value of the house once house prices start to drop (Admati and Hellwig 
2013). In the case of payment-to-income ratios, the reason is that unemployment spreads in 
times of crisis. If payment-to-income ratios are high, even short spells of unemployment or a 
moderate income drop can force households to sell off their house. Fire-sales concentrated in 
one region lead to a drop in housing prices, exacerbating existing problems with high loan-to-
value ratios.   
We calculate the original loan-to-value ratio (OLTV) by dividing the original loan amount by 
the purchase price of the house. We also calculate the current loan-to-value ratio (CLTV), by 
dividing the outstanding amount of debt by the current perceived house value. We take into 
account any savings to pay off the mortgage at the end of the term, for instance in the case of 
investment mortgages or life insurance mortgages. We calculate the payment-to-income ratio 
(PTI) by dividing monthly gross mortgage payments by monthly net household income.  
As reported in Table 3.5 the mean original loan-to-value ratio is 0.97, suggesting that the 
average borrower makes a down-payment on their mortgage of just 3%. This implies that if 
house-prices drop by more than 3% at the beginning of the repayment period, the volume of 
the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. 45% of borrowers took out a mortgage exceeding 
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the value of their house. Note that in the Dutch context, paying off the mortgage may still 
generate a positive return on investment for borrowers, as mortgage payments are subsidized 
by the government through the tax deductibility of interest paid on mortgages. However, it 
would be more advantageous for borrowers with negative equity to walk away from their 
mortgage and buy a house at reduced housing prices with a new mortgage. Unlike in the US, 
walking away from your mortgage is however not permitted in the Netherlands.  
Our findings are consistent with the findings in Van Ooijen et al. In their study, the authors 
point out a rising trend in OLTV ratios in the period between 2007 and 2010, the last year for 
which data was available. This period is of course exceptional due to the financial crisis of 
2008/9. As illustrated by Figure 3.1 in 0, we see that the presumed trend did not last, as OLTV 
ratios diminished after 2011. This development is consistent with tightening regulation in the 
mortgage market in the aftermath of the financial crisis. According to our calculations, 60% of 
loans in the period from 2007-2010 had an OLTV ratio exceeding 1 (67% according to Van 
Ooijen et al.’s computations; the difference is probably due to different strategies in cleaning 
the data). In the period between 2010 and 2016, the share of new mortgages with OLTV ratios 
above 1 has diminished to 47%.  
We find that current Loan-to-Value ratios are 0.56 on average. Van Ooijen et. al find a very 
similar ratio of 0.55 on average. CLTV ratios of about half of OLTV ratios reflect the fact that 
many households have paid off parts of their mortgage debt. It is the CLTV ratio that 
determines at what point a drop in housing values leads to the mortgage exceeding the value 
of the house. Hence the CLTV ratio is crucial from a financial stability perspective.  
Our final measure is the payment-to-income ratio. The PTI ratio is a measure of the payment 
burden of a mortgage. It expresses what share of their income households spend on housing. 
While LTV ratios are high by international comparison, PTI ratios are comparatively low at 
just below 20%. Note that our calculation does not take the full tax deductibility of mortgage 
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interest payments in the Netherlands into account. Taking the deduction into account would 
further decrease PTI ratios.  
With these measures of the objective riskiness of mortgages in place, we are now in a position 
to investigate the relationship between perceived mortgage riskiness and objective measures of 
risk. Table 3.5 shows the perceived mortgage risks relative to the original and current LTV 
ratios, as well as the current PTI ratios. Answers to R1, the question about general mortgage 
risks, range from 1 (no risk at all) to 4 (very high risk). The columns for R2 on income risk and 
R3 on wealth risk report the proportion of respondents in each category who answer the income 
risk and wealth risk question in the affirmative, respectively. For the current LTV and PTI 
ratios, the differences between the low, medium, and high quantiles are significant at a 1% 
level according to Pearson’s Chi2 test. In the case of the original LTV ratio, differences are 
significant at the 1% level for R2 and R3, but not for R1. For current LTV and PTI, perceived 
riskiness goes up for respondents with objectively riskier mortgages. This result suggests that 
respondents with objectively riskier mortgage terms tend to be aware of the increased risks 
they run. Our findings are consistent with Van Ooijen et. al, who also find that borrowers with 
objectively riskier mortgages tend to report higher perceived mortgage risks (Van Ooijen and 
Van Rooij 2016). It appears that borrowers are in general well attuned to the mortgage risks 
they face.  
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Table 3.5: Perceived mortgage risks relative to LTV and PTI ratios (N=872) 
Original LTV Mean R1: Overall Risk R2: Income Risk R3: Wealth Risk 
Low 0.57 1.66 6.43% 3.51% 
Medium 0.99 1.94 12.43% 7.10% 
High 1.35 1.86 10.00% 7.65% 
Average 0.97 1.82 9.61% 6.08% 
Pearson's Chi2 test   p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.22 p-value = 0.16  
          
Current LTV Mean R1: Overall Risk R2: Income Risk R3: Wealth Risk 
Low 0.18 1.57 4.73% 0.59% 
Medium 0.53 1.70 3.01% 2.41% 
High 0.96 2.06 16.56% 12.27% 
Average 0.56 1.77 8.03% 5.02% 
Pearson's Chi2 test   p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00  
          
Current PTI Mean R1: Overall Risk R2: Income Risk R3: Wealth Risk 
Low 0.06 1.55 2.82% 2.26% 
Medium 0.17 1.82 5.71% 5.71% 
High 0.35 2.02 19.19% 11.05% 
Average 0.19 1.79 9.16% 6.30% 
Pearson's Chi2 test   p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00  p-value = 0.00 
Note: Mean reports the average LTV/PTI value within the respective category. R1 is reported as a mean on a scale from 0 
(no risk) to 4 (high risk). R2 and R3 are dummy variables. The percentages indicate the proportion of respondents who 
reported that they were concerned about income and wealth risk, respectively.  
3.6 Results  
In this section, we investigate the relationship between mortgage literacy and perceived 
mortgage risk as well as the management of mortgage risks. We use the following demographic 
variables as controls: the net household income, household wealth, education, gender, age, 
family circumstances, professional status, and risk proneness. These standard controls are 
included in all regressions.  
3.6.1 Mortgage Literacy and Perceived Mortgage Risk  
Let us first consider how mortgage literacy relates to perceived mortgage risks. Above we 
distinguished two effects mortgage literacy might have on perceived mortgage risks which run 
contrary to each other: the cautionary effect and the sensitivity effect. The cautionary effect 
consists in the mortgage literate being better able to manage the risks from their mortgages. 
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They should therefore be less vulnerable to income and wealth shocks. In contrast, to the extent 
that mortgage literate people are more sensitive to mortgage risks without taking action to 
address these risks, they should perceive their mortgage to be riskier. The empirical question 
is whether the sensitivity effect or cautionary effect dominates.  
By introducing objective measures of mortgage riskiness, we have prepared the ground to test 
which of these two effects is more pronounced. By controlling for LTV and PTI ratios, we 
estimate the effect of mortgage literacy on perceived mortgage riskiness abstracting from 
differences in the size of the mortgage relative to household income or wealth. Given that 
households have decided they want a mortgage of a certain size relative to their economic 
potential, we measure to what extent they manage (perceived) mortgage risks.  
Table 3.6 reports the results of an OLS regression with the z-score of perceived general 
mortgage riskiness introduced in section 3.5.3 as outcome variable (R1). We first show the 
results for mortgage literacy in addition to standard controls (Column 1), add the objective risk 
measures (Column 2), replace mortgage literacy with basic and advanced financial literacy 
(Column 3), and finally include mortgage literacy as well as financial literacy scores (Column 
4).  
Column 1 shows no significant association between mortgage literacy and perceived mortgage 
risks. Mortgage literacy turns significant at a 10% level with a negative sign once objective 
risk measures are included. In light of our distinction between sensitivity and caution we can 
interpret these results as follows: Since the regression in Column 1 does not control for the 
objective riskiness of mortgages, the sensitivity effect and the cautionary effect may cancel 
each other out. By contrast, once we control for objective risk measures, the cautionary effect 
becomes salient. The payment-to-income ratio is significant at a 1% level. The positive 
coefficient of the PTI indicates that respondents who spend a greater proportion of their income 
on their mortgage perceive their mortgage to be riskier. The mortgage literacy coefficient 
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expresses the contribution mortgage literacy makes when objective risk measures are 
controlled for. An increase in mortgage literacy by one standard deviation is associated with a 
11% of a standard deviation decrease in perceived overall mortgage risk. This can be explained 
by the cautionary effect of mortgage literacy that is now salient: given mortgages with identical 
LTV and PTI ratios, mortgage literate borrowers will do more to manage the risks of their 
mortgages, such as fixing interest rates.  
The negative coefficient of mortgage literacy stays significant, now at a 5% level, and becomes 
slightly larger once we additionally include basic and advanced financial literacy scores 
(Column 4). Neither basic nor advanced financial literacy is significantly related to overall 
mortgage riskiness in this model (Column 3). This result indicates that mortgage literacy is 
significantly associated with perceived financial riskiness over and above basic and advanced 
financial literacy. By contrast, neither basic nor advanced financial literacy is significantly 
related to differences in perceived mortgage riskiness.  
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Table 3.6: Regression results: Mortgage literacy and perceived general mortgage risks (R1) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mortgage Literacy -0.0016 -0.1086*   -0.1228** 
  (0.0405) (0.0571)   (0.0616) 
Basic Financial Literacy     -0.0038 0.0050 
      (0.0521) (0.0521) 
Advanced Financial Literacy     -0.0055 0.0386 
      (0.0607) (0.0644) 
Male 0.0320 0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0133 
  (0.0788) (0.1063) (0.1100) (0.1097) 
Age (18-34 omitted)         
35-44 years -0.0636 -0.3113 -0.2907 -0.3153 
  (0.1525) (0.2141) (0.2159) (0.2153) 
45-54 years -0.3258** -0.6200*** -0.6016*** -0.6230*** 
  (0.1496) (0.2157) (0.2176) (0.2170) 
55-64 years -0.4424*** -0.4758** -0.4648** -0.4809** 
  (0.1499) (0.2233) (0.2257) (0.2249) 
65 years and older -0.4505** -0.5663** -0.5393** -0.5734** 
  (0.1816) (0.2705) (0.2730) (0.2724) 
Education (School degree omitted)         
Vocational Education 0.0387 0.1146 0.1466 0.1162 
  (0.0843) (0.1139) (0.1138) (0.1143) 
University Education 0.1575 0.2430 0.2686 0.2407 
  (0.1333) (0.1650) (0.1656) (0.1655) 
Log Household Income -0.0435 0.1842 0.1824 0.1744 
  (0.0918) (0.1448) (0.1466) (0.1460) 
Log Household Wealth -0.0278** -0.0347* -0.0424** -0.0361* 
  (0.0137) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0208) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0348 0.0150 -0.0007 0.0110 
  (0.0465) (0.0611) (0.0615) (0.0616) 
Married -0.0478 0.0696 0.0636 0.0717 
  (0.0849) (0.1111) (0.1118) (0.1114) 
Divorced 0.0548 -0.0954 -0.1089 -0.0952 
  (0.1530) (0.1993) (0.2005) (0.1998) 
Number of Children in Household 0.0750* 0.0903* 0.0939* 0.0925* 
  (0.0426) (0.0527) (0.0532) (0.0530) 
Self-employed 0.0593 0.1660 0.1615 0.1776 
  (0.1544) (0.2064) (0.2085) (0.2078) 
Retired -0.2099 -0.0931 -0.0877 -0.0894 
  (0.1333) (0.1860) (0.1874) (0.1866) 
Unemployed 0.1984 0.0758 0.1121 0.0684 
  (0.1736) (0.2286) (0.2294) (0.2295) 
Government worker -0.0958 0.0864 0.0971 0.0865 
  (0.1145) (0.1372) (0.1387) (0.1382) 
Risk proneness 0.1339*** 0.1275** 0.1172** 0.1188** 
  (0.0421) (0.0543) (0.0563) (0.0561) 
Mortgage Characteristics       
OLTV   -0.1107 -0.1163 -0.1112 
    (0.1144) (0.1151) (0.1147) 
CLTV   0.0022 0.0009 0.0066 
    (0.1934) (0.1949) (0.1941) 
PTI   1.5778*** 1.5425*** 1.5588*** 
    (0.4662) (0.4702) (0.4683) 
Constant 0.8254 -1.0414 -0.9684 -0.9274 
  (0.7078) (1.1038) (1.1259) (1.1215) 
Observations 814 383 383 383 
R-squared 0.1226 0.2428 0.2352 0.2436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.196 0.186 0.193 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Appendix 5, we run a robustness check with perceived income risk (R2) and wealth risk 
(R3) as dependent variables. The results support the present analysis: increased mortgage 
literacy is associated with lower perceived mortgage risk. In addition, we run another 
robustness check that uses only questions 1-4 in the mortgage risk questionnaire. The reason 
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is that questions five and six were very difficult for most participants. Someone might argue 
that our results might be driven by these difficult questions. They are not. The robustness check 
shows that excluding questions five and six leads qualitatively to the same results, with slightly 
bigger coefficients, rendering mortgage literacy in column 2 significant at the 5% level, rather 
than only at the 10% level as with the full measure. We ran the remaining regressions below 
with the shorter measure as well. Again, we find qualitatively the same results. Hence the 
difficult questions five and six do not drive our results.  
3.6.1.1 Addressing Endogeneity  
Based on the results from the OLS regressions reported so far, we cannot yet give a causal 
interpretation of the relationship between mortgage literacy and perceived mortgage risks. 
Mortgage literacy might be endogenous due to reverse causality, if by managing mortgage risks 
better one becomes more mortgage literate. Omitted variables are another potential source for 
endogeneity. We have included a wide range of controls to mitigate omitted variable bias. 
Nonetheless, we cannot control for the general ability to deal with fiscal and legal issues and 
to navigate intransparent product markets. As a result, the estimated mortgage literacy 
coefficient may be biased upwards. By contrast, it is likely that mortgage literacy is measured 
with substantial error with the short instrument we developed, which may lead to a downward 
bias in the estimated mortgage literacy coefficient.  
To address these concerns about potential upward or downward biases in the mortgage literacy 
coefficient, we perform an instrumental variable estimation, instrumenting mortgage literacy 
with financial literacy scores ten years ago. Having general knowledge about personal finance 
puts people in a better position to acquire more specialized knowledge about finance. Mortgage 
literacy is a specialized aspect of financial literacy. It is therefore plausible that being 
financially literate ten years ago is causally linked to being more mortgage literate today. Hence 
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financial literacy in 2006 is a good candidate to meet the first stage requirement on a good 
instrument.  
The regression results reported above suggest that not even present basic and advanced 
financial literacy scores are significantly associated with perceived mortgage risks. It is 
therefore hard to see how financial literacy ten years ago should be influenced by perceived 
mortgage risks today. Financial literacy scores in 2006 therefore seem to meet the exclusion 
requirement on good instruments, making it a promising instrument to rule out reverse 
causality. 
Finally, good instruments are required to be unrelated to the assumed omitted variables we 
want to control for. Financial literacy is likely to be unrelated to the omitted variables we are 
most concerned about, including the ability to deal with tax and legal issues and the ability to 
navigate non-transparent product markets. The reason is that financial literacy abstracts from 
the details of concrete financial products, as well as the legal and tax implications of financial 
decisions.   
Appendix 7 reports the results of a GMM regression using basic and advanced literacy scores 
in 2006 as instruments for mortgage literacy. The second-stage regression supports our 
previous analysis. Mortgage literacy is negatively related to perceived mortgage risks, 
significant at a 1% level. The coefficient is almost ten times as large as in the OLS regression, 
suggesting that the OLS estimate may be biased downwards. The results of the Wu-Hausman 
test for endogeneity suggest that mortgage literacy is indeed endogenous (p = 0.0024). 
Hansen’s over-identification test suggests that there is indeed no significant correlation 
between our instrument and the error term (p = 0.24).  
However, we should treat the results of the IV repression with extreme caution. After merging 
with the 2006 dataset, only 131 observations survive – a severely diminished sample. 
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Moreover, financial literacy in 2006 is far from a perfect instrument for mortgage literacy. The 
F-statistic is well below the recommended cut-off point of 10 to avoid the weak-instrument 
problem (F = 1.9) (Staiger and Stock 1997). For weak instruments, the coefficients in GMM 
estimations may be biased in the same direction as the OLS estimate. We should therefore not 
rest strong conclusions on the IV regression. Mitigating these features somewhat is that 
repeating the regression with the LIML instead of the GMM estimator leads to qualitatively 
the same results (mortgage literacy has a coefficient of -2.91, significant at the 10% level). 
LIML estimators tend to be less biased for weak instruments than GMM estimates. Overall, 
the instrumental variable approach is consistent with the conclusion that mortgage literacy 
leads to lower perceived mortgage risks. Because of the flaws of the instrument, however, we 
cannot derive much additional support from the approach. 
It is worth mentioning an alternative explanation for why mortgage literate borrowers report 
lower perceived mortgage risks. Increased mortgage literacy may somehow be associated with 
a lower sensitivity for risks associated with a mortgage. This explanation is strongly counter-
intuitive, as the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire tests for knowledge that should improve the 
awareness of borrowers of mortgage risks. Because of the implausibility of the alternative 
explanation, we conclude that increased mortgage literacy is associated with lower perceived 
mortgage risk because mortgage risks for this group are indeed smaller.  
We suspect that mortgage risks are smaller for mortgage literate borrowers because they 
manage risks originating from their mortgage more cautiously. For instance, fixing the interest 
rate of a mortgage for longer hedges the risk of surging mortgage payments due to interest rate 
increases. This explanation supports our expectation that increased mortgage literacy is 
associated with lower mortgage risks. In the next section, we provide further support by 
showing that mortgage literate borrowers do indeed take additional steps to hedge risks from 
their mortgages.  
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3.6.2 Mortgage Literacy and Mortgage Terms 
In this section, we test our expectation that increased mortgage literacy is associated with 
borrowers hedging risks originating from their mortgage. Fixing mortgage interest rates is a 
way of managing the risk of interest rate hikes. For this reason, we expect that more mortgage 
literate respondents are more likely to fix their interest rates. 
In Table 3.7, we run a probit analysis with the dummy variable whether people fixed their 
interest rates as dependent variable. We first show results for mortgage literacy as independent 
variable, in addition to standard controls (Column 1). Second, we replace mortgage literacy by 
basic and advanced financial literacy (Column 2). Finally, we combine all three literacy 
measures into one regression (Column 3).  
The coefficient of mortgage literacy is positive and significant at the 1% level. This result 
suggests that more mortgage literate people are more likely to fix their rates, with an increase 
in mortgage literacy of one standard deviation associated with an increase of 28% of the 
likelihood of fixing your rate. In contrast, financial literacy is not associated with a significant 
increase of rate-fixing. If financial and mortgage literacy scores are combined, mortgage 
literacy stays significant, and financial literacy remains insignificant. Therefore, the significant 
association of mortgage literacy with rate fixing exists even if we control for financial literacy.  
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Table 3.7: Regression results: Mortgage Literacy and rate-fixing 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Mortgage Literacy 0.2383***   0.2065** 
  (0.0920)   (0.1009) 
Basic Financial Literacy   0.0592 0.0302 
    (0.0900) (0.0920) 
Advanced Financial Literacy   0.1467 0.0688 
    (0.1011) (0.1093) 
Male -0.0128 -0.0380 -0.0481 
  (0.1844) (0.1879) (0.1904) 
Age (18-34 omitted)       
35-44 years -0.1038 -0.0706 -0.0922 
  (0.4142) (0.4040) (0.4129) 
45-54 years -0.1553 -0.1260 -0.1398 
  (0.4045) (0.3972) (0.4048) 
55-64 years -0.6373 -0.5659 -0.6280 
  (0.3939) (0.3840) (0.3946) 
65 years and older -0.8363* -0.7907* -0.8262* 
  (0.4630) (0.4567) (0.4645) 
Education (School degree omitted)       
Vocational Education -0.3473* -0.3915* -0.3466* 
  (0.2054) (0.2040) (0.2057) 
University Education -0.5521* -0.5981** -0.5521* 
  (0.3035) (0.3007) (0.3036) 
Log Household Income 0.3594* 0.3294 0.3417 
  (0.2117) (0.2125) (0.2137) 
Log Household Wealth 0.0248 0.0260 0.0216 
  (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0304) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0767 0.0962 0.0684 
  (0.1073) (0.1070) (0.1081) 
Married -0.2919 -0.2673 -0.2893 
  (0.1942) (0.1934) (0.1947) 
Divorced 0.0995 0.1502 0.1014 
  (0.3887) (0.3795) (0.3882) 
Number of Children in Household -0.0426 -0.0475 -0.0429 
  (0.1012) (0.1009) (0.1013) 
Self-employed -1.0001*** -0.9510*** -0.9849*** 
  (0.2964) (0.2978) (0.2979) 
Retired -0.0609 -0.0756 -0.0592 
  (0.3150) (0.3157) (0.3164) 
Unemployed -0.6570* -0.7204** -0.6787* 
  (0.3597) (0.3570) (0.3613) 
Government worker -0.2126 -0.2138 -0.2186 
  (0.2483) (0.2487) (0.2496) 
Risk proneness -0.2701*** -0.2847*** -0.2902*** 
  (0.0972) (0.1001) (0.1010) 
Constant -1.0550 -0.8896 -0.8521 
  (1.6217) (1.6425) (1.6541) 
Observations 533 533 533 
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.105 0.115 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The first question in the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire concerns the advantages of fixing 
mortgage rates. The expected answer is that fixing the interest rate hedges the downside risk 
of interest rate hikes. Is the regression result driven just by the answer to the first question, or 
does the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire as a whole elicit a tendency to manage mortgage 
risks better? In Appendix 6, we report the results of a robustness analysis to address this issue. 
We run the above regression with a modified mortgage literacy score, which is only based on 
answers to questions two to six in the questionnaire, excluding question 1. The results are 
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qualitatively the same as in the above regression, with the exception that the significance level 
of mortgage literacy in column 1 decreases to 5%.  
For robustness, we run an additional OLS regression with the duration of the interest rate fix 
as dependent variable (Table 3.8). On average, the 42% of respondents who fixed their interest 
rates (N=491) fixed rates for 12 years, from a minimum of one year (N=10) to a maximum of 
30 years (N=26). Popular choices are five years (N=62), ten years (N=226), and 20 years 
(N=54). We include as an additional control the year in which the mortgage was fixed, to pick 
up on trends in inflation expectations and varying practice over time. Column 1 reports results 
for mortgage literacy, column 2 for financial literacy, and column 3 for both mortgage and 
financial literacy.  
The coefficient of mortgage literacy is positive and significant at a 5% level, suggesting that 
an increase in mortgage literacy of one standard deviation is associated with an increase in the 
duration of the interest rate fix of almost three quarters of a year. There is no significant 
association between financial literacy and the duration of the interest fix. If both mortgage and 
financial literacy are included, mortgage literacy stays significant, at the 10% level, while 
financial literacy remains insignificant.  
This result supports the finding from the previous analysis: mortgage literacy is associated with 
an increase not only of whether people fix their mortgage rates, but also with for how long. 
Financial literacy, however, does not appear to be associated with the duration of the interest 
rate fix. 
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Table 3.8: Regression results: Mortgage literacy and duration of interest rate fix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Mortgage Literacy without Q1 0.6801**   0.6702* 
  (0.3350)   (0.3619) 
Basic Financial Literacy   0.2856 0.2222 
    (0.3396) (0.3404) 
Advanced Financial Literacy   0.1755 -0.0799 
    (0.3789) (0.4023) 
Male -0.7963 -0.7950 -0.8067 
  (0.6398) (0.6613) (0.6595) 
Age (18-34 omitted)       
35-44 years 1.7629 1.8182 1.8113 
  (1.1476) (1.1554) (1.1522) 
45-54 years 0.0763 0.0515 0.1254 
  (1.1625) (1.1708) (1.1683) 
55-64 years -1.2236 -1.1493 -1.1284 
  (1.1807) (1.1964) (1.1932) 
65 years and older -1.8086 -1.7729 -1.7321 
  (1.5163) (1.5297) (1.5257) 
Education (School degree omitted)       
Vocational Education -0.1196 -0.2325 -0.1174 
  (0.7221) (0.7228) (0.7235) 
University Education 0.3816 0.2475 0.3798 
  (1.0868) (1.0894) (1.0888) 
Log Household Income 1.3279 1.3319 1.3090 
  (0.9032) (0.9127) (0.9102) 
Log Household Wealth -0.0456 -0.0180 -0.0461 
  (0.1265) (0.1272) (0.1277) 
Socioeconomic Status -0.4979 -0.3856 -0.4943 
  (0.4073) (0.4065) (0.4096) 
Married 0.1206 0.1815 0.1301 
  (0.6998) (0.7025) (0.7012) 
Divorced 0.4600 0.7181 0.4416 
  (1.3138) (1.3116) (1.3165) 
Number of Children in Household -0.5018 -0.5315 -0.5040 
  (0.3316) (0.3330) (0.3325) 
Self-employed -3.0205** -3.1168** -2.9952** 
  (1.2966) (1.3014) (1.2995) 
Retired -0.6086 -0.6969 -0.6318 
  (1.2051) (1.2106) (1.2078) 
Unemployed -0.3832 -0.5186 -0.4550 
  (1.6774) (1.6930) (1.6888) 
Government worker 0.1147 0.0177 0.0795 
  (0.8683) (0.8735) (0.8717) 
Risk proneness -0.2484 -0.2657 -0.2559 
  (0.3501) (0.3648) (0.3638) 
Year of Mortgage Contract  -0.6332*** -0.6279*** -0.6293*** 
  (0.0559) (0.0565) (0.0564) 
Constant 1,277.8977*** 1,266.8896*** 1,270.2631*** 
  (112.4391) (113.7170) (113.4204) 
Observations 464 464 464 
R-squared 0.2717 0.2668 0.2724 
Adjusted R-squared 0.239 0.232 0.236 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from this section lend additional support to the hypothesis that increased mortgage 
literacy has a cautionary effect on borrowers. This is consistent with the explanation that since 
mortgage literate borrowers know more about risks that originate from mortgages, they take 
active steps to hedge these risks, such as fixing their mortgage for longer. The reason that more 
mortgage literate borrowers perceive their mortgage to be less risky may thus indeed be that 
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their mortgage risks are in fact lower due to better management of mortgage risks on the part 
of borrowers.  
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion  
We introduced the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire, a new measure of the domain-specific 
knowledge relevant to mortgage decisions, to study mortgage risks and risk management 
strategies. We showed that mortgage literacy captures a specific domain of knowledge that is 
not covered by basic and advanced financial literacy. We have investigated two main questions: 
first, how much do mortgage borrowers know about different mortgage products, as well as 
the legal and fiscal implications of their mortgage? Second, is increased mortgage literacy 
associated with differences in how mortgage risks are perceived and whether they are hedged? 
We find that there are considerable shortcomings in the knowledge of Dutch households 
concerning mortgages. Only 9% of respondents answered all six questions of the Mortgage 
Literacy Questionnaire correctly. Only a minority understand the National Mortgage Guarantee 
scheme or the fiscal implications of taking out a mortgage. The three questions concerning 
legal and fiscal matters were answered correctly by between a quarter and just over half of 
participants.  
We find evidence that mortgage literacy is associated with lower perceived mortgage risk. We 
considered two reasons for this result: either increased mortgage literacy makes borrowers less 
sensitive to mortgage risks, or increased mortgage literacy leads to more cautionary 
management of mortgage risks. The former explanation is highly counterintuitive. We have 
found additional support for the latter explanation by investigating whether mortgage literacy 
is associated with a particular strategy to hedge mortgage risks, namely to fix interest rates. We 
find that mortgage literate borrowers are more likely to fix their mortgage rates, and that they 
fix their rates for longer. These results suggest that mortgage literacy has a cautionary effect, 
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leading to better management of mortgage risks and thus to less vulnerability to income and 
wealth shocks.  
It is noteworthy that basic and advanced financial literacy are not significantly associated with 
either mortgage risks or the management of mortgage risks. This result suggests that mortgage 
literacy has predictive power concerning mortgage decisions over and above financial literacy.  
Our OLS regressions do not exclude the possibility that mortgage literacy arises endogenously 
with financial choices. If mortgage literacy is correlated with unobserved variables, this could 
lead to falsely attributing the effects of these unobserved variables to mortgage literacy. We 
addressed this problem partly by including a large range of controls that could influence the 
outcome variables and may be correlated with mortgage literacy, including variables capturing 
household wealth and income as well as socioeconomic status, gender, age, employment, risk 
proneness, loan-to-value and payment-to-income ratios, and education.  
Another potential source of endogeneity is reverse causality. Mortgage literacy might arise 
from financial behaviour or outcomes, rather than vice versa. For instance, in making particular 
mortgage decisions, people may gain mortgage literacy (Allgood and Walstad 2016).  
Evidence on endogeneity bias in studies examining financial literacy is mixed. Lusardi and 
Mitchell find that IV approaches tend to show larger effect sizes than OLS regressions, 
suggesting that OLS regressions tend to underestimate the importance of financial literacy for 
financial outcomes (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). By contrast, Fernandes et al. find smaller 
effects for IV designs than OLS designs (Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer 2014).  
Insofar as reverse causality influences our estimates, it likely leads to an underestimation of 
the effect size of mortgage literacy on our outcome variables. Concerning our first regression, 
people who perceive their mortgages to be riskier may feel motivated to learn more about 
mortgages, thereby improving their mortgage literacy. Our OLS regression would tend to 
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underestimate the negative association of mortgage literacy on perceived mortgage risks. The 
negative association we find between mortgage literacy and perceived mortgage risks would 
thus in reality be even larger.  
Concerning the second regression, it is difficult to see how rate fixing would lead to improved 
mortgage literacy. By contrast, borrowers who opt for adjustable-rate mortgages may increase 
their mortgage literacy as they work through the reasons for changing mortgage payments over 
the duration of the loan. We find that mortgage literacy increases the likelihood of rate-fixing. 
Therefore, insofar as reverse causality affects the results, it likely decreases the effect size of 
mortgage literacy on rate-fixing behaviour.  
To further address the endogeneity problem, we take an instrumental variable approach to 
address reverse causality and remaining omitted variable bias (section 3.6.1) with respect to 
the regression with perceived mortgage risk as dependent variable (Gathergood and Weber 
2017). We find that financial literacy ten years ago meets the criteria of a good instrument. The 
GMM estimation supports the results from the OLS regression. However, financial literacy ten 
years ago is only a weak instrument. Based on a conditional likelihood ratio test, we can be 
confident that there is a negative causal relation between mortgage literacy and perceived 
mortgage risks.   
The main policy implication of this study is that mortgage literacy matters. Mortgage literacy 
is distinct from financial literacy. Training numeracy and educating people about general 
financial concepts such as interest rates and the time value of money is insufficient to put them 
in a good place for selecting a mortgage. Rather, an expanded notion of mortgage literacy, 
including information about different mortgage products, as well as legal and fiscal aspects of 
mortgages is needed to equip households to make prudent mortgage choices.  
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Appendix 1 Questions 
Table 3.9: Basic Financial Literacy Questions 
# Question Answer 
B1 Numeracy: Suppose you had €100 in a savings account 
and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, 
how much do you think you would have in the account 
if you left the money to grow? 
(i) More than €102; (ii) 
Exactly €102; (iii) Less 
than €102; (iv) Do not 
know.  
B2 Interest compounding: Suppose you had €100 in a 
savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and 
you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 
5 years, how much would you have in this account in 
total? 
(i) More than €200; (ii) 
Exactly €200; (iii) Less 
than €200; (iv) Do not 
know.  
B3 Inflation: Imagine that the interest rate on your savings 
account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. 
After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with 
the money in this account? 
(i) More than today; (ii) 
Exactly the same; (iii) 
Less than today; (iv) Do 
not know.  
B4 Time value of money: Assume a friend inherits €10,000 
today and his sibling inherits €10,000 3 years from now. 
Who is richer because of the inheritance?  
(i) My friend; (ii) His 
sibling; (iii) They are 
equally rich; (iv) Do not 
know.  
B5 Money illusion: Suppose that in the year 2010, your 
income has doubled and prices of all goods have 
doubled too. In 2010, how much will you be able to buy 
with your income?  
(i) More than today; (ii) 
The same; (iii) Less than 
today; (iv) Do not know. 
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Table 3.10: Advanced Financial Literacy Questions 
# Question Answer 
A1 Which of the following 
statements describes the 
main function of the stock 
market? 
 (i) The stock market helps to predict stock earnings; 
(ii) The stock market results in an increase in the price 
of stocks; (iii) The stock market brings people who 
want to buy stocks together with those who want to 
sell stocks; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know.  
A2 Which of the following 
statements is correct? If 
somebody buys the stock 
of firm B in the stock 
market: 
 (i) He owns a part of firm B; (ii) He has lent money 
to firm B; (iii) He is liable for firm B’s debts; (iv) None 
of the above; (v) Do not know.  
A3 Which of the following 
statements is correct?  
(i) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot 
withdraw the money in the first year; (ii) Mutual funds 
can invest in several assets, for example invest in 
both stocks and bonds; (iii) Mutual funds pay a 
guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past 
performance; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know.  
A4 Which of the following 
statements is correct? If 
somebody buys a bond of 
firm B 
(i) He owns a part of firm B; (ii) He has lent money to 
firm B; (iii) He is liable for firm B’s debts; (iv) None 
of the above; (v) Do not know.  
A5 Considering a long time 
period (for example 10 or 
20 years), which asset 
normally gives the highest 
return? 
(i) Savings accounts; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Stocks; (iv) Do 
not know.  
A6 Normally, which asset 
displays the highest 
fluctuations over time?  
(i) Savings accounts; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Stocks; (iv) Do 
not know.  
A7 When an investor spreads 
his money among 
different assets, does the 
risk of losing money 
(i) Increase; (ii) Decrease; (iii) Stay the same; (iv) Do 
not know.  
A8 If you buy a 10-year bond, 
it means you cannot sell it 
after 5 years without 
incurring a major penalty. 
True or false?  
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know.  
A9 Stocks are normally 
riskier than bonds. True or 
false? 
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know.  
A10 Buying a company stock 
usually provides a safer 
return than a stock mutual 
fund. True or false? 
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know.  
A11 If the interest rate falls, 
what should happen to 
bond prices? 
(i) Rise; (ii) Fall; (iii) Stay the same; (iv) None of the 
above; (v) Do not know; (vi) Refusal. 
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Appendix 2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3.11: Correlation matrix of variables used in the analysis (N=872) 
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Appendix 3 Financial Literacy 
Table 3.12: Summary Statistics Basic Financial Literacy (N=872) 
Panel A: Respondents who answered individual questions correctly / incorrectly / do not know 
 
  Question   
  1 2 3 4 5   
Correct 










662   
Incorrect 
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Don't know 










29   
              
Panel B: Respondents with respective number of correct answers 
 
  Number of corrects answers 
 None 1 2 3 4 5 
Correct 














       
Table 3.13: Summary Statistics Advanced Financial Literacy (N=872) 
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Appendix 4 Mortgage Risks 
Table 3.14: Summary statistics perceived financial mortgage risk questions 
R1: General Riskiness: Does having a mortgage pose a risk to your overall financial 
situation? 
 Self-assessed Frequency Percent 
Very high risk 18 2.98 
High risk 103 11.81 
Low Risk 427 48.97 
No risk 298 34.17 
I don't know 26 2.98 
Total 872 100 
R2: Income Risk: If you became unemployed for half a year, would that cause problems with 
servicing your mortgage?  
 Self-assessed Frequency Percent 
Yes 80 9.17 
No 729 83.60 
I don't know 63 7.22 
Total 872 100 
R3: Wealth Risk: If the market price of your house dropped 20%, would that cause you 
financial distress? 
 Self-assessed Frequency Percent 
Yes 59 6.77 
No 745 85.44 
I don’t know 68 7.80 
Total 872 100 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Plot of mean OLTV ratios in the Netherlands by year, 1990-2016 
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Appendix 5 Robustness Check Perceived Mortgage Risks 
In the main text, we only analysed R1, the first question pertaining to general mortgage risk. 
Here we show that using R2 and R3 as dependent variables further supports the analysis in the 
main text. In Table 3.15, we use a probit analysis with the dummy reflecting whether 
respondents believe that they run into financial difficulties if they become unemployed (R2) as 
dependent variable in columns 1-3. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable is a dummy 
reflecting whether respondents believe that they will run into financial difficulties if the value 
of their house drops (R3). Column 1 and 4 shows results for mortgage literacy. Columns 2 and 
5 show results for financial literacy. Columns 3 and 6 show results for mortgage and financial 
literacy together. All models include standard demographic controls as well as the objective 
risk measures OLTV, CLTV and PTI.  
Mortgage literacy has the expected negative sign throughout, and is significant in column 3, at 
the 5% level. Basic financial literacy is significant only in column 2, at the 10% level. 
Advanced financial literacy is significant at 5% and 1% level respectively for income risk 
(Columns 2 and 3). However, the positive sign of the coefficient indicates that respondents 
who score higher in advanced financial literacy are more likely to report income vulnerabilities 
due to their mortgage. There are two possible and complimentary explanations for this result. 
First, advanced financial literacy may increase the sensitivity of borrowers to income risks 
associated with their mortgages. Second, respondents who score high in advanced financial 
literacy but low in mortgage literacy may assume that they understand mortgages better than 
they do. As a result, they may end up with riskier mortgages and do less to manage the income 
risks associated with their mortgages. 
The robustness analysis supports the results from the regression in the main text. Mortgage 
literacy is negatively associated with perceived income and wealth vulnerability concerning 
mortgages even when financial literacy scores are included as dependent variables. Hence 
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mortgage literacy explains variation in income and wealth vulnerability due to mortgage risk 
over and above measured financial literacy.  
Table 3.15: Regression results: Literacy scores and perceived income and wealth risks (R2 and 
R3) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








































Male 0.0363 -0.1750 -0.2359 0.2485 0.1920 0.1685 
  (0.2741) (0.2865) (0.2974) (0.3498) (0.3606) (0.3698) 
Age (18-34 omitted) 
      
35-44 years 0.8603 0.7397 0.7185 0.8459 0.8658 0.9040 
  (0.5999) (0.5796) (0.6291) (0.5758) (0.5737) (0.5951) 
45-54 years 0.7428 0.6201 0.6525 0.6580 0.6906 0.7079 
  (0.6303) (0.6071) (0.6588) (0.6242) (0.6219) (0.6435) 
55-64 years 0.6094 0.4432 0.4543 -0.3416 -0.2792 -0.3034 
  (0.6686) (0.6567) (0.7032) (0.8204) (0.8032) (0.8318) 
65 years and older 0.6308 0.5297 0.4499 -1.0485 -0.7298 -0.9374 
  (0.8088) (0.8052) (0.8464) (1.6568) (1.7739) (1.6450) 
Education (School degree 
omitted) 
      
Vocational Education 0.2130 0.4028 0.1971 -0.2065 -0.0973 -0.2587 
  (0.3657) (0.3741) (0.3850) (0.5033) (0.4918) (0.5129) 
University Education 0.5984 0.7307 0.5492 0.6334 0.6665 0.5678 
  (0.4956) (0.5090) (0.5102) (0.7110) (0.7036) (0.7169) 
Log Household Income -0.3769 -0.5376 -0.5264 0.0962 -0.0084 0.0483 
  (0.3952) (0.4205) (0.4272) (0.5562) (0.5638) (0.5710) 
Log Household Wealth -0.1291** -0.1765*** -0.1508*** -0.1136* -0.1306** -0.1100* 
  (0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0528) (0.0581) (0.0569) (0.0591) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0123 -0.0638 -0.0254 -0.2192 -0.2318 -0.1974 
  (0.1925) (0.1978) (0.1962) (0.2591) (0.2566) (0.2608) 
Married -0.3239 -0.4116 -0.3491 -0.2839 -0.3009 -0.2118 
  (0.3049) (0.3247) (0.3320) (0.3821) (0.3873) (0.3889) 
Divorced 0.1785 0.1515 0.2527 0.4675 0.4386 0.4796 
  (0.5374) (0.5247) (0.5391) (0.5881) (0.5666) (0.5967) 
Number of Children in 
Household 
0.1339 0.2024 0.1834 -0.1706 -0.1330 -0.1883 
  (0.1314) (0.1375) (0.1399) (0.1557) (0.1506) (0.1584) 
Self-employed 0.1035 0.1952 0.2122 -0.2356 -0.2520 -0.1949 
  (0.4941) (0.5121) (0.5277) (0.6711) (0.6744) (0.6691) 
Retired -0.4914 -0.4389 -0.4635 0.7010 0.5217 0.6455  
(0.5917) (0.6093) (0.6207) (1.5917) (1.7143) (1.5743) 
Government worker 0.4084 0.6439* 0.5946* -0.2910 -0.2400 -0.3460 
  (0.3297) (0.3384) (0.3414) (0.4332) (0.4331) (0.4481) 
Risk proneness 0.0270 -0.0764 -0.0735 -0.1658 -0.2004 -0.2062 
  (0.1565) (0.1639) (0.1686) (0.1958) (0.1971) (0.2025) 
Mortgage Characteristics 
      
OLTV -1.1317** -1.0562** -1.0509** -0.5632 -0.5627 -0.6105 
  (0.4506) (0.4555) (0.4627) (0.6557) (0.6514) (0.6827) 
CLTV 0.6093 0.5697 0.6170 1.5817** 1.6280** 1.6829** 
  (0.5631) (0.5790) (0.5888) (0.6921) (0.6927) (0.7098) 
PTI 1.3811 1.1259 1.2079 1.6282 1.0623 1.4815 
  (1.2047) (1.2255) (1.2045) (1.4252) (1.3938) (1.4579) 
Unemployed omitted omitted omitted 0.7103 0.7966 0.6714     
(0.6235) (0.6071) (0.6290) 
Constant 2.4013 4.2513 4.0136 -1.6858 -0.7762 -1.4355  
(3.0036) (3.2139) (3.2637) (4.2493) (4.3128) (4.3725) 
Observations 368 368 368 383 383 383 
Pseudo R-squared 0.270 0.296 0.325 0.364 0.353 0.370 
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Table 3.16: Regression results: Literacy scores and perceived mortgage risk (R1) (only Qs 1-
4 for Mortgage Risk Questionnaire) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mortgage Literacy (Qs 1-4) -0.0251 -0.1395**   -0.1616** 
  (0.0411) (0.0600)   (0.0653) 
Basic Financial Literacy     -0.0038 0.0080 
      (0.0521) (0.0520) 
Advanced Financial Literacy     -0.0055 0.0531 
      (0.0607) (0.0648) 
Male 0.0347 0.0037 -0.0015 -0.0190 
  (0.0788) (0.1061) (0.1100) (0.1095) 
Age (18-34 omitted)         
35-44 years -0.0634 -0.3197 -0.2907 -0.3258 
  (0.1524) (0.2137) (0.2159) (0.2148) 
45-54 years -0.3271** -0.6328*** -0.6016*** -0.6380*** 
  (0.1495) (0.2154) (0.2176) (0.2166) 
55-64 years -0.4412*** -0.4858** -0.4648** -0.4936** 
  (0.1499) (0.2229) (0.2257) (0.2244) 
65 years and older -0.4509** -0.5719** -0.5393** -0.5815** 
  (0.1815) (0.2699) (0.2730) (0.2716) 
Education (School degree omitted)         
Vocational Education 0.0375 0.1060 0.1466 0.1078 
  (0.0842) (0.1137) (0.1138) (0.1140) 
University Education 0.1565 0.2323 0.2686 0.2278 
  (0.1333) (0.1648) (0.1656) (0.1652) 
Log Household Income -0.0416 0.1843 0.1824 0.1705 
  (0.0918) (0.1445) (0.1466) (0.1456) 
Log Household Wealth -0.0270** -0.0337 -0.0424** -0.0356* 
  (0.0136) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0207) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0392 0.0190 -0.0007 0.0136 
  (0.0463) (0.0610) (0.0615) (0.0614) 
Married -0.0457 0.0702 0.0636 0.0732 
  (0.0848) (0.1108) (0.1118) (0.1111) 
Divorced 0.0608 -0.0976 -0.1089 -0.0981 
  (0.1529) (0.1988) (0.2005) (0.1991) 
Number of Children in Household 0.0750* 0.0908* 0.0939* 0.0939* 
  (0.0426) (0.0526) (0.0532) (0.0528) 
Self-employed 0.0603 0.1823 0.1615 0.2010 
  (0.1544) (0.2061) (0.2085) (0.2076) 
Retired -0.2110 -0.1031 -0.0877 -0.0996 
  (0.1333) (0.1856) (0.1874) (0.1861) 
Unemployed 0.1950 0.0748 0.1121 0.0651 
  (0.1736) (0.2278) (0.2294) (0.2285) 
Government worker -0.0956 0.0841 0.0971 0.0837 
  (0.1145) (0.1368) (0.1387) (0.1378) 
Risk proneness 0.1363*** 0.1245** 0.1172** 0.1118** 
  (0.0420) (0.0539) (0.0563) (0.0560) 
Mortgage Characteristics         
OLTV   -0.1054 -0.1163 -0.1053 
    (0.1142) (0.1151) (0.1144) 
CLTV   -0.0004 0.0009 0.0055 
    (0.1929) (0.1949) (0.1935) 
PTI   1.5600*** 1.5425*** 1.5300*** 
    (0.4647) (0.4702) (0.4669) 
Constant 0.7912 -1.0350 -0.9684 -0.8741 
  (0.7083) (1.1007) (1.1259) (1.1186) 
Observations 814 383 383 383 
R-squared 0.1231 0.2465 0.2352 0.2480 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.200 0.186 0.198 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix 6 Robustness Check Mortgage Risk Management 
The regression below repeats the regression in section 3.6.2 with a revised mortgage literacy 
measure excluding question 1 on the advantages of rate fixing from the calculation of the score.  
Table 3.17: Regression results: Literacy scores and interest-rate fixing, with revised mortgage 
literacy score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Mortgage Literacy without Q1 0.2207**   0.1893** 
  (0.0883)   (0.0950) 
Basic Financial Literacy   0.0592 0.0394 
    (0.0900) (0.0915) 
Advanced Financial Literacy   0.1467 0.0767 
    (0.1011) (0.1083) 
Male -0.0019 -0.0380 -0.0449 
  (0.1840) (0.1879) (0.1904) 
Age (18-34 omitted)       
35-44 years -0.1066 -0.0706 -0.0915 
  (0.4147) (0.4040) (0.4131) 
45-54 years -0.1616 -0.1260 -0.1410 
  (0.4050) (0.3972) (0.4051) 
55-64 years -0.6416 -0.5659 -0.6291 
  (0.3946) (0.3840) (0.3949) 
65 years and older -0.8373* -0.7907* -0.8242* 
  (0.4632) (0.4567) (0.4646) 
Education (School degree omitted)       
Vocational Education -0.3495* -0.3915* -0.3471* 
  (0.2053) (0.2040) (0.2057) 
University Education -0.5422* -0.5981** -0.5430* 
  (0.3035) (0.3007) (0.3037) 
Log Household Income 0.3571* 0.3294 0.3376 
  (0.2115) (0.2125) (0.2134) 
Log Household Wealth 0.0252 0.0260 0.0214 
  (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0304) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0733 0.0962 0.0637 
  (0.1076) (0.1070) (0.1084) 
Married -0.2919 -0.2673 -0.2898 
  (0.1941) (0.1934) (0.1946) 
Divorced 0.0931 0.1502 0.0957 
  (0.3877) (0.3795) (0.3875) 
Number of Children in Household -0.0435 -0.0475 -0.0436 
  (0.1010) (0.1009) (0.1012) 
Self-employed -0.9937*** -0.9510*** -0.9770*** 
  (0.2960) (0.2978) (0.2975) 
Retired -0.0608 -0.0756 -0.0589 
  (0.3146) (0.3157) (0.3163) 
Unemployed -0.6653* -0.7204** -0.6897* 
  (0.3594) (0.3570) (0.3611) 
Government worker -0.2034 -0.2138 -0.2132 
  (0.2483) (0.2487) (0.2497) 
Risk proneness -0.2612*** -0.2847*** -0.2860*** 
  (0.0967) (0.1001) (0.1009) 
Constant -1.0270 -0.8896 -0.8006 
  (1.6213) (1.6425) (1.6534) 
Observations 533 533 533 
Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.105 0.114 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 7 Instrumental Variable Approach 
Table 3.18: Second stage regression with perceived mortgage risk (R1) as dependent variable 
Variables (1) 
Mortgage Literacy -2.3332** 
  (1.1464) 
Basic Financial Literacy 0.0538 
  (0.2048) 
Advanced Financial Literacy 0.7962* 
  (0.4836) 
Male -0.3776 
  (0.3831) 
Age (18-44 omitted)   
45-54 years 0.0738 
  (0.5435) 
55-64 years 0.5027 
  (0.6524) 
65 years and older -0.3993 
  (0.6622) 
Education (School degree omitted) 
Vocational Education -0.8246* 
  (0.4666) 
University Education -0.9904 
  (0.6311) 
Log Household Income 0.5094 
  (0.4903) 
Log Household Wealth -0.0377 
  (0.1113) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0907 
  (0.2138) 
Married -0.2069 
  (0.3847) 
Divorced -0.0022 
  (0.5973) 
Number of Children in Household 0.1711 
  (0.1566) 
Self-employed 0.1885 
  (0.4937) 
Retired 0.0343 
  (0.3646) 
Unemployed -1.2553 
  (1.1171) 
Government worker -0.3444 
  (0.4453) 
Risk proneness 0.1216 
  (0.2043) 
Mortgage Characteristics -0.2320 
OLTV (0.3516) 
  -0.5980 
CLTV (0.6951) 
  4.4054** 
PTI (2.0530) 
  -2.5483 
Constant (3.3997) 
Observations 131 
p-value endogeneity test 0.0024  
p-value Hansen OIR test  0.2447 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.19: First stage regression 
Variables (1) 
Basic Financial Literacy 0.0534 
  (0.0870) 
Advanced financial Literacy 0.3006** 
  (0.1221) 
Male -0.0710 
  (0.1814) 
Age (18-44 omitted)   
45-54 years 0.2107 
  (0.2710) 
55-64 years 0.3207 
  (0.2979) 
65 years and older -0.0006 
  (0.3353) 
Education (School degree omitted) 
Vocational Education -0.2687* 
  (0.1540) 
University Education -0.3348 
  (0.2147) 
Log Household Income 0.0157 
  (0.2325) 
Log Household Wealth -0.0339 
  (0.0512) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0085 
  (0.0911) 
Married -0.0997 
  (0.1484) 
Divorced 0.1315 
  (0.2535) 
Number of Children in Household -0.0054 
  (0.0835) 
Self-employed 0.1401 
  (0.2132) 
Retired 0.0149 
  (0.1647) 
Unemployed -0.5633 
  (0.4014) 
Government worker -0.0186 
  (0.2168) 
Risk proneness -0.0097 
  (0.0860) 
Mortgage Characteristics   
OLTV -0.0087 
  (0.1593) 
CLTV -0.2219 
  (0.3234) 
PTI 0.9797 
  (0.7542) 
Basic Financial Literacy 2006 -1.4329 
  (1.4565) 
Advanced financial literacy 2006 0.2983* 
  (0.1642) 
Constant 0.8325 
  (1.6151) 
Observations 131 
F(2, 106) 1.9 
R-squared 0.30 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4 Developing and Validating the Intellectual Virtue 
Scale 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops and validates the Intellectual Virtue Scale (IVS). Intellectual virtues are 
acquired character traits that support gaining knowledge and understanding (Zagzebski 1996; 
Montmarquet 1993; Roberts and Wood 2007). Research on intellectual virtues has so far 
mainly been conducted in philosophy, which has led to an emphasis on conceptual and 
theoretical matters (Battaly 2008). Only recently have researchers started to interrogate the 
empirical underpinnings of intellectual virtue (Fairweather and Flanagan 2014). There has also 
been some interest by psychologists, experimental philosophers, and researchers on education 
in notions closely related to intellectual virtue (Peterson and Seligman 2004; Tetlock et al. 
2000; Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Tetlock 1983, 2005; Alfano et al. 2017). 
The IVS is to our knowledge the first scale that measures a broad spectrum of intellectual 
virtues. We measure the virtues of love of knowledge, open-mindedness, conscientiousness, 
humility, and courage with four items for each virtue. The resulting 20-item scale is the first 
instrument to measure intellectual virtues comprehensively.  
The scale can be employed to investigate causes and effects of intellectual virtue. Prior research 
suggests that intellectual virtue is related to knowledge, justification of beliefs, and 
understanding (Zagzebski 1996). The IVS allows us to test the effects of intellectual virtue 
empirically. Do intellectually virtuous people have more true beliefs and fewer false ones? Are 
their beliefs better justified? Do they understand issues better? Are they more keenly aware of 
the limitations of their knowledge? The IVS can also be used as an outcome measure. To what 
extent do education and training interventions support intellectual virtue?   
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Being deficient in intellectual virtue is to be intellectually vicious. Examples of deficits in 
intellectual virtue are epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007), shallowness (De Bruin 2014), and 
gullibility (Cassam 2016). Prior research suggests that epistemic vice explains why some 
people end up with unsupported or wrong beliefs. For instance, gullibility may explain why 
people believe in conspiracy theories (Cassam 2016). The Intellectual Virtue Scale can be used 
to investigate the relationship between intellectually vicious behaviour and intellectual vice as 
a character trait. Moreover, the scale can be used to investigate whether intellectual virtue 
affects learning, personal finance, political views, life satisfaction, and many other areas. 
But epistemic vice can also come in the form of an excessive concern with knowledge and 
understanding. For instance, an excess of intellectual conscientiousness and humility can lead 
to scruples and paralysis. We define a virtue as a mean between a deficit and an excess. The 
IVS mirrors this structure by asking respondents to place themselves on a five-point scale with 
the deficit and the excess descriptions attached to the leftmost and rightmost scale point 
respectively, and the mean description in the middle.   
Section 4.2 introduces the concept of intellectual virtue. Section 4.3 discusses our approach to 
measuring intellectual virtue. In section 4.4, we define the intellectual virtues we measure. 
Section 4.5 reports the results of the validation studies. Section 4.6 discusses strengths and 
limitations of the Intellectual Virtue Scale and provides an outlook for further research.   
4.2  The Concept of Intellectual Virtues 
We define intellectual virtues as acquired character traits that support gaining knowledge and 
understanding (Zagzebski 1996; Montmarquet 1993; Roberts and Wood 2007). Intellectual 
virtues dispose their bearers to seek knowledge, gather and process information in an open-
minded and conscientious way, and adjust their beliefs diligently.  
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Note that our definition excludes other-regarding and deliberative intellectual virtues. An 
example of an other-regarding epistemic virtue is intellectual generosity—the disposition to 
share knowledge freely. An example of a deliberative virtue is the disposition to express 
yourself clearly. We exclude other-regarding and deliberative intellectual virtues because they 
do not, in the first instance, increase the tendency of their bearers to acquire knowledge. Both 
are important however, calling for future work. 
4.2.1 Intellectual virtues in contrast to related constructs 
Intellectual virtues differ from personality traits as measured by the Big Five (Donnellan et al. 
2006) in that intellectual virtues are traits that support gaining knowledge and understanding. 
These traits include dispositions to search for information, form and revise beliefs, and 
communicate and discuss beliefs. While measures of personality traits capture some aspects of 
intellectual virtue at least in a general way (e.g. openness to experience, conscientiousness), 
the Intellectual Virtue Scale allows for a more specific and more differentiated assessment of 
intellectual virtue. In section 4.5.7, we demonstrate that the intellectual virtues we test are 
distinct from related personality traits.  
Intellectual virtues also differ from moral virtues or character strengths, such as benevolence 
or justice. The Virtues in Action Scale (VIA) measures a range of moral virtues (Peterson and 
Seligman 2004). The difference between moral virtues and intellectual virtues is that the former 
are traits regulating moral conduct, while the latter regulate epistemic conduct – the way people 
deal with information. For example, the VIA measures justice, including teamwork, fairness, 
and leadership. By contrast, the IVS focuses on virtues that are directly relevant for dealing 
with information, such as gathering, processing, and evaluating information.  
We grant that some forms of behaviour are open to moral as well as intellectual evaluation. For 
example, epistemic injustice occurs when we pay insufficient attention to certain speakers, for 
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instance because of their gender, ethnic background, or political adherence (Fricker 2007). 
Epistemic injustice is an intellectual failing, because it draws us away from the truth. But 
epistemic injustice is a moral failing as well. Behaving morally involves treating others with 
respect. Discounting someone’s views on the ground of their gender or skin colour fails to take 
them seriously as thinkers. The notion of intellectual injustice shows that an action can be 
subject to both moral and epistemic evaluation. But despite their intimate relation, epistemic 
and moral virtues are conceptually distinct. Moral virtues facilitate morally excellent action. 
By contrast, epistemic conduct supports knowledge and understanding. Section 4.5.7 
demonstrates that moral virtues as measured by the VIA and intellectual virtues are not only 
conceptually, but also psychologically distinct.  
Intellectual virtues differ from intelligence in that intellectual virtues are acquired character 
traits. We think about intelligence as raw cognitive ability (Bartholomew 2004), whereas 
intellectual virtues determine how this raw capacity is brought to bear on epistemic activities. 
Two equally intelligent persons may differ in intellectual courage. For instance, one of them 
may be too cowardly to challenge a superior. If so, intellectual virtues should explain variance 
in knowledge and understanding that intelligence alone cannot account for.  
Finally, intellectual virtues are also different from cognitive skills such as memory, speech, 
writing, and reading (Royer, Cisero, and Carlo 1993). Cognitive skills are about whether we 
have mastered certain cognitive abilities. By contrast, intellectual virtues are about how we 
engage in these cognitive activities. For example, two people might have mastered reading to 
the same level of skill, but differ in intellectual humility. Confronted with the same newspaper 
article about the consequences of Brexit, the humble reader uses her reading skills to test and 
refine her beliefs on the matter, increasing her knowledge and understanding. By contrast, 
arrogant readers do not take the views expressed in the reading seriously, and thereby fail to 
challenge their beliefs.  
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4.2.2 Features of our conception of Intellectual Virtue 
Our conception of intellectual virtue is grounded in new work in virtue epistemology 
(Zagzebski 1996; Montmarquet 1993; Roberts and Wood 2007; Morton 2012; Fricker 2007; 
De Bruin 2013; Baehr 2011, 2006; Fairweather and Zagzebski 2001). Research in virtue 
epistemology makes people rather than beliefs the primary focus of study (Battaly 2008). 
Agents are evaluated in terms of the intellectual virtues and vices they display in dealing with 
information. According to virtue epistemology, whether a belief is justified or even amounts 
to knowledge depends on whether it is the product of virtuous epistemic conduct.  
The task of designing a measurement instrument based on virtue epistemology is complicated 
by the fact that there is a family of different views that differ on deep theoretical issues (Battaly 
2006). Where possible, the IVS takes a neutral stance towards these differences. We emphasize 
what virtue theorists have in common: a focus on the exploration of intellectual virtues. A 
justified belief is seen as “what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has 
the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like 
circumstances” (Zagzebski 1996, 241).   
There is, however, one distinction within virtue epistemology where we take sides. So-called 
reliabilists maintain that intellectual virtues are faculties, such as perception, induction, and 
memory (Sosa 2000). By contrast, we follow here the so-called responsibilist approach, 
according to which intellectual virtues are states of character rather than natural faculties 
(Zagzebski 1996; Montmarquet 1993; Roberts and Wood 2007; Baehr 2011). The important 
difference to reliabilism is that responsibilists are interested in features of character that can in 
principle be acquired and nurtured. It is of course an empirical question to what extent 
intellectual virtues are in fact malleable through interventions or self-cultivation. From the 
perspective of scale construction, the important point is to focus on things that in principle 
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could be influenced by training, such as habits, attitudes and traits, rather than the existence of 
the faculties themselves (Battaly 2006; Fairweather and Flanagan 2014).   
4.3  Measuring Intellectual Virtues   
In this section, we introduce our approach to measuring intellectual virtue. In section 4.3.1, we 
discuss the scaling method we use to capture the structure of intellectual virtue as a mean 
between two extremes. In section 4.3.2, we discuss the dimensionality of the scale. In section 
4.3.3, we consider challenges posed by self-assessment.  
4.3.1 Scaling  
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, we conceive of virtues as a mean between two vicious extremes. 
For example, courage is a mean between cowardice and recklessness. The same structure 
applies to intellectual virtues. Table 4.1 maps the virtues we measure to their respective deficits 
and excesses.   
Table 4.1: Mapping of intellectual virtues to their deficits and excesses   
Deficit Virtue Excess 
Indifference towards 
knowledge 
Love of knowledge Idolatry of knowledge 
Narrow-mindedness in 
gathering information 
Openness in gathering 
information 
Heedlessness in gathering 
information  
Carelessness in evaluating 
information 
Conscientiousness in evaluating 
information 
Scrupulousness in evaluating 
information 
Pretension in belief formation Humility in belief formation Self-depreciation in belief 
formation 
Intellectual cowardice Intellectual courage Intellectual recklessness 
 
We discuss the definitions of the virtues in section 4.4. The point for now is that the structure 
of virtues poses a challenge for developing and scaling items. A common approach is to use a 
Likert-type scale (DeVellis 2016). Likert-type scales ask respondents to what degree they 
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endorse or agree with a given statement. This approach works best for traits that are more or 
less present in any given respondent. The information that can be extracted from an answer to 
a Likert-type item is to what extent a trait is present in respondents. An example of an item 
measuring humility is “I proportion the strength of my beliefs to the strength of my evidence.” 
Answer options may range from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  
The statement reflects a virtuous way of forming beliefs, avoiding the pitfalls of pretension (“I 
know everything”) and self-depreciation (“I don’t know anything”). A limitation of scaling 
items this way is that it does not allow to differentiate between self-depreciatory and 
pretentious respondents. Both of these groups should disagree with the statement. But they 
disagree for opposite reasons. The pretentious person disagrees because they lack humility, 
whereas the self-deprecatory person disagrees because they have humility in excess. 
There are several ways in which this drawback can be avoided. One is to develop three scales, 
measuring virtue, deficit, and excess each individually. An advantage of this approach is that 
finding inverse correlations between the scales provides an additional internal validation point. 
A major drawback is however that the number of items is tripled.  
Our alternative approach is to assign three statements to each item: a deficit description, a 
virtue description, and an excess description. Items are scored on a five-point scale. The deficit 
description is attached to the leftmost scale point, the virtue description to the middle scale 
point, and the excess description to the rightmost scale point. The remaining two scale-points 
do not have a statement attached. They mark intermediate positions between deficit and virtue, 
and virtue and excess, respectively. An example of an item measuring humility has “I hold my 
beliefs firmly even in areas I know little about” as the leftmost deficit option; “I proportion the 
strength of my beliefs to the strength of my evidence” as the middle option; and “I hardly have 
any strong beliefs even in areas I know a lot about” as the excessive right-most option.  
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The advantage of this approach is that we can distinguish the direction in which people diverge 
from the virtue with a single item. This method allows us not only to determine to what extent 
respondents are intellectually virtuous, but also whether they tend more towards excess or 
towards deficit concerning specific virtues.  
4.3.2 Dimensionality 
Is intellectual virtue an integrated construct, or should we differentiate different intellectual 
virtues? This apparently theoretical question has important repercussions for scale 
development. The former option would call for a single integrated scale. The latter option, by 
contrast, calls for differentiating different subscales for each intellectual virtue.  
The so-called doctrine of the “unity of the virtues” appears to align with the first option to 
construct one integrated scale. The unity of the virtues is the doctrine that the virtues are 
interdependent, such that a person cannot have any of the virtues without having all others 
(Wolf 2007). The doctrine goes back to Aristotle (Aristotle 2009, 1145a1-2). In other words, 
the intellectual virtues may be conceptually distinct without being psychologically distinct. 
While we can conceptually distinguish between different intellectual virtues, factor analysis 
will not be able to pick up these differences (Clayton Peterson 2017). The reason is that 
according to the doctrine of the unity of the virtues, possession of the virtues co-varies despite 
the conceptual distinctions between them. 
The unity of the virtues raises a possible concern with using factor analysis in scale 
development. Factor analysis is a statistical method that extracts common factors explaining 
covariation between items. It is common practice in psychology to test whether items really 
tap into a well-defined construct to subject items to a factor analysis (DeVellis 2016; DeBode 
et al. 2013). Items that tap into the same construct should strongly load on the same factor 
without large cross loadings on different factors.  The objection is that if virtues strongly co-
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vary, factor analysis may lead us to discard items that tap into one specific virtue. Since 
possession of virtues co-varies, items pertaining to one virtue would show large cross-loadings 
on other virtues. Large cross-loadings count against the inclusion of these items in the final 
scale according to standard methodology, because they are perceived to indicate that the item 
does not measure just one but several constructs. But according to the doctrine of the unity of 
the virtues, it would appear that we should expect to find cross-loadings even with items that 
tap into one specific virtue exclusively generally.   
If the doctrine of the unity of the virtues is correct in the sense that virtues strongly co-vary, 
we expect that all items display significant cross-loadings. But the exploratory factor analysis 
reveals that many items do not display any large cross-loadings (section 4.5.4). Therefore, we 
distinguish subscales for each of the virtues we seek to measure.  
4.3.3 Challenges of Self-Assessment 
We administer the IVS as a self-assessment questionnaire. Self-assessment has two advantages. 
First, data gathering is relatively unproblematic. Through online services like Amazon 
Mechanical Turk researchers have easy access to a large pool of participants (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Paolacci and Chandler 2014). Second, participants retain a high 
degree of autonomy over how they are described and rated. But this latter feature also gives 
rise to two potential drawbacks of self-assessment. First, respondents may lack the self-
knowledge necessary to respond to items adequately (Dunning, Heath, and Suls 2004). Second, 
respondents may fail to answer according to their self-assessment (McGrath et al. 2010).  
Consider whether respondents have the appropriate self-knowledge to respond to the items in 
the Intellectual Virtue Scale appropriately (Vazire 2010). We do not see major challenges 
concerning the virtues love of knowledge, open-mindedness, conscientiousness, and 
intellectual courage. We have all experienced countless situations that allowed us to compare 
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our curiosity to the curiosity of others, how conscientiously we and others process information, 
and how courageously we have pursued the truth in challenging circumstances as compared 
with others.  
Self-knowledge about intellectual humility however may be more tenuous. One feature of the 
truly humble may be that they do not think about themselves as particularly humble. The 
boastful, on the other hand, are unlikely to fully appreciate their lack of intellectual humility. 
In effect, the pretentious as well as the self-depreciatory may well lack the self-knowledge 
necessary to answer questions on intellectual humility correctly. 
Consider now whether participants will respond to the items in the Intellectual Virtue Scale 
truthfully. We have deliberately refrained from tricking participants into revealing their 
intellectual virtues or lack thereof unwittingly. Recall that the Intellectual Virtue Scale has a 
very transparent structure, with the statement reflecting a virtuous character trait always in the 
middle of the scale. Participants who want to appear intellectually virtuous can therefore very 
easily do so. The transparency of the scale limits its application to cases where respondents do 
not have strong incentives to answer in socially desirable ways. But in the absence of strong 
incentives to appear virtuous, the motive of self-discovery gives respondents a reason to answer 
truthfully.  
Note that the problems with self-assessment just outlined do not affect the development of the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale. The development of the scale would be affected if, for instance, 
challenges with self-assessment would lead to the selection of different items. The problem is 
rather with the adequacy of the assessment. Insofar as respondents are mistaken with regard to 
the items considered, the Intellectual Virtue Scale will suggest a higher or lower level of virtue 
than respondents actually have. In order to mitigate this problem, we suggest to respondents to 
compare themselves with people around them they know well. Moreover, we selected items 
that require only a modest amount of self-knowledge, for instance by asking about concrete 
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behaviours. Nonetheless, these challenges of self-assessment constitute a limitation of the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale. As in the case of other psychometric scales relying on self-
assessment, these doubts can be mitigated, but not entirely put to rest looking at internal 
reliability alone. Studies of construct validity are best suited to evaluate how serious the 
problems of self-assessment truly are (cf. chapter 5). If the IVS relates to outcomes as 
predicted, this provides strong evidence that the challenges of self-assessment are limited in 
practice. After all, other measures like the Big Five personality measures enjoy good construct 
validity, while facing similar challenges to the IVS (Barrick and Mount 1991; Robins, Fraley, 
and Krueger 2009, chap. 13).   
4.4  Definition of Constructs and Hypotheses  
In this section, we provide definitions of our constructs. We also show how our definitions of 
intellectual virtues relate to other classifications developed by philosophers.   
Our starting point for differentiating intellectual virtues is three different phases of information 
processing. First, the selection of evidence, sources, and interlocutors; second, the evaluation 
of evidence; and third the formation of beliefs of varying strengths. We postulate three 
intellectual virtues mapping on the three phases of epistemic conduct: open-mindedness on 
belief gathering, conscientiousness on the evaluation of evidence, and humility on forming 
beliefs. Moreover, we postulate two further epistemic virtues pertaining to all three phases 
jointly. Love of knowledge propels people to exercise the other intellectual virtues. Intellectual 
courage supports people in overcoming fears that threaten to undermine the exercise of 
intellectual virtues. We define the five intellectual virtues as follows:  
Love of Knowledge or curiosity is the disposition to actively and purposefully seek knowledge 
and understanding. Love of knowledge supports and enables the exercise of the other 
intellectual virtues by motivating their bearers to pursue knowledge and understanding.  
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Open-mindedness in gathering information is the disposition to take up different standpoints 
and perspectives in seeking out evidence and being impartial in appraising the reliability of 
sources of information. Open-mindedness relates to the information-gathering phase of 
processing information, concerning the selection of evidence, sources, and interlocutors.  
Conscientiousness in evaluating information is the disposition to evaluate evidence 
methodically, thoroughly, and carefully. Conscientiousness relates to the evaluation of 
information, pertaining to acknowledging, comparing, and weighing information according to 
its relevance and merits.  
Humility in belief formation is the disposition to acknowledge you may be wrong, and to 
proportion the strength of your beliefs to the strength of your evidence. Humility pertains to 
the formation and revision of beliefs, including striking the right balance between over- and 
under-confidence.  
Intellectual Courage is the disposition to pursue knowledge and understanding even if this may 
negatively affect your wellbeing. Similar to love of knowledge, intellectual courage supports 
and enables the exercise of other intellectual virtues by fostering resilience in dealing with risks 
and fears in acquiring knowledge and understanding.  
To validate our taxonomy of intellectual virtues, we compare it with other leading 
classifications. Our classification can be seen as a consensus definition that integrates the major 
concerns of the leading proposals in virtue epistemology. Appendix 8 shows the mapping of 
three major taxonomies of intellectual virtue on our taxonomy (Roberts and Wood 2007; 
Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996). Except for the other-regarding and deliberative virtues 
which we exclude from our analysis, the Intellectual Virtue Scale can accommodate each of 
the virtues proposed in these alternative classification systems.  
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It should be noted that we do not claim to have covered all character traits that regulate 
epistemic activity, for two reasons. First, some leading virtue epistemologists shun the idea of 
a comprehensive classification of intellectual virtues in the first place (Zagzebski 1996; Fricker 
2007). Instead, they investigate specific epistemic virtues, leaving open whether there might 
be others. Second, the language of virtues is flexible and open-ended, which makes it 
impossible even in principle to ensure completeness. Nevertheless, we are confident that we 
cover a broad range of intellectual virtues. 
4.5  Validation  
4.5.1 Overview of Validation Steps 
We follow the validation procedure suggested by DeVellis (DeVellis 2016).  
Drafting. We draft more than 300 items, none of which makes it into the final version of the 
scale in their original form. We develop items based on the definitions given above, as well as 
examples presented in the literature on intellectual virtue. We also review existing related 
scales and take inspiration for our items.  
Expert Validation. We elicit detailed feedback on the item pool from a number of experts in 
philosophy working on intellectual virtues, which leads to a fundamental revision of the item 
pool.  
Discrimination analysis. We ask a convenience sample of 20 participants to rate items 
depending on how well they reflect each of the intellectual virtues. This step helps us in 
identifying items that tap into exactly one of the virtues that we seek to measure and leads to a 
further revision of the item pool. 
Exploratory factor analysis. We ask 1,000 participants recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
to respond to all items in the revised item pool. The analysis reveals that a subset of the items 
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has a clean factor structure, with items belonging to the same intellectual virtue loading on the 
same factor. We optimise scale length based on substantive and internal validity considerations. 
We select 20 items, with 4 items per virtue, as candidate items for the final scale.  
Confirmatory factor analysis. We ask another 1,000 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
to respond to the 20 items identified during the exploratory factor analysis. We find that the 
factor structure remains stable in the confirmatory analysis. The final Intellectual Virtue Scale 
consists of the 20 items identified in the exploratory factor analysis. 
Convergence and Divergence analysis. While gathering data for the confirmatory data 
analysis, we also ask participants to fill in a number related scales to determine convergent and 
divergent validity. We find that the Intellectual Virtue Scale taps into a construct that is distinct 
from related personality traits and moral virtues. 
4.5.2 Study 1: Expert Validation 
The purpose of the expert validation is to ensure that we are capturing the whole domain of 
intellectual virtue and that our items capture each intellectual virtue appropriately. We present 
a selection of 80 items from the initial item pool to philosophers working on intellectual virtues 
and at the intersection of philosophy and psychology. Participating experts are Jason Baehr 
(Loyola Marymount University), Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma), Olivia Bailey 
(Harvard University), Megan Haggard (University of Oklahoma), Kate Vredenburgh (Harvard 
University), and Miranda Fricker (City University of New York). 
The expert review takes the form of an online survey, and is structured as follows. First, we 
present experts with a project outline and definitions of all virtues. Second, we ask experts to 
rate items according to how well they reflect the virtue they are meant to capture, on a three-
point scale from “very well” to “not well at all”. Third, we ask for free-text suggestions for 
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revising each of the items. Finally, we ask experts at the end of each section dedicated to a 
virtue whether they have suggestions for additional items.  
The expert feedback leads us to revise more than 80% of the items, add new items, and discard 
others. The result is a list of 55 revised items, with at least ten items for each virtue.  
4.5.3 Study 2: Discrimination Analysis 
The purpose of the discrimination analysis is first to ensure items are comprehensible. Second, 
the aim is to identify items that pertain to one and only one virtue. The reason this is important 
is that items which pertain to several virtues will load on several factors in the factor analysis. 
This is typically regarded as a reason to discard such items (DeVellis 2016; Hinkin 1995). 
Moreover, to test the hypothesis that virtues co-vary discussed in section 4.3.2, we need items 
that pertain only to single virtues.  
We ask a convenience sample of 20 people to participate in the discrimination analysis in the 
form of an online questionnaire. After providing participants with some background on the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale, we first ask participants for each of the items how they rate its 
comprehensibility on a three-point scale from “understanding this item is easy” to “the meaning 
of this item is not clear to me”. Second, we ask to what degree each item reflects each of the 
five intellectual virtues, again on a three-point scale from “the item does not reflect the virtue 
at all” to “the item strongly reflects the virtue.” Participants have no information about which 
virtue each item was intended to reflect. Additionally, participants can leave comments 
suggesting improvements of each of the items.  
If participants on average judge an item to reflect another virtue than the one we had intended 
most, we discarded or revised the item. Next, we compute the mean endorsement value of each 
item for the dominant virtue. The mean endorsement value has its lower bound at 0, indicating 
that the item does not reflect the virtue at all, and its upper bound at 2, indicating that the item 
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strongly reflects the item. We discard items with a lower dominant item endorsement than 1.5. 
Next, we consider the balanced endorsement score for each item. We compute this score by 
subtracting the sum of the mean endorsement values for all but the dominant virtue from the 
mean endorsement value for the dominant virtue. The balanced endorsement score measure is 
bounded between -8 and 2. We discard all items with a negative balanced endorsement score. 
In effect, the strength of reflection of the dominant virtue needs to exceed the strength of 
reflection of all of the other virtues. Finally, we compute the comprehensibility score by 
subtracting the share of respondents who rated the item as having medium clarity or being 
unclear from the share of people who rated it as easy to understand. This measure is bounded 
between -2 and 1. We discarded or revised items with comprehensibility below 0.8, ensuring 
high comprehensibility ratings. 
Of the 55 items reviewed, 26 items survive these tests unchanged, 14 items miss some test 
narrowly, and 15 items fail at least one test clearly. We discard the clearly failed items, revise 
the items that miss some test narrowly, and keep the items that pass the tests, sometimes with 
slight revisions. Revisions are motivated by two pilot studies with 100 respondents each 
recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 0 shows the measures discussed for each item in the 
discrimination analysis. 
4.5.4 Study 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The purpose of the exploratory factor analysis is, first, to determine the dimensionality of the 
scale using factor analysis. Dimensionality determines the number of subscales, if any. The 
second purpose of the exploratory factor analysis is to optimise scale length and select the best 
items for the final scale.  
We recruit 1,801 respondents on Amazon Mechanical Turk and administer the 40 revised 
items, with eight items per intellectual virtue. We present items in random order. To ensure 
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participants answer diligently, we include two attention checks. 236 participants miss the first 
attention check, 568 miss the second check. We exclude participants who fail either check from 
the analysis. To further improve data quality, we drop all respondents who take less than three 
minutes to complete the survey (median: 7.9 minutes), excluding 64 participants. This leaves 
us with 933 respondents, more than 23 times the number of items we administer. We hence 
comfortably reach the recommended ratio of participants to items of at least 10 (DeVellis 
2016).  
Remaining participants are on average 37 years old, with a minimum age of 19 and a maximum 
age of 85. 51% of participants are male, 49% are female, with 1 participant identifying as 
neither male nor female. 79% of respondents are from the United States, 14% are from India, 
and the remaining 7% of respondents from 27 different countries. More than 60% have at least 
a Bachelor’s degree as their highest qualification.  Table 4.7 in 0 reports the items we test, as 
well as the item-rest scores for each item and Cronbach’s alpha for each of the subscales. 
We conduct a factor analysis to determine the dimensionality of the scale. Table 4.8 in 0 shows 
the Eigenvalues of the principal factor analysis of all items. A test for deciding on the number 
of factors to extract is the parallel test, which compares the Eigenvalues observed in the data 
with the Eigenvalues of randomly generated data. One should retain factors until differences 
between the Eigenvalues in the collected and the randomly generated data become small 
(DeVellis 2016). Figure 4.1 in 0 shows the plot of the parallel analysis. Parallel analysis 
suggests a six-factor solution, because Eigenvalues come close to randomly generated data 
after the sixth factor.  
Based on the parallel analysis, we extract six factors. Table 4.9 in 0 shows the rotated factor 
loadings, using an oblique oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy is 0.88, indicating meritorious sampling adequacy (DeVellis 2016). While the factor 
structure is far from clean, few items load on the wrong factor. Only one item, I7, loads above 
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0.3 on the sixth factor. This result suggests that the five-factor solution suggested by theory is 
an adequate model for the data after eliminating I7. A possible explanation for why the item 
loads on a separate factor is that it is the only item that mentions the possibility of harming 
others in the excess description. The readiness to harm others may have been framed by 
respondents not as an excess of courage, but as a disregard for the basic claims of others.  
Crucially, items L5 and L7 are the only items with cross loadings above 0.3. Many items very 
clearly load onto one factor only. This dispels the challenge based on the unity of virtue idea 
described in section 4.3.2, according to which virtues co-vary too strongly to allow for 
meaningful factor analysis. As indicated in the discussion above, this hypothesis is inconsistent 
with many items loading on just one factor. We therefore opt for distinguishing a subscale for 
each of the five intellectual virtues.  
We eliminated items loading on a different factor than expected or on several factors, as well 
as items with loadings below 0.4. For instance, H2 loads primarily on the openness to 
experience factor, indicating that people have read this item primarily as one about how to 
relate to new information. Some items do not load above 0.3 on any factor: O1, C1, C5, and 
H3. The following items fail at least one of these tests: L5, L7, L8; O1, O7; C1, C5, C7, C8; 
H1, H2, H3; I3, I5, I7. This leaves us with four (C), five (L, H, I), or six (O) items per subscale. 
By experimenting with different scale lengths based on internal consistency measures and 
considering the content of the items, we decide to select four items per subscale, aiming for 
high internal consistency as well as for items that comprehensively sample the domain of the 
virtues.  
We conduct a new factor analysis based on the 20 items selected. Parallel analysis as well as 
the scree plot suggest a five-factor structure, as illustrated in Figure 4.2 in 0. 
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Table 4.2 shows the factor loadings of a principal factor analysis after an oblique oblimin 
rotation. 
Table 4.2: Factor loadings exploratory factor analysis 20 best items, 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
I2 0.66         
I3 0.53         
I4 0.58         
I6 0.61         
O2       0.42   
O3       0.56   
O6       0.42   
O8       0.56   
C2   0.56       
C3   0.62       
C4   0.57       
C6   0.52       
H4         0.40 
H6         0.48 
H7         0.56 
H8         0.43 
I1     0.47     
I2     0.56     
I4     0.54     
I6     0.55     
Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3 
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.80, which is at the lower end of 
meritorious sampling adequacy (DeVellis 2016). All items load on the appropriate factor with 
loadings of at least 0.4, without any cross loadings above 0.3. Moreover, all cross loadings are 
at least 0.15 smaller than the primary loading of each item.  
Table 4.3 shows Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales and the scale as a whole, as well as the 
item-rest correlations of the individual items. Cronbach’s alpha for the whole scale at 0.75 is 
in the desirable range (DeVellis 2016). The alphas for the subscales are between 0.61 for 
humility and 0.73 for love of knowledge. While internal consistency for love of knowledge and 
open-mindedness is below 0.7, it should be kept in mind that the subscales are short and 
designed to sample the whole domain of the respective construct.  
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Table 4.3: Final item list exploratory factor analysis with internal consistency measures 
 
 




Love of Knowledge or curiosity is the disposition to actively and purposefully seek knowledge and 
understanding.  
0.73 
L2 I am not very interested in 
understanding things. 
I want to understand things. I am excessively interested 
in understanding things. 0.58 
L3 I am not so interested in the 
reasons why. 
I want to know the reasons 
why. 
I am excessively interested 
in understanding the reasons 
why. 
0.47 
L4 I am not particularly curious 
to learn new things. 
I am curious to learn new 
things. 
I get lost in learning new 
things. 0.51 
L6 I do not much enjoy gaining 
knowledge. 
I enjoy gaining knowledge. I unduly enjoy gaining 
knowledge. 0.53 
 
Open-mindedness in gathering information is the disposition to take up different standpoints and 
perspectives in seeking out evidence and being impartial in appraising the reliability of sources of 
information. 
0.65 
O2 I usually get one or at best a 
few different perspectives 
on any given topic. 
I get a number of different 
perspectives on a given 
topic. 
I often get more different 
perspectives on a topic than 
I can handle. 
0.4 
O3 I pay less attention to the 
views of people I disagree 
with. 
I consider the views of 
people I disagree with. 
I consider the views of 
people I disagree with 
extensively even when their 
views have little merit. 
0.48 
O6 Loyalty to one's ideas is 




different perspectives is 
crucial to overcoming 
prejudices. 
Open-mindedness towards 
different perspectives is 
more important than getting 
to the truth efficiently. 
0.36 
O8 I am not very open-minded 
towards viewpoints 
different from my own. 
I am open-minded towards 
viewpoints different from 
my own. 
I am excessively open-
minded towards viewpoints 
different from my own. 
0.46 
 
Conscientiousness in evaluating information is the disposition to evaluate evidence methodically, 
thoroughly, and carefully.  
0.71 
C2 I tend not to think things 
through at great length. 
I think things through. I sometimes mull over 
things until it is too late. 0.48 
C3 I make up my mind without 
much fuss about the many 
factors that may affect an 
issue. 
I think through the relevant 
factors before making up 
my mind. 
I think through so many 
factors that might affect an 
issue that I sometimes 
struggle to make up my 
mind. 
0.55 
C4 I do not dwell on the pros 
and the cons when I make 
up my mind. 
I weigh the pros and the 
cons when I make up my 
mind. 
I often get stuck weighing 
the pros and cons when I 
make up my mind. 
0.5 
C6 I tend to take important 
decisions on the spot. 
I reason carefully and 
critically before taking 
important decisions. 
I cannot take important 
decisions unless I am 100% 
sure. 
0.45 
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Humility in belief formation is the disposition to acknowledge you may be wrong, and to proportion 
the strength of your beliefs to the strength of your evidence.  
0.61 
H4 I know I am right about 
most things. 
I could be wrong about 
many things. 
I suspect I am wrong about 
most things. 0.35 
H6 I tend to be overconfident in 
my opinions. 
I have a realistic sense of 
what I know. 
I lack confidence in what I 
know. 0.39 
H7 I have strong opinions about 
issues I know little about. 
The more I know about an 
issue, the more confident I 
become of my opinions. 
I often lack confidence in 
my opinions even on issues 
I know a lot about. 
0.46 
H8 I hold my beliefs firmly 
even in areas I know little 
about. 
I proportion the strength of 
my beliefs to the strength of 
my evidence. 
I hardly have any strong 
beliefs even in areas I know 
a lot about. 
0.35 
 
Intellectual Courage is the disposition to pursue knowledge and understanding even if this may 
negatively affect your wellbeing.  
0.68 
I1 I am afraid to hold an 
unpopular opinion. 
I am not afraid to adopt an 
unpopular opinion. 
I enjoy holding unpopular 
opinions for the sake of it. 0.4 
I2 I am afraid to ask questions 
that could make me look 
stupid. 
I am not afraid to ask 
questions that could make 
me look stupid. 
I often ask questions that 
could make me look stupid 
for the fun of it. 
0.48 
I4 I tend to accept answers I 
do not understand in order 
not to appear stupid. 
If I do not understand an 
answer, I keep asking until I 
understand. 
I tend to keep on asking 
questions for the sake of it. 0.47 
I6 I avoid asking questions 
that might reveal my 
ignorance. 
I ask questions even if they 
reveal my ignorance. 
I do not mind at all about 
how the questions I ask 
come across. 
0.48 
      Overall Alpha 20 items 0.75 
 
The 20 selected items display promising psychometric properties in the exploratory factor 
analysis, both considering the factor analysis and the internal consistency analysis. We 
therefore preliminarily select these items to constitute the Intellectual Virtue Scale.  
4.5.5 Study 4: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The purpose of the confirmatory factor analysis is to test whether the factor structure and 
internal consistency values obtained in the exploratory factor analysis remain stable when the 
instrument is applied to a new group of people.  
We recruit 1,989 respondents on Amazon Mechanical Turk and administer the 20 items 
identified in the exploratory factor analysis. The items are administered randomly. We also ask 
participants to answer a number of additional scales for discrimination and divergence analysis, 
to be discussed in section 4.5.7. We again include two attention checks, which are failed by 
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983 and 3 respondents, respectively. We exclude the 37 respondents who completed the survey 
in less than 3 minutes (median completion time: 7.6 minutes). This leaves us with 966 
respondents, more than 46 times the number of scale items we seek to test. Remaining 
participants are between 18 and 81 years old, with an average age of 36. 55% of participants 
are male, 45% are female, with one participant identifying as neither male nor female. 77% of 
participants reside in the United States, 18% in India. The remaining 51 participants are from 
25 different countries. 63% have obtained at least a Bachelor’s degree.    
We conduct a factor analysis. Parallel analysis suggests again a five-factor solution, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.3 in Appendix 11. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy is 0.79, which is 0.01 lower than in the exploratory factor analysis for the same items.  
Table 4.10 in Appendix 11 shows the factor loadings for a principal factor analysis of the 20 
target items after an oblique oblimin rotation. The results confirm the factor structure in the 
exploratory data analysis. All items load on the appropriate factor with loadings of at least 0.4, 
without any cross loadings above 0.3. Moreover, all cross loadings are at least 0.15 smaller 
than the primary loading of each item. The items with the lowest loadings in the exploratory 
factor analysis, H4 and O2, have markedly higher loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis. 
However, the loading of I1 has decreased to 0.4.  
Table 4.11 in Appendix 11 shows Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales and the scale as a whole, 
as well as the item-rest correlations of the individual items. Similar to the exploratory factor 
analysis, Cronbach’s alpha for the whole scale is 0.72. The alphas for the subscales are slightly 
higher than in the exploratory factor analysis, between 0.64 for humility and 0.73 for open-
mindedness.  
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We find that the factor structure of the exploratory factor analysis is replicated in the 
confirmatory factor analysis. The internal consistency values are all within the acceptable 
range. We thus confirm the selected items as constituting the Intellectual Virtue Scale. 
4.5.6 Descriptive Statistics 
We will now describe the intellectual virtues of our sample in the exploratory factor analysis. 
Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics for the scores of the individual intellectual virtues, 
obtained by just summing up the values of each of the scores. Appendix 12 contains histograms 
of each intellectual virtue.  
Note that each item is scored from -2 (deficit) to +2 (excess), with the virtuous value at 0. Since 
there are four items per virtue, the individual virtue scales range from -8 to +8. Ideally virtuous 
individuals would be at 0 for each of the virtues.   
The means are close to 0 for openness, humility, and courage. The mean for conscientiousness, 
however, is more than half a standard deviation above 0, while the mean for love of knowledge 
is more than a full standard deviation above 0. These figures show that an average participant 
sees themselves as tending towards the mid-point between virtue and excess concerning love 
of knowledge and almost halfway towards that midpoint concerning conscientiousness. 
Concerning the other three virtues, average participants score close to the virtuous mean. 
In order to allow for all five virtues to have an equal impact on the overall intellectual virtue 
score, we calculate the intellectual virtue score as the sum of the standard scores (z-values) of 
the individual virtues. Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics for the intellectual virtue score.  
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics intellectual virtues 
Virtue Mean SD N Median 
Love of Knowledge 3.20 2.40 965 3 
Openness 0.69 2.69 966 0 
Conscientiousness 1.62 2.52 965 1 
Humility -0.33 2.17 966 0 
Courage -0.57 2.57 966 0 
IVS Score 0.00 2.85 965 -0.16 
 
We conduct an OLS regression with the intellectual virtue score as outcome variable, and the 
demographic variables collected in the exploratory factor analysis as independent variables. To 
capture country effects, we created dummies for participants from India and the US, the 
overwhelming majority of participants. To account for educational differences, we created a 
dummy capturing all participants that got a BA, MA, or doctorate degree (N=606). Table 4.12 
in Appendix 12 reports the results. Only age is significantly associated with the score, at the 
1% level. Younger people tend to score slightly higher on the Intellectual Virtue Scale. Sex, 
country of residence, and whether people were university educated does not have a significant 
effect on the intellectual virtue score in this sample.   
4.5.7 Study 5: Convergence and Divergence Analysis 
The purpose of the convergence and divergence analysis is twofold. First, finding positive 
associations with scales tapping into related constructs provides some support for construct 
validity, which is the requirement that scales measure the construct they claim to measure. 
Second, if associations with closely related scales are only small or moderate, this supports the 
distinctness of the construct one sets out to measure. In our case, we seek to test whether 
intellectual virtue really is different from related personality traits and moral virtues, as claimed 
in section 4.2.1. 
We use the study for the confirmatory factor analysis to gather data on the convergence and 
divergence of the Intellectual Virtue Scale and its subscales with related concepts. Hence the 
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sample is identical to the sample described in section 4.5.5. To investigate the associations with 
personality, we focus on the two personality traits from the Big Five most closely related to the 
virtues we test, conscientiousness and open-mindedness. We used items from the International 
Personality Item Pool measuring the respective personality trait (Johnson 2014; Maples et al. 
2014; Donnellan et al. 2006). To investigate associations with scales for moral virtues, we 
include a number of subscales of the IPIP Virtue in Action scale which have a bearing on 
intellectual virtue: curiosity, love of learning, equity/fairness, valour/bravery, and 
judgment/open-mindedness (Peterson and Seligman 2004). Finally, we add a professional 
scepticism (Hurtt 2010) and a critical thinking scale (Sosu 2013). The items of the subscales 
are listed in Table 4.13 in Appendix 13. We randomly allocate three out of nine scales to each 
respondent, leading to 320 responses per scale on average. 
Table 4.14 in Appendix 13 shows the pairwise correlation between the intellectual virtues and 
each of the additional scales, including Cronbach’s alpha for the measures. As predicted, the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale is positively correlated to each of the scales we tested. Except for the 
personality trait of conscientiousness and the equity subscale of the virtue in action scale, all 
correlations are significant at a 1% level.  
The IVS correlates strongest with the critical thinking scale (0.34). The correlation is mostly 
driven by the items pertaining to love of knowledge and openness, and to a lesser extent by 
conscientiousness and courage. Humility is weakly and non-significantly negatively correlated 
with the critical thinking scale.  
The second strongest correlation of the Intellectual Virtue Scale is with the curiosity subscale 
of the Virtue in Action scale “Love of Learning” (0.33). This correlation is mainly driven by 
the items pertaining to love of knowledge in the IVS (0.49). It is noteworthy that the humility 
items are significantly and quite strongly negatively correlated with the Virtue in Action “Love 
of Learning” scale (-0.22). Note also that humility is also negatively correlated with the 
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intellectual virtue items on love of knowledge, but this negative correlation is small (-0.03) and 
not significant.  
The personality trait openness to experience is the third strongest correlation with the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale (0.29). The correlation is again mainly driven by love of knowledge 
(0.35), but also by openness in information gathering (0.22).  
At the level of individual virtues, love of knowledge correlated strongest with the Virtue in 
Action scale “Love of Knowledge,” as mentioned above (0.49). Openness correlated strongest 
with critical thinking (0.31), closely followed by the Virtue in Action subscale “Curiosity” 
(0.30). Conscientiousness correlates strongest with the Virtue in Action subscale “Judgement” 
(0.28). Humility’s only strong correlations are negative, most strongly with the Virtue in Action 
subscale “Valour” (-0.27). “Valour” is also the subscale most strongly correlated with 
intellectual courage (0.34).  
We draw two conclusions from this analysis. First, there are no correlations with an unexpected 
sign. All selected scales are positively correlated with the Intellectual Virtue Scale. This 
provides evidence that the IVS is construct valid, that is, that the scale measures intellectual 
virtue. Moreover, none of the correlations is so strong as to indicate that the IVS is tapping into 
the same constructs as already measured by other scales. Hence, we conclude that intellectual 
virtue is in fact psychologically distinct both from moral virtue and from personality, as well 
as from related notions like professional criticism and critical thinking.  
It is notable that the correlations of the included scales with conscientiousness and humility are 
comparatively small, and in a number of cases negative. This result may suggest that none of 
the included scales focusses specifically on the epistemic stages of processing information and 
forming beliefs. We are not aware of any scales that relate to this aspect of the epistemic 
process. The Intellectual Virtue Scale fills this research gap.  
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to develop and validate the Intellectual Virtue Scale. While there 
are numerous scales to measure personality traits, virtues, and the ability to think critically, we 
are not aware of a scale that measures intellectual virtues specifically. The Intellectual Virtue 
Scale fills this gap. The scale has been developed based on leading research on intellectual 
virtue. Some of the leading researchers on intellectual virtue participated in the expert 
validation as part of the scale validation.  
The resulting 20-item scale has desirable psychometric properties: the scale has a clean factor 
structure and it shows acceptable levels of internal consistency. Moreover, the convergence 
and divergence analysis suggests that the IVS is measuring a distinct construct from moral 
virtue and personality. At the same time, it shows convergence with related scales, providing 
some support for the construct validity of the scale.  
Some limitations of this study warrant acknowledgement. First, we rely on self-assessment and 
make it obvious to respondents what the socially desirable answer to each item is. As discussed 
in section 4.3.3, this limits the usefulness of the scale to scenarios where participants have no 
strong incentives to cast themselves in a positive light. The scale could also be used to rate 
third parties. Further work could compare the results of the scale when used in self-assessment 
and when assessment is done by others.    
The next step for further validating the scale is to evaluate construct validity. A scale is 
construct-valid if it is related to outcomes in predictable ways. If the IVS measures intellectual 
virtue successfully, respondents who score higher should be better at gaining knowledge and 
understanding. A higher score should therefore lead to better outcomes across domains where 
knowledge and understanding are key, such as education, economic and financial outcomes, 
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health, and more. In the next chapter, we will begin this work by investigating the relationship 
between intellectual virtue and financial outcomes. 
Yet another step in further validating the scale is to assess its test-retest validity. A scale has 
high test-retest validity if the scores of participants change little over time.  
Finally, there is more work to be done in developing scales that explore the aspects of 
intellectual virtue we have excluded so the current scale, including deliberative and other-
regarding intellectual virtues.   
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Appendix 8 Mapping of major taxonomies on the IVS 
Table 4.5: Mapping of major taxonomies on the IVS 
Roberts and Wood Intellectual Virtue Scale 
Love of Knowledge Love of Knowledge 
Firmness Intellectual Courage 
Courage and Caution Intellectual Courage 
Humility Humility 
Autonomy Outside of our scope 
Generosity Outside of our scope 
Practical Wisdom Related to all intellectual virtues 
    
Montmarquet Intellectual Virtue Scale 
Epistemic Conscientiousness Love of Knowledge, aspects of all 
intellectual virtues 
Impartiality Humility and Open-mindedness 
Sobriety Conscientiousness 
Intellectual courage Intellectual Courage 
    
Zagzebski Intellectual Virtue Scale 
Sensitivity to detail Conscientiousness 
Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising 
evidence Open-mindedness 
Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others Conscientiousness 
Intellectual humility Humility 
Intellectual perseverance, diligence, care, and 
thoroughness Intellectual Courage/Conscientiousness 
Adaptability of intellect Open-mindedness 
Being able to recognize reliable authority Outside of our scope 
Insight into persons, problems, theories Outside of our scope 
The social virtues of being communicative, 
including intellectual candour and knowing 
your audience Outside of our scope 
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Appendix 9 Discrimination Analysis 
Table 4.6: Summary of outcomes of the discrimination analysis, omitting the deficit and excess 
descriptions for each item 









L1 I am excited to learn new things. L 1.74 0.79 0.88 
L2 I want to understand many things. L 1.89 1.11 0.67 
L3 I enjoy taking things apart to see how they 
work. 
L 1.35 -0.41 0.63 
L4 I am willing to struggle to figure out things 
that are important to me. 
I 1.53 -0.58 0.65 
L5 I seek explanations of things. L 1.55 -0.05 0.89 
L6 I want to know the reasons why. L 1.79 0.32 0.44 
L7 If I hear of something interesting I will try 
to find out about it. 
L 1.74 0.79 0.67 
L8 I love to hear about other countries and 
cultures. 
L 1.00 -1.18 -0.18 
L9 I am open to exploring new things. L 1.50 -0.28 0.76 
L10 I enjoy gaining knowledge. L 1.94 1.11 0.76 
O1 I am valued by others for my open-
mindedness. 
O 1.74 0.63 1.00 
O2 I check my sources for reliability. C 1.89 0.44 1.00 
O3 I get a number of different perspectives on 
a given topic. 
O 1.88 0.88 0.88 
O4 I like to be challenged by people who think 
differently from me. 
O 1.53 -0.68 0.89 
O5 I consider the opinions of people I disagree 
with when making up my mind about 
controversial topics. 
O 1.76 0.24 0.60 
O6 I actively look for views I disagree with 
when trying to make up my mind about 
something. 
O 1.63 0.31 0.86 
O7 I often see merit on both sides of the 
argument. 
O 1.06 -1.11 0.67 
O8 I sometimes get my news from media 
outlets that favour viewpoints different 
from my own. 
O 1.67 0.11 0.88 
O9 I seek out unfamiliar views and 
perspectives. 
O 1.33 0.11 0.33 
O10 I believe that open-mindedness is crucial to 
avoiding and overcoming prejudices. 
O 1.72 -0.11 0.76 
O11 If someone told me I’ve been ignoring their 
points I would try to rectify that. 
O 1.35 -0.55 0.80 
O12 There is something to learn from everyone. O 1.38 0.06 0.87 
O13 I am open-minded. O 1.85 1.00 0.60 
C1 I break down difficult problems into small 
parts. 
C 1.58 1.16 0.89 
C2 I think things through. C 1.78 0.72 1.00 
C3 I make choices carefully. C 1.57 0.62 0.78 
C4 I make up my mind only after I have taken 
into account the relevant information. 
C 1.65 0.50 0.78 
C5 I think through the relevant factors before 
making up my mind. 
C 1.61 0.11 0.65 
C6 I weigh the pros and the cons when making 
up my mind. 
C 1.72 0.56 0.78 
C7 When I try to make predictions, I estimate 
how likely an outcome is. 
C 1.10 0.20 0.16 
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C8 When I cannot know for sure, I try to find 
out how likely things are. 
C 0.80 -0.65 0.20 
C9 I reason carefully and critically when 
making important decisions. 
C 1.79 0.95 0.89 
C10 I regularly check my reasoning for 
mistakes. 
C 1.67 0.28 1.00 
C11 If my feelings get in the way of evaluating 
an argument for some conclusion, I put it 
aside and come back to it later. 
C 1.26 -1.11 0.50 
C12 I evaluate information methodically and 
thoroughly. 
C 2.00 1.15 0.90 
H1 When I don't know something, I admit it. H 1.74 0.42 1.00 
H2 I adjust my views when conflicting 
information comes up. 
H 1.70 -0.20 0.89 
H3 There is nothing wrong with being 
undecided if there is little information to go 
on. 
H 1.39 -0.39 0.76 
H4 I could be wrong about many things. H 1.95 1.05 1.00 
H5 I rethink my position when new 
information comes up. 
H 1.44 -0.56 1.00 
H6 It is easy for me to concede I am wrong. H 1.78 0.83 0.76 
H7 I do not exaggerate how much I know. H 1.53 0.68 0.76 
H8 The more I know about an issue, the more 
confident I become of my opinions. 
H 1.68 0.89 0.89 
H9 I reconsider my views when reflection 
suggests I may be wrong. 
H 1.40 -0.40 0.58 
H10 I proportion the strength of my beliefs to 
the strength of my evidence. 
H 1.79 0.26 0.71 
I1 I am not afraid to adopt an unpopular 
opinion. 
I 1.50 0.60 1.00 
I2 I am not afraid to ask 'stupid questions'. I 1.22 -0.67 0.65 
I3 I tend to speak up in the face of strong 
opposition. 
I 1.05 0.16 0.56 
I4 I am not afraid to try new ways of thinking. O 1.11 -1.17 0.18 
I5 I keep asking questions until I understand 
the answer. 
L 1.26 -0.58 0.76 
I6 I pursue the truth even if it might be 
uncomfortable for me. 
I 1.83 0.28 0.63 
I7 I ask questions even if they reveal my 
ignorance. 
I 1.33 -0.89 0.67 
I8 I stick to my beliefs in spite of criticism as 
long as I am not convinced by the 
criticism. 
H 1.26 -0.42 0.89 
I9 To help the debate, I would give reasons in 
favour of an unpopular opinion, even if it is 
not my own. 
O 1.16 -0.63 0.79 
I10 I speak my mind freely even at some 
personal risk. 
I 1.57 1.19 0.81 
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Appendix 10 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Table 4.7: Item pool and internal consistency measures exploratory factor analysis 








L1 I am not very interested in 
learning new things. 
I am excited to learn new 
things. 
I am so excited to learn new 
things that other 
commitments might suffer. 
0.55 
L2 I am not very interested in 
understanding things. 
I want to understand things. I am excessively interested 
in understanding things. 
0.55 
L3 I am not so interested in the 
reasons why. 
I want to know the reasons 
why. 
I am excessively interested 
in understanding the reasons 
why. 
0.49 
L4 I am not particularly curious 
to learn new things. 
I am curious to learn new 
things. 
I get lost in learning new 
things. 
0.59 
L5 I like to stick to what I know 
when solving a problem. 
I am open to learn new 
things when solving a 
problem. 
I care more about learning 
something new than finding 
the best solution to a 
problem. 
0.45 
L6 I do not much enjoy gaining 
knowledge. 
I enjoy gaining knowledge. I unduly enjoy gaining 
knowledge. 
0.51 
L7 I am not very much 
concerned about other 
countries and cultures. 
I love to hear about other 
countries and cultures. 
I sometimes spend too much 
time learning about other 
countries and cultures. 
0.39 
L8 I have no inclination to learn 
how things work by taking 
them apart. 
I like to learn how things 
work by taking them apart. 
I like to learn how things 
work by taking them apart 




Open-mindedness in gathering information is the disposition to take up different standpoints and 
perspectives in seeking out evidence and being impartial in appraising the reliability of sources of 
information. 
0.73 
O1 I sometimes ignore sources 
of information that are 
potentially relevant to my 
purpose (e.g. people or 
media outlets). 
I choose an appropriate 
range of sources of 
information relevant to my 
purpose. 
I sometimes choose a wide 
variety of sources of 
information without thinking 
too much about their 
relevance for my purpose. 
0.31 
O2 I usually get one or at best a 
few different perspectives on 
any given topic. 
I get a number of different 
perspectives on a given 
topic. 
I often get more different 
perspectives on a topic than I 
can handle. 
0.47 
O3 I pay less attention to the 
views of people I disagree 
with. 
I consider the views of 
people I disagree with. 
I consider the views of 
people I disagree with 
extensively even when their 
views have little merit. 
0.55 
O4 I pay little attention to 
viewpoints I disagree with. 
I actively look for views I 
disagree with. 
I tend to get lost when 
looking for views I disagree 
with. 
0.47 
O5 I get most of my news from 
media outlets that favour 
viewpoints I agree with. 
I get a good part of my news 
from media outlets that 
favour viewpoints I disagree 
with. 
I spend a lot of time getting 
news from media outlets that 
favour viewpoints I disagree 
with, even when their 
viewpoints have little merit. 
0.41 
O6 Loyalty to one's ideas is 




different perspectives is 
crucial to overcoming 
prejudices. 
Open-mindedness towards 
different perspectives is 
more important than getting 
to the truth efficiently. 
0.38 
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O7 Few people are really worth 
listening to. 
There is something to learn 
from everyone. 
Everyone's perspective 
should always get equal 
attention. 
0.33 
O8 I am not very open-minded 
towards viewpoints different 
from my own. 
I am open-minded towards 
viewpoints different from 
my own. 
I am excessively open-
minded towards viewpoints 
different from my own. 
0.5 
 
Conscientiousness in evaluating information is the disposition to evaluate evidence methodically, 
thoroughly, and carefully.  
0.7 
C1 I often do not break down 
difficult problems in small 
parts. 
I frequently break down 
difficult problems into small 
parts. 
I tend to lose sight of my 
main problem because I get 
lost in details. 
0.28 
C2 I tend not to think things 
through at great length. 
I think things through. I sometimes mull over things 
until it is too late. 
0.48 
C3 I make up my mind without 
much fuss about the many 
factors that may affect an 
issue. 
I think through the relevant 
factors before making up my 
mind. 
I think through so many 
factors that might affect an 
issue that I sometimes 
struggle to make up my 
mind. 
0.51 
C4 I do not dwell on the pros 
and the cons when I make up 
my mind. 
I weigh the pros and the cons 
when I make up my mind. 
I often get stuck weighing 
the pros and cons when I 
make up my mind. 
0.47 
C5 When I make a prediction, I 
am not interested in 
probability, but in whether 
an outcome will happen or 
not. 
When I make a prediction, I 
guess the probability that an 
outcome will happen. 
I seldom make a prediction, 
because I find it difficult to 
deal with uncertainty. 
0.23 
C6 I tend to take important 
decisions on the spot. 
I reason carefully and 
critically before taking 
important decisions. 
I cannot take important 
decisions unless I am 100% 
sure. 
0.45 
C7 I sometimes forget to check 
my reasoning for mistakes. 
I regularly check my 
reasoning for mistakes. 
I tend to obsess about 
avoiding mistakes in my 
reasoning. 
0.39 
C8 I often evaluate information 
without much of a system. 
I evaluate information 
systematically. 
I am excessively systematic 
in evaluating information. 
0.31 
 
Humility in belief formation is the disposition to acknowledge you may be wrong, and to 
proportion the strength of your beliefs to the strength of your evidence.  
0.64 
H1 I very rarely realize when I 
know less than I should. 
I have a good sense of how 
much I know. 
I tend to underestimate how 
much I know. 
0.27 
H2 I tend to hold on to my views 
even if conflicting 
information comes up. 
I adjust my views in the light 
of new information. 
I tend to overreact to new 
information. 
0.29 
H3 Suspending judgment is a 
sign of weakness. 
There is nothing wrong with 
suspending judgment if there 
is little information to go on. 
It is best to suspend 
judgment because it avoids 
error. 
0.17 
H4 I know I am right about most 
things. 
I could be wrong about many 
things. 
I suspect I am wrong about 
most things. 
0.34 
H5 I very rarely recognize that I 
am wrong. 
It is easy for me to recognize 
when I am wrong. 
I am easily led to believe that 
I am wrong. 
0.39 
H6 I tend to be overconfident in 
my opinions. 
I have a realistic sense of 
what I know. 
I lack confidence in what I 
know. 
0.4 
H7 I have strong opinions about 
issues I know little about. 
The more I know about an 
issue, the more confident I 
become of my opinions. 
I often lack confidence in my 
opinions even on issues I 
know a lot about. 
0.42 
H8 I hold my beliefs firmly even 
in areas I know little about. 
I proportion the strength of 
my beliefs to the strength of 
my evidence. 
I hardly have any strong 
beliefs even in areas I know 
a lot about. 
0.39 
 0.77 
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Intellectual Courage is the disposition to pursue knowledge and understanding even if this may 
negatively affect your wellbeing.  
I1 I am afraid to hold an 
unpopular opinion. 
I am not afraid to adopt an 
unpopular opinion. 
I enjoy holding unpopular 
opinions for the sake of it. 
0.49 
I2 I am afraid to ask questions 
that could make me look 
stupid. 
I am not afraid to ask 
questions that could make 
me look stupid. 
I often ask questions that 
could make me look stupid 
for the fun of it. 
0.54 
I3 I abandon opinions if my 
environment disapproves of 
them. 
I entertain opinions that I 
find plausible even if my 
environment disapproves of 
them. 
I endorse opinions my 
environment disapproves of 
for the sake of it. 
0.37 
I4 I tend to accept answers I do 
not understand in order not 
to appear stupid. 
If I do not understand an 
answer, I keep asking until I 
understand. 
I tend to keep on asking 
questions for the sake of it. 
0.51 
I5 I sometimes sacrifice 
pursuing the truth when it is 
uncomfortable for me. 
I pursue the truth even if it 
might be uncomfortable for 
me. 
I pursue the truth even if I 
know doing so will do more 
harm than good. 
0.41 
I6 I avoid asking questions that 
might reveal my ignorance. 
I ask questions even if they 
reveal my ignorance. 
I do not mind at all about 
how the questions I ask 
come across. 
0.49 
I7 I don't pursue knowledge at 
the risk of personal costs. 
I pursue knowledge even at 
the risk of personal costs. 
I pursue knowledge even at 
the risk of harming others. 
0.41 
I8 I don't speak my mind freely 
when there might be 
negative results for me. 
I speak my mind freely even 
at some personal risk. 
I speak my mind freely even 
at the risk of causing serious 
harm to others. 
0.55 
 
Table 4.8: Eigenvalues of Exploratory Principal Factor Analysis all items   
Factor Eigenvalue Difference 
Factor1 5.85 3.37 
Factor2 2.48 1.05 
Factor3 1.43 0.39 
Factor4 1.04 0.27 
Factor5 0.77 0.27 
Factor6 0.50 0.03 
Factor7 0.47 0.16 
Factor8 0.31 0.04 
Factor9 0.27 0.03 
Factor10 0.24 0.03 
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Table 4.9: Factor loading exploratory factor analysis all items 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
L1 0.60           
L2 0.63           
L3 0.49           
L4 0.66           
L5 0.39 0.30         
L6 0.63           
L7 0.34 0.33         
L8 0.31           
O1             
O2   0.45         
O3   0.60         
O4   0.51         
O5   0.42         
O6   0.42         
O7   0.39         
O8   0.58         
C1             
C2       0.55     
C3       0.59     
C4       0.58     
C5             
C6       0.54     
C7       0.37     
C8       0.31     
H1         0.30   
H2   0.31         
H3             
H4         0.41   
H5         0.41   
H6         0.54   
H7         0.55   
H8         0.42   
I1     0.42       
I2     0.67       
I3     0.31       
I4     0.56       
I5     0.36       
I6     0.66       
I7           0.39 
I8     0.50       
Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3 
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Appendix 11 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
Figure 4.3: Parallel analysis for Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Table 4.10:  Factor loadings confirmatory factor analysis 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
L2 0.70         
L3 0.65         
L4 0.34         
L6 0.58         
O2   0.48       
O3   0.65       
O6   0.48       
O8   0.69       
C2       0.51   
C3       0.61   
C4       0.56   
C6       0.49   
H4         0.53 
H6         0.54 
H7         0.55 
H8         0.44 
I1     0.40     
I2     0.65     
I4     0.54     
I6     0.61     
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Table 4.11: Internal consistency confirmatory factor analysis 
Name Alpha/Item-Rest 

























Alpha whole scale 0.72 
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Appendix 12 Descriptive Statistics Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Figure 4.4: Histograms of intellectual virtue score for individual virtues overlaid with plot of 
normal distribution 
 
















Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 13 Convergence/Divergence Analysis  
Table 4.13: Items of scales for convergence and discrimination analysis 
IPIP VIA Curiosity (VC) 
Find the world a very interesting place. 
Am never bored. 
Am always busy with something interesting. 
Am excited by many different activities. 
Can find something of interest in any situation. 
Think that my life is extremely interesting. 
Love to hear about other countries and cultures. 
Will try anything once.  
Love to travel to places that I have never been before.  
Am not all that curious about the world. (R) 
Find it difficult to entertain myself. (R) 
  
IPIP VIA Love of Learning (VL) 
Am thrilled when I learn something new. 
Look forward to the opportunity to learn and grow. 
Am a true life-long learner. 
Read all the time. 
Consult the library or the Internet immediately if I want to know something. 
Do not like to learn new things. (R) 
Do not like to visit museums. (R) 
When learning something new it is easy for me to spend a long amount of time learning it.  
Like to spend time learning new things that do not have anything to do with my studies or 
work. 
My friends and family would say that I am interested in lots of different things. 
  
IPIP VIA Equity/Fairness (VE) 
Admit when I am wrong. 
Treat all people equally. 
Am a good listener. 
Believe that everyone's rights are equally important. 
Give everyone a chance. 
Am committed to principles of justice and equality. 
Refuse to take credit for work I haven’t done. 
No one deserves to be discriminated against because of the colour of their skin.  
Try to act fairly in all situations.  
Think that everyone should be responsible for their own behaviours.  
Help people even when I do not want to, because it is the right thing to do. 
Think that everyone should get a fair share.  
Take advantage of others. (R) 
Know people whose opinions are simply not worth listening to. (R) 
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IPIP VIA Valour/Bravery (VV) 
Have taken frequent stands in the face of strong opposition. 
Do not hesitate to express an unpopular opinion. 
Call for action while others talk. 
Can face my fears. 
Speak up in protest when I hear someone say mean things. 
Am a brave person.   
Have overcome pain and disappointment. 
Avoid dealing with uncomfortable emotions.  
Avoid dealing with awkward situations. 
Do not stand up for my beliefs. (R) 
Do not speak my mind freely when there might be negative results. (R) 
Can think of a time(s) in my life where I was very brave. 
Am able to do what I should do, even when I feel scared. 
  
IPIP VIA Judgment/Open-Mindedness (VJ) 
Try to identify the reasons for my actions. 
Make decisions only after I have all of the facts. 
Am valued by others for my objectivity. 
Am a firm believer in thinking things through. 
Weigh the pros and the cons. 
Am valued by my friends for my good judgment. 
Do not think about different possibilities when making decisions. (R) 
Do not tend to think things through critically. (R) 
Do not think about more possibilities than the one I like first. (R) 
Am approached often by people who want help, advice, or guidance with their problems. 
Think that changing important personal beliefs is often necessary to grow as a person. 
  
IPIP NEO Conscientiousness (NC) 
Am always prepared. 
Pay attention to details. 
Get chores done right away. 
Carry out my plans. 
Make plans and stick to them. 
Waste my time. (R) 
Find it difficult to get down to work. (R) 
Do just enough work to get by. (R) 
Don't see things through. (R) 
Shirk my duties. (R) 
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IPIP NEO Openness to Experience (NO) 
Believe in the importance of art. 
Have a vivid imagination. 
Tend to vote for liberal political candidates. 
Carry the conversation to a higher level. 
Enjoy hearing new ideas. 
Am not interested in abstract ideas. (R) 
Do not like art. (R) 
Avoid philosophical discussions. (R) 
Do not enjoy going to art museums. (R) 
Tend to vote for conservative political candidates. (R) 
  
Professional Scepticism (PS) 
I often accept other people's explanations without further thought. 
I feel good about myself. 
I wait to decide on issues until I can get more information 
The prospect of learning excites me. 
I am interested in what causes people to behave in the way that they do. 
I am confident of my abilities. 
I often reject statements unless I have proof that they are true. 
Discovering new information is fun. 
I take my time when making decisions. 
I tend to immediately accept what other people tell me. 
Other people's behaviour does not interest me (R) 
I am self-assured. 
My friends tell me that I usually question things that I see or hear. 
I like to understand the reason for other people's behaviour. 
I think that learning is exciting. 
I usually accept things I see, read, or hear at face value. (R) 
I do not feel sure of myself. 
I usually notice inconsistencies in explanations. 
Most often I agree with what others in my group think. (R) 
I dislike having to make decisions quickly. 
I have confidence in myself. 
I do not like to decide until I have looked at all of the readily available information. 
I like searching for knowledge. 
I frequently question things that I see or hear. 
It is easy for other people to convince me. (R) 
I seldom consider why people behave in a certain way. (R) 
I like to ensure that I've considered most available information before making a decision. 
I enjoy trying to determine if what I read or hear is true. 
I relish learning. 
The actions people take and the reasons for those actions are fascinating. 
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Critical Thinking Disposition Scale (CT) 
I usually try to think about the bigger picture during a discussion. 
I often use new ideas to shape (modify) the way I do things. 
I use more than one source to find out information for myself. 
I am often on the lookout for new ideas. 
I sometimes find a good argument that challenges some of my firmly held beliefs. 
It’s important to understand other people’s viewpoint on an issue. 
It is important to justify the choices I make. 
I often re-evaluate my experiences so that I can learn from them. 
I usually think about the wider implications of a decision before taking action. 
I usually check the credibility of the source of information before making judgements. 
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Table 4.14: Pairwise correlation coefficients for IVS and related scales 
 
Note: Alphas and number of observations for each of the scales in the diagonal. Numbers in 
brackets are p-values.  
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5 Do Intellectual Virtues Matter for Financial 
Literacy? 
5.1 Introduction 
Research on financial literacy has shown that knowledge and understanding of financial 
concepts and products is associated with better financial decisions. For instance, financial 
literacy is associated with better preparedness for retirement (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 
2011a), safer mortgages (Van Ooijen and Van Rooij 2016), and higher rates of stock-market 
participation (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011b). 
The importance of financial literacy raises the question of which factors support the acquisition 
of financial literacy. Researchers are sometimes quick to assume that financial education is the 
only viable way of boosting financial literacy, even though the impact evaluations of 
educational interventions to boost financial knowledge have been mixed (Lusardi and Mitchell 
2014).  An area that has received little attention in the literature on financial literacy is the role 
of personal characteristics in becoming financially literate. Which intellectual qualities 
promote the formation of financial literacy? We start addressing this research gap by 
investigating whether intellectual virtues support gaining knowledge and understanding about 
finance. Moreover, we explore whether intellectual virtues lead to a more reflective and 
conscientious approach to financial decision making.  
Intellectual virtues are qualities of individuals that support processing information and dealing 
with information conscientiously (Morton 2012; Alfano et al. 2017; De Bruin 2013; Peterson 
and Seligman 2004). We focus on five intellectual virtues: love of knowledge, openness in 
gathering information, conscientiousness in processing information, humility in belief 
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formation, and intellectual courage. We assess these virtues using a novel measurement 
instrument, the Intellectual Virtue Scale (IVS), introduced in chapter 4. 
We find that intellectually virtuous people are more financially literate. We also demonstrate 
that intellectually virtuous people deal more reflectively and conscientiously with financial 
matters. In particular, intellectually virtuous people display greater self-awareness about their 
financial knowledge or lack thereof, and are more likely to compare different financial 
advisors. 
These results have implications for policies to promote financial literacy. To date there is little 
evidence that financial literacy can be effectively taught directly (Fernandes, Lynch, and 
Netemeyer 2014; Lusardi 2008). This motivates searching for alternative ways of promoting 
financial literacy. Intellectual virtues are acquired traits which can be trained and fostered 
(Battaly 2006; Baehr 2013). Fostering intellectual virtue may thus provide a route to improve 
financial decision making. On a policy level, improving financial literacy across the population 
may be achieved by making the development of intellectual virtue a priority in the education 
system.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 relates our contribution to existing literature 
on intellectual virtue and financial literacy and articulates our hypotheses. Section 5.3 
describes how we measure intellectual virtue and the outcome variables. Section 5.4 presents 
and discusses regression results. Section 5.5 discusses strengths and limitations of the current 
investigation, and points to opportunities for further research.   
5.2 The Intellectual Virtue Scale and Financial Decision Making 
This study brings together two fields of research that have developed independently of each 
other and have not been linked so far. The financial literacy literature is one strand of research 
(Cox, Brounen, and Neuteboom 2015; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; Hilgert, Hogarth, and 
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Beverly 2003; Duca and Kumar 2014; Alessie, Rooij, and Lusardi 2011). The research on 
financial literacy has been conducted by economists with an emphasis on relating financial 
literacy to economic outcomes. Financial literacy is measured with questions on financial 
numeracy and knowledge about financial concepts. While this research has amply shown that 
financial literature is associated with better financial outcomes, the determinants of gaining 
financial knowledge and understanding have received little attention so far. One study has 
found that wealth plays only a minor role in explaining differences in financial literacy 
(Monticone 2010). Another study finds that motivation to become financially literate explains 
some of the variance in financial literacy scores after participants went through a financial 
education program (Mandell and Klein 2007).  
We seek to connect the literature on financial literacy with research on intellectual virtue. 
Intellectual virtues are acquired character traits that support gaining knowledge and 
understanding (Zagzebski 1996; Montmarquet 1993; Roberts and Wood 2007; Morton 2012; 
Fricker 2007; De Bruin 2013; Baehr 2011; 2006; Fairweather and Zagzebski 2001).  Research 
on intellectual virtue has been conducted mainly in philosophy, which has led to an emphasis 
of conceptual and theoretical investigations of intellectual virtues (Battaly 2008). Only recently 
have researchers started to investigate the empirical underpinnings of intellectual virtue 
(Fairweather and Flanagan 2014). There has also been interest by psychologists into some 
aspects of intellectual virtue (Peterson and Seligman 2004; Tetlock et al. 2000; Lerner and 
Tetlock 1999; Tetlock 1983, 2005). 
The finding by Mandell and Klein (mentioned above) that motivation explains differences in 
financial literacy suggests that intellectual qualities more broadly may affect financial literacy. 
Intellectual virtues include love of knowledge or curiosity, which is related to motivation, but 
also assesses a range of other intellectual qualities that may support the acquisition of financial 
knowledge and understanding. We are concerned with the following five intellectual virtues: 
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Love of Knowledge or curiosity is the disposition to actively and purposefully seek knowledge 
and understanding. Love of knowledge supports and enables the exercise of the other 
intellectual virtues by motivating their bearers to pursue knowledge and understanding.  
Open-mindedness in gathering information is the disposition to take up different standpoints 
and perspectives in seeking out evidence and being impartial in appraising the reliability of 
sources of information. Open-mindedness relates to the information-gathering phase of 
processing information, concerning the selection of evidence, sources, and interlocutors.  
Conscientiousness in evaluating information is the disposition to evaluate evidence 
methodically, thoroughly, and carefully. Conscientiousness relates to the evaluation of 
information, pertaining to acknowledging, comparing, and weighing information according to 
their relevance and merits.  
Humility in belief formation is the disposition to acknowledge you may be wrong, and to 
proportion the strength of your beliefs to the strength of your evidence. Humility pertains to 
the formation and revision of beliefs, including striking the right balance between over- and 
under-confidence.  
Intellectual Courage is the disposition to pursue knowledge and understanding even if this may 
negatively affect your wellbeing. Similar to love of knowledge, intellectual courage supports 
and enables the exercise of other intellectual virtues by fostering resilience in dealing with risks 
and fears in acquiring knowledge and understanding.  
How are intellectual virtues relevant to financial decision making? The Intellectual Virtue 
Scale evaluates traits related to motivating people to learn relevant information, and to be more 
competent in dealing with information. Therefore, we expect intellectually virtuous people to 
have more financial knowledge and understand financial concepts better. Moreover, some 
intellectual virtues, in particular humility and intellectual courage, require the ability to reflect 
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on the state of one’s beliefs and the strength of the justification of these beliefs.  We therefore 
expect intellectually virtuous people to be better aware of the limits of their knowledge and to 
be more reflective in making financial decisions. As a result, we expect intellectually virtuous 
people to score higher on traditional measures of financial literacy and to display higher self-
awareness of the extent of their financial knowledge. We expect that these behaviours lead 
intellectually virtuous people to make financial decisions more diligently.  
The expectation that intellectually virtuous people are more financially literate is a direct 
consequence of what intellectual virtues are, namely stable dispositions supporting people in 
coming to know and understanding relevant information (Zagzebski 1996). While finance is 
perhaps not intrinsically interesting for many people, financial decisions are critical for the 
financial wellbeing of households in modern developed societies like the Netherlands 
(Campbell 2006). We expect that intellectually virtuous people are more likely to take an 
interest in finance and thereby improve their financial literacy. We therefore expect that 
intellectually virtuous people are more financially literate.   
The expectation that intellectual virtue influences the accuracy of the self-assessment of people 
about their financial knowledge is also grounded in the nature of intellectual virtue. Exercising 
conscientiousness, humility, and intellectual courage all require us to deal with information 
diligently (De Bruin 2014). Diligence involves reflecting critically on whether one’s state of 
knowledge in a certain domain is sufficient to take consequential decisions based on that 
knowledge (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). Hence the ability to monitor one’s state of 
knowledge in different domains is an important dimension of intellectual knowledge (Baehr 
2011). Since some financial decisions by households have major consequences for decades, 
we expect that intellectually virtuous people will be good at assessing the state of their 
knowledge in this domain, as measured by their estimate of how many questions they answered 
correctly in financial literacy questionnaires. A more accurate self-assessment puts people in a 
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better position to avoid costly financial mistakes due to over- or under-confidence (Kramer 
2016). We therefore expect that intellectually virtuous people have a more accurate self-
assessment of their financial knowledge.  
Finally, we expect that intellectually virtuous people are more conscientious in selecting a 
financial advisor as measured by whether they compare different financial advisors before 
making a decision. Comparing financial advisors is an instance of conscientious financial 
decision making because the quality of financial advisors differs (Mullainathan, Noeth, and 
Schoar 2012). Previous research has investigated the relationship between financial literacy 
and advice seeking (Kramer 2016; Calcagno and Monticone 2015; Christine T. Ennew 1992), 
without finding a robust link. But the impact of intellectual virtue on financial advice seeking 
has been neglected so far. We expect that intellectually virtuous people are more likely to 
compare advisors rather than work with the first best candidate. In particular, comparing 
financial advisors is an exercise of the virtues of openness in information gathering and 
conscientiousness in information processing. Hence, we expect that intellectually virtuous 
people are more likely to compare different financial advisors. 
5.3  The Data 
5.3.1 The DNB Household Survey 
We designed a questionnaire including measures of financial literacy, the Intellectual Virtue 
Scale, and questions about financial advice. The questionnaire was fielded in the CentERpanel 
over two weeks in June 2017. The CentERpanel is an Internet based panel of over 2,000 
households administrated by CentERdata at Tilburg University and sponsored by the Dutch 
Central Bank. The panel is representative of the Dutch population. Questionnaires are 
administered online. Panel members without internet access receive equipment that enables 
them to participate through their television. Both the head of the household and any partner 
  157 
aged 20 or above are interviewed. 2,126 household members completed the survey (1,746 
households). 69% of respondents have a residential mortgage on their property (1,443 
respondents).  
Our questionnaire is combined with background information from the 2016 Dutch Household 
Survey (DHS). The DHS is an annual panel study which collects detailed information on the 
economic situation of households and psychological traits. The DHS consists of six modules. 
We were able to merge our survey with 1,174 people who completed the survey. Demographic 
information about the survey participants is summarized in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics Sample 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Demographics           
Male 1,174 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Age 1,174 58.39 15.47 21 92 
Net Household Income 1,174 2,803 1,384 0 12,617 
Wealth 1,174 52,116 16,4791 1 2,874,771 
Socioeconomic Status 1,173 3.62 1.05 1 5 
Educational Degree Dummies           
School degree 1,174 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Vocational Degree 1,174 0.48 0.50 0 1 
University degree 1,174 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Married 1,174 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Divorced 1,174 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Number of Children in Household 1,174 0.49 0.92 0 5 
Self Employed 1,174 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Retired 1,174 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Unemployed 1,174 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Government Employee 1,174 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Risk-Propensity Score 1,092 0.00 0.83 -1.22 2.24 
            
Intellectual Virtues           
IVS Score 1,159 0.00 0.64 -3.83 3.53 
Love of Knowledge 1,159 3.37 0.65 1 5 
Openness 1,159 3.20 0.57 1 5 
Conscientiousness 1,158 3.12 0.58 1 5 
Humility 1,158 2.91 0.45 1 5 
Courage 1,157 2.91 0.51 1 5 
            
Dependent Variables           
Basic Financial Literacy  1,174 4.19 0.90 1 5 
Advanced Financial Literacy 1,174 6.57 3.13 0 11 
Mortgage Literacy 1,174 3.18 1.78 0 6 
Self-assessment Basic Financial Literacy 1,171 -0.24 1.13 -4 4 
Self-assessment Advanced Financial Literacy 1,169 -0.47 2.13 -7 11 
Self-assessment Mortgage Financial Literacy 1,164 0.16 1.43 -4 6 
Advisors Compared? 726 0.23 0.42 0 1 
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5.3.2 Measuring Intellectual Virtues  
In order to elicit the intellectual virtues of the participants in our study, we administer the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale (IVS). The IVS is a new instrument designed to measure intellectual 
virtue. The IVS has been validated in previous work (Chapter 4), demonstrating the internal 
validity of the scale. Internal validity is a measure of whether the items in a scale have a high 
internal consistency and exhibit the expected factor structure (DeVellis 2016).  
What has not been shown to date is that the IVS is also construct-valid. Construct validity 
concerns whether the measurement instrument is appropriately related to outcome measures 
(DeVellis 2016). To show that the IVS is construct valid, we need to demonstrate that higher 
scores on the scale are associated with better knowledge and understanding. Here we 
investigate the relationship between the IVS and financial knowledge as well as conscientious 
and reflective conduct in making financial decisions.  
The Intellectual Virtue Scale is to our knowledge the first instrument to measure intellectual 
virtue in depth. We measure the five intellectual virtues described above with four items each, 
leading to a twenty-item self-reporting questionnaire.4  
Figure 5.1 illustrates the summary statistics as boxplots of the individual virtue scores.5 Note 
that each item is scored from zero (deficit) to five (excess), with the virtuous value at three. 
Ideally virtuous individuals would score three for each of the virtues. 
Average respondents score close to the virtuous mean, as indicated by the fact that all means 
fall within one standard deviation of 3. Variance is lowest for humility (SD 0.46), and highest 
                                               
4 The wording of the items is contained in Appendix 14. Appendix 2 confirms that the IVS 
meets psychometric standards concerning its factor structure and internal validity. 
5 Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for the scores of the individual intellectual virtues, 
obtained by averaging the values of the four items pertaining to each virtue. Appendix 3 
contains a histogram for each virtue. 
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for love of knowledge (0.65). This result shows that with regard to some virtues, there is more 
perceived diversity among Dutch households than for others.  
There are correlations between the intellectual virtue scores, as shown in Appendix 3. Almost 
all correlations are positive, with the exception of two small negative correlations between 
humility and love of knowledge as well as conscientiousness. This result indicates that there 
are not trade-offs between intellectual virtues in the sense that having some precludes the 
development of others. Rather, bearers of some virtues are more likely to bear some other 
virtues as well. Intellectual virtues thus appear to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Correlations are strongest between love of knowledge, openness, and conscientiousness, 
ranging between 0.45 and 0.48. Intellectual courage is correlated with these three virtues as 
well, but coefficients are smaller, between 0.15 and 0.29. Correlations are weakest between 
humility and the other virtues, ranging between -0.01 with love of knowledge to 0.28 with 
conscientiousness. An explanation for the weaker correlation between humility and the other 
virtues could be that humility requires that people take up a critical perspective on their quest 
for knowledge. Humility is concerned with interrogating one’s assumed knowledge as to 
whether it really is backed up by sufficient evidence. This self-critical critical perspective may 
be largely independent of other intellectual virtues.   
Among the virtues, respondents report the highest levels of love of knowledge, followed by 
openness and conscientiousness. The results are qualitatively similar to the results from the 
validation study (chapter 4). It is notable that respondents tend to report somewhat excessive 
levels of love of knowledge, conscientiousness, and openness, while reporting somewhat 
deficient levels of humility and intellectual courage. This pattern was also present in the 
validation study. 
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Figure 5.1: Boxplot of intellectual virtue score for individual virtues 
 
In order for all five virtues to have an equal impact on the overall intellectual virtue score, we 
calculate the intellectual virtue score as the mean of the z-values of the individual virtue scores. 
To understand better which demographic factors are associated with higher scores in 
intellectual virtue, we regress demographic characteristics of the population on the intellectual 
virtue score (Appendix 17). Educational background is significant at a 1% level. Participants 
who completed vocational training achieve higher scores than participants who only graduated 
from secondary school, and participants with a university degree do better than participants 
with vocational training. This suggests that participants with more formal training tend to 
display more intellectual virtue.  
The other characteristic that is significant at a 1% level is the propensity to take risks. The 
greater the propensity of participants to take risk, the higher their intellectual virtue score. This 






Love of Knowledge Openness
Conscientiousness Humility
Courage
  161 
people investing in the stock market have a greater need of and use for knowledge about finance 
than people who invest in less volatile assets. Similarly, people doing risky sports need to 
acquire knowledge about safety precautions to keep themselves out of harm’s way than people 
who do not engage in risky sports.  
Other variables are significant at a lower level of significance. We find that divorced 
participants tend to score higher on intellectual virtue, significant at the 5% level. Concerning 
age, participants in every age bracket above the youngest 18-24 age bracket tend to score 
slightly lower on intellectual virtue than the participants in this youngest age bracket, 
significant at a 10% level. Wealth and Socioeconomic Status is positively related to intellectual 
virtue, with the coefficients significant at the 10% level. Gender does not appear to be 
correlated with intellectual virtue scores. The overall association of intellectual virtue with 
demographic variables is small, however, as indicated by an R2 for the whole regression of 
0.07.  
5.3.3 Measuring Financial Literacy and Self-Awareness of Financial 
Knowledge 
We elicit financial literacy with two established measures, basic and advanced financial 
literacy, as well as one novel measure, the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire. Appendix 14 
shows the exact wording of the questions. Summary statistics for the scores associated with 
each measure are contained in Appendix 3.  
The basic and advanced financial literacy questionnaires assess understanding of basic 
economic principles such as interest rates, inflation, and portfolio diversification, as well as 
characteristics of financial instruments. These questions or a subset thereof have been used in 
almost all studies on financial literacy referred to in section 5.2, making the basic and advanced 
financial literacy questionnaires the established measure of financial literature (Huston 2010). 
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Our results are very similar to the results reported by van Rooij et al. using the same panel in 
2011 (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011a).  
The novel measure we employ is the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire (MLQ). We have 
developed the MLQ to assess mortgage-specific knowledge not covered by basic and financial 
literacy questionnaires, including legal and fiscal aspects of mortgages. In another study, we 
show that mortgage literacy is associated with mortgage risks and mortgage risk management 
over and above financial literacy (cf. chapter 3).  
To evaluate self-awareness of financial literacy, we ask respondents how many questions they 
believe they answered correctly for each of the literacy measures. Measuring self-awareness 
enables us to investigate whether higher levels of intellectual virtue are associated with higher 
levels of self-awareness about one’s financial knowledge or the lack thereof. Detailed results 
for each of the measures are contained in Appendix 3. In Table 5.16, we report estimates of 
correct answers by actual literacy scores. We find that mean and median estimates track the 
actual scores closely. In cases of advanced financial literacy for instance, the median does not 
deviate by more than one from the actual score. But these measures mask to what extent many 
respondents make mistakes in estimating the number of correct answers. Between 26% of 
participants (mortgage literacy) and 44% of participants (basic financial literacy) estimate their 
scores correctly. The remaining participants are either over- or under-confident. Still, a large 
part of respondents is at least approximately accurate in their self-assessments.  
Respondents are more confident about their knowledge about mortgages than about basic and 
advanced financial literacy. Only in case of mortgage literacy is the proportion of respondents 
who overestimate their scores higher than the proportion of respondents who underestimate 
their scores. Table 5.2 shows the difference between the self-assessment of respondents and 
their score for basic and advanced financial literacy, as well as for mortgage literacy. If 
respondents score zero on this measure, their self-assessment is exactly in line with their actual 
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literacy score. Negative values indicate that respondents are on average under-confident. 
Positive values indicate that respondents are on average over-confident. Concerning advanced 
financial literacy, respondents underestimate their score by half a question on average. It is 
only with respect to mortgage literacy that respondents are overconfident. 
Table 5.2: Difference between self-assessment and correct questions 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Basic Financial Literacy 1,171 -0.24 1.13 -4 4 
Advanced Financial Literacy 1,169 -0.47 2.13 -7 11 
Mortgage Debt Literacy 1,164 0.16 1.43 -4 6 
 
5.3.4 Measuring Propensity to Compare Advisors  
Financial literacy and self-knowledge about financial literacy are determinants of economic 
decision making. By contrast, in using the propensity to compare advisors as an outcome 
variable, we attempt to demonstrate a direct association between intellectual virtue and 
economic decision making. By contrast, our final outcome variable concerns economic 
decision making directly. We assess whether participants compare financial advisors before 
settling for one. 
Financial advisors differ in price as well as quality (De Bruin 2014, chs. 3-4). In the 
Netherlands, price differences between financial advisors amount to several hundred Euros per 
mortgage. But whether financial advisors select a suitable mortgage at a low interest rate is 
even more crucial. Small differences between mortgage rates can easily increase interest 
payments over the lifetime of a mortgage by several thousands of Euros. Hence taking care in 
selecting a financial advisor matters considerably for household finances. We expect that 
intellectually virtuous people are more likely to display the intellectual courage required to 
resist working with the first advisor one encounters, and to display the conscientiousness to 
compare several advisors.  
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The overwhelming majority of respondents works with financial advisors, regardless of their 
level of financial literacy. Of the 872 respondents who have taken out a mortgage, 83% have 
worked with a financial advisor (N=726). Yet more than three quarters of participants who 
worked with a financial advisor report that they did not compare advisors. As Table 5.3 shows, 
most respondents who compared advisors sought some kind of direct contact with them, either 
in person, or via phone or email (15%). Smaller groups compared offerings of financial 
advisors online (5%) or took guidance from family or friends (7%).   
Table 5.3: How respondents compared different financial advisors 
 N Percent 
Compared different advisors in person, on phone, or via email contact 107 15% 
Compared different advisors online 33 5% 
Took guidance from family or friends about different advisors 48 7% 
Has not compared advisors 556 76% 
Total 744 103% 
Note: Among the first three answer options, selecting multiple options was possible. 
 
What are the reasons not to compare advisors? Table 5.4 lists responses from our survey. The 
majority of respondents say that they trusted the advisor they selected (58%). Since these 
respondents did not compare different financial advisors, it is unlikely that they had much 
evidence of the comparative quality of their particular advisor. It appears that many 
respondents trusted their advisor in the absence of any evidence of their quality. There is only 
a small share of respondents who indicate that comparing advisors was difficult. This result 
suggests that for most respondents, the reason for not comparing advisors is not lack of 
cognitive ability or access to information, but lack of diligence. 
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Table 5.4: Why people did not compare advisors  
  N Percent 
I trust the advisor I selected 321 58% 
Comparison was difficult 11 2% 
First advisor I came across was good enough 97 17% 
Other 79 14% 
I don't know 48 9% 
Total 556 100% 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Intellectual virtue and financial literacy 
We expect that the IVS is positively associated with financial literacy scores. To test this 
hypothesis, we run an OLS regression with standardized scores of basic, advanced, and 
mortgage literacy as dependent variables, respectively. We use the following controls 
throughout: log household income, log household wealth, socioeconomic status, gender, 
education, age, marriage status, number of children, employment status, risk propensity.  
Table 5.5 shows the regression results. Columns 1-3 use the summary measure of intellectual 
virtue as independent variable, testing one of the three kinds of financial literacy we discussed 
in section 5.3.3: basic financial literacy, advanced financial literacy, and mortgage literacy. 
The association of advanced financial literacy and mortgage literacy with intellectual virtue is 
significant at the 1% level, and of basic financial literacy with intellectual virtue at a 10% level.   
Note that we are using standardised scores, both for the IVS scores and the financial literacy 
scores throughout. Hence the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of fractions of standard 
deviations. For instance, the coefficient of the IVS score in column 1 means that an increase in 
one standard deviation in intellectual virtue is associated with an increase in basic financial 
literacy of 5% of a standard deviation. The associations of intellectual virtue with mortgage 
literacy and advanced financial literacy are even stronger. An increase in intellectual virtue of 
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one standard deviation is associated with an increase in mortgage literacy of 0.08 standard 
deviations, and with an increase in advanced financial literacy of 0.12 standard deviations.  
Intellectual virtue is most strongly associated with advanced financial literacy. Moreover, Van 
Rooij finds that advanced financial literacy is most strongly associated with economic 
behaviour of households. We therefore investigate this measure of financial literacy in detail 
in columns 4-9. In columns 4-8, we use one of the five intellectual virtues as dependent 
variable, respectively. Column 9 includes all five intellectual virtues as dependent variables 
jointly. The regressions show that the positive association between intellectual virtue and 
advanced financial literacy is driven by three virtues: love of knowledge and openness, which 
are significant at a 1% level individually, and conscientiousness, which is significant at the 5% 
level. Love of knowledge remains significant at the 1% level in column 9 as well. Humility 
and courage are not significantly associated with advanced financial literacy in individual 
regressions.  
The results for individual virtues make sense given the meaning of the virtues. Acquiring 
financial knowledge requires motivation to learn, which is captured by love of knowledge; 
openness to different perspectives, as captured by openness in information gathering; and 
careful processing of information, as captured by conscientiousness in information processing. 
By contrast, humility does not seem to be essential to master financial concepts. Being boastful 
does not seem to be a hindrance to becoming financially literate. Nor is a special amount of 
intellectual courage required to acquire basic financial knowledge, as the information can be 
obtained from many sources, including magazines and the internet, that do not require courage.   
We thus find support for our expectation that intellectual virtue is positively associated with 
financial literacy. Our regression approach does not establish causation, nor indicate the 
direction of causation. But the result is consistent with our expectation that intellectual virtue 
supports gaining financial knowledge.    
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Table 5.5: Regression results: Intellectual virtue and financial literacy 


















IVS Score 0.0522* 0.1162*** 0.0758***             
  (0.0306) (0.0264) (0.0285)             
Love of Knowledge       0.1832***         0.1751*** 
        (0.0267)         (0.0320) 
Openness         0.1044***       0.0484 
          (0.0256)       (0.0301) 
Conscientiousness           0.0643**     -0.0145 
            (0.0259)     (0.0300) 
Humility             -0.0099   -0.0180 
              (0.0261)   (0.0273) 
Courage               0.0228 -0.0319 
                (0.0257) (0.0264) 
Male 0.1907*** 0.4227*** 0.1736*** 0.3982*** 0.4328*** 0.4252*** 0.4147*** 0.4088*** 0.4108*** 
  (0.0689) (0.0595) (0.0642) (0.0588) (0.0597) (0.0599) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0603) 
Log Net Household Income  0.0530 0.2039*** 0.2422*** 0.1869*** 0.1978*** 0.1988*** 0.1988*** 0.2025*** 0.1771*** 
  (0.0739) (0.0638) (0.0688) (0.0631) (0.0639) (0.0642) (0.0645) (0.0645) (0.0633) 
Log Wealth 0.0382*** 0.0718*** 0.0512*** 0.0682*** 0.0727*** 0.0705*** 0.0724*** 0.0728*** 0.0665*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0096) (0.0104) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0096) 
Socio-Economic Status 0.0848** 0.1258*** 0.1818*** 0.1143*** 0.1354*** 0.1364*** 0.1391*** 0.1375*** 0.1229*** 
  (0.0385) (0.0332) (0.0358) (0.0329) (0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0330) 
Married  0.0293 0.0066 0.1809*** 0.0075 0.0196 0.0142 0.0237 0.0204 0.0147 
  (0.0740) (0.0639) (0.0689) (0.0631) (0.0639) (0.0643) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0632) 
Divorced  0.0840 0.0892 0.2442** 0.0722 0.0952 0.1054 0.1142 0.1092 0.0664 
  (0.1279) (0.1104) (0.1190) (0.1090) (0.1105) (0.1109) (0.1111) (0.1113) (0.1091) 
Number of Children 0.0213 -0.0083 0.0227 -0.0070 -0.0107 -0.0064 -0.0089 -0.0092 -0.0033 
  (0.0397) (0.0343) (0.0370) (0.0339) (0.0343) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0340) 
Self-Employed  -0.1416 0.0375 0.1141 0.0556 0.0552 0.0358 0.0400 0.0347 0.0658 
  (0.1365) (0.1178) (0.1271) (0.1163) (0.1180) (0.1185) (0.1189) (0.1188) (0.1165) 
Retired 0.0953 -0.0145 0.0972 0.0031 -0.0135 -0.0075 -0.0042 -0.0064 0.0054 
  (0.1140) (0.0984) (0.1061) (0.0972) (0.0986) (0.0989) (0.0993) (0.0992) (0.0972) 
Unemployed 0.0212 0.0468 -0.1542 0.0595 0.0516 0.0486 0.0501 0.0528 0.0842 
  (0.1247) (0.1077) (0.1161) (0.1063) (0.1079) (0.1087) (0.1090) (0.1091) (0.1069) 
Government Worker 0.2153** 0.1302 0.0896 0.1164 0.1287 0.1215 0.1107 0.1084 0.1197 
  (0.1055) (0.0911) (0.0983) (0.0899) (0.0912) (0.0916) (0.0923) (0.0920) (0.0906) 
Risk-Proneness  0.1226*** 0.2477*** 0.1355*** 0.2428*** 0.2483*** 0.2533*** 0.2603*** 0.2606*** 0.2389*** 
  (0.0374) (0.0323) (0.0348) (0.0318) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0319) 
Age (18-24 omitted)                   
25-34 years -0.1072 0.1560 0.2273 -0.0117 0.0351 0.1527 -0.0048 0.0123 -0.0577 
  (0.6763) (0.5839) (0.6296) (0.5756) (0.5838) (0.5887) (0.5901) (0.5879) (0.5798) 
35-44 years -0.0880 0.0718 0.1825 -0.0714 -0.0616 0.0659 -0.0985 -0.0880 -0.1308 
  (0.6763) (0.5840) (0.6297) (0.5756) (0.5838) (0.5890) (0.5900) (0.5878) (0.5800) 
45-54 years -0.0070 0.1554 0.1405 0.0313 0.0203 0.1636 0.0035 0.0119 -0.0210 
  (0.6758) (0.5835) (0.6292) (0.5753) (0.5835) (0.5885) (0.5894) (0.5875) (0.5795) 
55-64 years -0.0925 0.2031 0.2268 0.0929 0.0614 0.2050 0.0396 0.0472 0.0343 
  (0.6744) (0.5823) (0.6279) (0.5740) (0.5822) (0.5874) (0.5882) (0.5862) (0.5785) 
older than 65 years -0.1290 0.2163 0.0649 0.1079 0.0791 0.2146 0.0478 0.0553 0.0554 
  (0.6785) (0.5858) (0.6317) (0.5774) (0.5856) (0.5909) (0.5917) (0.5897) (0.5818) 
Education (School Degree omitted)                   
Vocational Degree 0.0872 -0.0400 -0.0495 -0.0435 -0.0367 -0.0211 -0.0091 -0.0117 -0.0461 
  (0.0741) (0.0639) (0.0689) (0.0630) (0.0640) (0.0641) (0.0642) (0.0641) (0.0631) 
University Degree 0.2680** 0.0986 0.0232 0.0623 0.0957 0.1208 0.1357 0.1325 0.0463 
  (0.1182) (0.1021) (0.1101) (0.1010) (0.1024) (0.1024) (0.1025) (0.1026) (0.1012) 
Constant -1.2477 -3.1229*** -3.3804*** -2.7794*** -2.9980*** -3.1308*** -2.9995*** -3.0252*** -2.6761*** 
  (0.8374) (0.7231) (0.7797) (0.7150) (0.7241) (0.7283) (0.7330) (0.7296) (0.7205) 
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,061 1,061 1,060 1,060 
R-squared 0.1086 0.2984 0.2061 0.3163 0.2966 0.2883 0.2842 0.2847 0.3175 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0915 0.285 0.191 0.303 0.283 0.275 0.270 0.271 0.302 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
 
5.4.2 Intellectual virtue and self-awareness about financial knowledge 
We expect that intellectual virtue is positively correlated with the accuracy of self-awareness 
about financial literacy. To test the hypothesis, we run an OLS regression with self-awareness 
scores for basic, advanced, and mortgage literacy scores as dependent variables.  
Table 5.6 shows the results. Recall that we compute self-awareness as the difference between 
the actual number of correctly answered literacy questions and the participant’s estimation of 
the number of correctly answered questions, as explained in section 5.3.3. On average, 
respondents are roughly realistic in their self-assessment. Negative coefficients are therefore a 
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sign of a self-critical attitude towards one own knowledge, and positive coefficients a sign of 
an optimistic attitude towards one’s self-knowledge.  
In columns 1-3, we test the association of intellectual virtue with self-awareness of knowledge 
about basic, advanced, and mortgage literacy, respectively. The dependent variable is the z-
score of the intellectual virtue score. The intellectual virtue score is not significantly associated 
with any of the literacy scores. At first sight, it might appear that intellectual virtue does not 
matter for self-awareness about financial knowledge.  
But once we investigate intellectual virtues separately, it turns out that the aggregate measure 
of intellectual virtue masks significant relationships between individual virtues and self-
knowledge about advanced financial literacy, which we investigate in columns 4-9. Columns 
4-8 use one of the five individual virtues as independent variables, respectively. Column 9 
includes all five virtues jointly as independent variables. While humility and courage are both 
significantly related to self-knowledge, their coefficient have opposite signs. Participants who 
score higher on humility tend to have a more self-critical attitude towards their knowledge 
about finance. By contrast, participants who score higher on courage tend to have a more 
optimistic attitude towards their knowledge about finance. When these scores are combined in 
aggregate intellectual virtue measure, they cancel each other out.   
We thus find support for the expectation that intellectual virtue is associated with self-
knowledge about finance, if not on the aggregate level. The association of humility with a self-
critical attitude towards one’s knowledge is in line with expectations. What is more surprising 
is that intellectual courage seems to be associated with lower levels of self-knowledge. This 
result suggests that intellectual courage, including the courage to question claims of others, is 
grounded in a high level of reassurance concerning one’s own knowledge.  
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IVS Score 0.0370 0.0087 0.0580             
  (0.0341) (0.0662) (0.0451)             
Love of Knowledge       0.0422         -0.0294 
        (0.0678)         (0.0810) 
Openness         0.0082       0.0067 
          (0.0640)       (0.0761) 
Conscientiousness           0.0154     0.0608 
            (0.0645)     (0.0759) 
Humility             -0.1835***   -0.2046*** 
              (0.0646)   (0.0691) 
Courage               0.1443** 0.1432** 
                (0.0638) (0.0667) 
Male 0.3443*** 0.5150*** 0.5965*** 0.5104*** 0.5158*** 0.5151*** 0.4478*** 0.4632*** 0.3995*** 
  (0.0768) (0.1492) (0.1016) (0.1492) (0.1495) (0.1494) (0.1504) (0.1506) (0.1526) 
Log Net Household Income  0.0298 -0.2224 -0.0263 -0.2267 -0.2229 -0.2198 -0.2424 -0.2152 -0.2378 
  (0.0824) (0.1599) (0.1089) (0.1601) (0.1600) (0.1602) (0.1598) (0.1600) (0.1601) 
Log Wealth 0.0075 -0.0652*** 0.0093 -0.0664*** -0.0652*** -0.0648*** -0.0656*** -0.0630*** -0.0652*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0241) (0.0164) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0242) 
Socio-Economic Status 0.0620 -0.0303 -0.1155** -0.0343 -0.0295 -0.0321 -0.0220 -0.0395 -0.0273 
  (0.0429) (0.0832) (0.0567) (0.0834) (0.0831) (0.0833) (0.0831) (0.0832) (0.0836) 
Married  0.1402* -0.0657 -0.1392 -0.0677 -0.0647 -0.0675 -0.0451 -0.0748 -0.0586 
  (0.0825) (0.1602) (0.1091) (0.1601) (0.1600) (0.1603) (0.1597) (0.1599) (0.1598) 
Divorced  0.0450 -0.3810 -0.1622 -0.3897 -0.3807 -0.3784 -0.3809 -0.4083 -0.4159 
  (0.1425) (0.2767) (0.1884) (0.2767) (0.2766) (0.2765) (0.2753) (0.2762) (0.2760) 
Number of Children -0.0115 0.0247 -0.0167 0.0257 0.0245 0.0225 0.0127 0.0205 0.0104 
  (0.0443) (0.0860) (0.0586) (0.0860) (0.0859) (0.0862) (0.0859) (0.0861) (0.0860) 
Self-Employed  0.2085 0.0222 -0.2428 0.0259 0.0236 0.0227 0.0516 0.0076 0.0341 
  (0.1521) (0.2953) (0.2011) (0.2953) (0.2955) (0.2955) (0.2945) (0.2950) (0.2948) 
Retired 0.0451 -0.1326 -0.1389 -0.1295 -0.1325 -0.1337 -0.1045 -0.1340 -0.1061 
  (0.1271) (0.2467) (0.1680) (0.2466) (0.2467) (0.2468) (0.2460) (0.2463) (0.2460) 
Unemployed -0.0835 -0.2023 0.0320 -0.1967 -0.2019 -0.2134 -0.2048 -0.1933 -0.1883 
  (0.1390) (0.2698) (0.1838) (0.2698) (0.2700) (0.2712) (0.2701) (0.2708) (0.2706) 
Government Worker -0.2086* 0.0809 -0.0941 0.0801 0.0809 0.0816 0.0099 0.0495 -0.0224 
  (0.1176) (0.2284) (0.1555) (0.2282) (0.2284) (0.2284) (0.2288) (0.2283) (0.2292) 
Risk-Proneness  0.0150 -0.0405 0.0305 -0.0437 -0.0405 -0.0404 -0.0297 -0.0376 -0.0309 
  (0.0416) (0.0809) (0.0551) (0.0808) (0.0809) (0.0808) (0.0803) (0.0804) (0.0808) 
Age (18-24 omitted)                   
25-34 years -0.6301 -0.3073 -0.0992 -0.3246 -0.3163 -0.2829 -0.6783 -0.3631 -0.6258 
  (0.7538) (1.4635) (0.9966) (1.4612) (1.4614) (1.4685) (1.4619) (1.4594) (1.4672) 
35-44 years -0.6063 0.4347 0.3573 0.4241 0.4248 0.4622 0.0684 0.3753 0.1123 
  (0.7538) (1.4636) (0.9967) (1.4610) (1.4613) (1.4691) (1.4618) (1.4592) (1.4677) 
45-54 years -0.5388 0.5770 0.2603 0.5694 0.5669 0.6002 0.2274 0.5077 0.2619 
  (0.7532) (1.4625) (0.9959) (1.4602) (1.4605) (1.4680) (1.4603) (1.4584) (1.4664) 
55-64 years -0.5068 0.4402 0.2713 0.4369 0.4296 0.4665 0.0882 0.3687 0.1194 
  (0.7517) (1.4595) (0.9939) (1.4571) (1.4573) (1.4653) (1.4573) (1.4553) (1.4638) 
older than 65 years -0.5054 0.7991 0.5061 0.7971 0.7889 0.8245 0.4394 0.7217 0.4659 
  (0.7562) (1.4683) (0.9999) (1.4657) (1.4659) (1.4740) (1.4660) (1.4639) (1.4723) 
Education (School Degree omitted)                 
Vocational Degree -0.0733 0.0612 0.0820 0.0558 0.0614 0.0606 0.0874 0.0524 0.0733 
  (0.0825) (0.1603) (0.1091) (0.1598) (0.1602) (0.1598) (0.1591) (0.1592) (0.1598) 
University Degree -0.0530 0.2973 0.0186 0.2826 0.2969 0.2981 0.2937 0.2903 0.2747 
  (0.1318) (0.2559) (0.1743) (0.2564) (0.2562) (0.2554) (0.2540) (0.2546) (0.2561) 
Constant -0.4656 1.0591 0.0721 1.1301 1.0687 1.0180 1.5654 1.1401 1.5709 
  (0.9334) (1.8122) (1.2341) (1.8148) (1.8125) (1.8166) (1.8160) (1.8111) (1.8231) 
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,061 1,061 1,060 1,060 
R-squared 0.0580 0.0428 0.0636 0.0431 0.0428 0.0424 0.0497 0.0466 0.0548 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0399 0.0244 0.0456 0.0247 0.0244 0.0240 0.0315 0.0283 0.0329 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
 
 
5.4.3 Intellectual Virtue and Propensity to Compare Advisors 
We now turn to the relationship between intellectual virtue and conscientiousness in financial 
decision making. Based on the discussion in section 5.3.4, we expect that intellectually virtuous 
people are more likely to compare financial advisors. The main reason is that advisors differ in 
price and quality. Selecting a good advisor can make a major difference to household finances. 
We expect intellectually virtuous people to be more likely to realise the potential gains of 
comparing advisors, be motivated to act on this insight, and display the intellectual courage to 
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resist working with the first advisor they encounter. We use the dummy variable measuring 
whether people compared advisors as dependent variable in a probit analysis, with the 
standardized intellectual virtue scores and individual virtue scores as independent variables, as 
well as standard controls. Table 5.7 shows the regression results.  
Column 1 includes the standardized intellectual virtue score as independent variable. The 
relationship between intellectual virtue and advisor comparison is positive, significant at a 1% 
level, and fairly large. An increase in intellectual virtue by one standard deviation is associated 
with an increase in the likelihood to compare advisors of 27%.  
Columns 2-6 include one of the individual virtues as independent variables, respectively. 
Except for humility, individually all virtues are positively associated with advice-seeking at a 
1% level. Column 7 includes all five virtues jointly as independent variables. Intellectual 
courage and humility both remain significant at the 10% level. Love of knowledge and 
openness are no longer significant, due to collinearity. In sum, we find support for our 
expectation that intellectual virtue is associated with a greater likelihood that people compare 
financial advisors before making their choice.     
Is it exclusively intellectual virtue that is positively related with the tendency to compare 
financial advisors, or is financial literacy also correlated with whether people compare financial 
advisors? We show in Appendix 18 that none of the three financial literacy measures is 
significantly positively associated with the tendency to compare advisors. In fact, people who 
score higher on basic financial literacy are significantly less likely to compare financial 
advisors. Hence intellectual virtue is associated with this example of conscientious financial 
decision making in a way that financial literacy is not.  
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Table 5.7: Regression Results: Intellectual virtues and whether people compare advisors 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IVS Score 0.2686***             
  (0.0664)             
Love of Knowledge   0.1906***         0.0842 
    (0.0619)         (0.0705) 
Openness     0.1907***       0.0995 
      (0.0633)       (0.0720) 
Conscientiousness       0.1907***     0.1308* 
        (0.0605)     (0.0688) 
Humility         0.0040   -0.0403 
          (0.0598)   (0.0650) 
Courage           0.1451*** 0.1057* 
            (0.0557) (0.0576) 
Male 0.1918 0.1792 0.2077 0.2025 0.1874 0.1192 0.1399 
  (0.1319) (0.1318) (0.1312) (0.1314) (0.1320) (0.1330) (0.1367) 
Log Net Household Income  0.0416 0.0151 0.0433 0.0247 0.0323 0.0538 0.0421 
  (0.1589) (0.1567) (0.1579) (0.1585) (0.1570) (0.1584) (0.1598) 
Log Wealth -0.0558** -0.0532** -0.0523** -0.0536** -0.0469** -0.0483** -0.0573** 
  (0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0231) 
Socio-Economic Status 0.0169 0.0170 0.0406 0.0296 0.0435 0.0396 0.0197 
  (0.0797) (0.0796) (0.0790) (0.0791) (0.0785) (0.0787) (0.0804) 
Married  -0.3406** -0.3301** -0.3299** -0.3368** -0.3241** -0.3332** -0.3487** 
  (0.1407) (0.1399) (0.1400) (0.1403) (0.1391) (0.1397) (0.1413) 
Divorced  -0.5210** -0.5045** -0.5081** -0.4807* -0.4508* -0.4798* -0.5488** 
  (0.2571) (0.2564) (0.2559) (0.2567) (0.2529) (0.2541) (0.2602) 
Number of Children 0.0023 0.0015 0.0011 0.0091 0.0071 0.0033 -0.0005 
  (0.0662) (0.0660) (0.0657) (0.0659) (0.0654) (0.0658) (0.0666) 
Self-Employed  -0.3566 -0.2964 -0.3284 -0.3096 -0.3196 -0.3699 -0.3346 
  (0.2724) (0.2641) (0.2676) (0.2656) (0.2624) (0.2707) (0.2753) 
Retired -0.0676 -0.0613 -0.0512 -0.0788 -0.0889 -0.1033 -0.0582 
  (0.2444) (0.2418) (0.2418) (0.2424) (0.2418) (0.2435) (0.2433) 
Unemployed -0.0335 -0.0323 0.0368 -0.0708 -0.0399 -0.0333 -0.0053 
  (0.2922) (0.2928) (0.2925) (0.2892) (0.2898) (0.2890) (0.2934) 
Government Worker 0.1672 0.1478 0.1579 0.1553 0.1543 0.1169 0.1114 
  (0.1776) (0.1768) (0.1770) (0.1764) (0.1769) (0.1766) (0.1801) 
Risk-Proneness  0.0345 0.0367 0.0374 0.0426 0.0510 0.0586 0.0406 
  (0.0718) (0.0715) (0.0716) (0.0714) (0.0709) (0.0711) (0.0724) 
Age (18-34 omitted)               
35-44 years 0.0208 0.0706 0.0176 0.0342 0.0440 0.0189 0.0222 
  (0.2258) (0.2260) (0.2257) (0.2264) (0.2250) (0.2262) (0.2288) 
45-54 years -0.1786 -0.0737 -0.1569 -0.1270 -0.0922 -0.1444 -0.1698 
  (0.2267) (0.2263) (0.2265) (0.2259) (0.2256) (0.2268) (0.2304) 
55-64 years -0.1551 -0.0406 -0.1440 -0.1015 -0.0780 -0.1208 -0.1329 
  (0.2320) (0.2315) (0.2319) (0.2313) (0.2315) (0.2318) (0.2362) 
older than 65 years -0.3283 -0.2067 -0.3374 -0.2502 -0.2294 -0.2605 -0.3016 
  (0.3048) (0.3024) (0.3044) (0.3029) (0.3034) (0.3042) (0.3074) 
Education (School Degree omitted)               
Vocational Degree -0.1086 -0.0988 -0.1117 -0.0975 -0.0882 -0.0963 -0.1186 
  (0.1471) (0.1466) (0.1463) (0.1464) (0.1455) (0.1458) (0.1474) 
University Degree 0.0199 0.0062 0.0021 0.0420 0.0572 0.0466 -0.0214 
  (0.2250) (0.2248) (0.2244) (0.2238) (0.2224) (0.2225) (0.2272) 
Constant -0.2425 -0.1510 -0.3923 -0.2362 -0.4178 -0.4598 -0.2115 
  (1.2187) (1.2036) (1.2133) (1.2185) (1.2079) (1.2167) (1.2245) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 677 676 676 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0587 0.0491 0.0487 0.0497 0.0362 0.0456 0.0643 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
  
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
Our research question is whether intellectual virtue is associated with greater financial literacy 
and with a more reflective and conscientious approach to financial decision making. We 
approached this question by analysing whether intellectual virtue is associated with three 
different measures of financial literacy; with a more accurate estimation of the number of 
financial literacy questions answered correctly; and with a tendency to compare different 
financial advisors. We find significant associations between intellectual virtue and each of 
these three outcome measures.  
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Taken together, our results suggest that fostering intellectual virtue may provide a way of 
equipping people to develop financial literacy, deal more courageously with financial advisors, 
and ultimately make better financial decisions.  
Our regression approach does not exclude the possibility that intellectual virtue arises 
endogenously with financial literacy or financial advisor selection. If intellectual virtue is 
correlated with unobserved variables, this could lead to falsely attributing the effects of these 
unobserved variables to intellectual virtue. For instance, education may improve intellectual 
virtues and foster financial literacy. We addressed this problem by including a large number of 
controls that may plausibly be related to intellectual virtue, covering education, variables 
related to wealth and income, socio-economic status, employment status, marriage status, risk 
aversion, age, and gender.  
Another potential source of endogeneity is reverse causality. We assume that intellectual virtue 
has an effect on financial literacy, self-knowledge, and advisor choice. Causality would be 
reversed if intellectual virtue would arise from these outcomes, rather than vice versa.  
It is however implausible that reverse causality influences our results. Intellectual virtues are 
relatively stable character traits. While these traits are acquired and improved over time, it is 
hard to see how our outcome variables would be connected to improved intellectual virtue. 
Concerning our first regression, reverse causality would implausibly imply that having 
financial knowledge improves intellectual virtue. Concerning the second regression, reverse 
causality would be at play if being accurate in one’s self-assessment about financial knowledge 
would improve intellectual virtue, which is also hardly probable. Reverse causality is most 
plausible concerning the third regression: it is possible that the activity of comparing financial 
advisors somewhat nourishes intellectual virtue. In particular, the experience of resisting 
working with the first financial advisor one encounters and instead comparing different 
advisors may foster intellectual courage. However, intellectual virtues are general character 
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traits that may be somewhat influenced in every conscious effort we make to acquire 
knowledge and understanding. The potential impact of comparing advisors on intellectual 
virtue is therefore small, making it unlikely that it drives the significant results we see in the 
regression analysis. 
This is the first study that investigated the construct validity of the Intellectual Virtue Scale by 
investigating its relationships with outcomes variables. The expected relationships between the 
virtues and the studied outcomes hold up well for all five virtues.  
The focus of this study was to analyse the relationship between intellectual virtue and financial 
literacy as well as self-awareness of one’s financial knowledge. We thereby contribute to the 
little explored question of the individual characteristics that determine financial literacy. It is 
worth noting, however, that the Intellectual Virtue Scale can also be used to investigate the 
relationship between intellectual virtue and economic decisions directly. Here we have 
considered but one example of economic decision making, namely the selection process of 
financial advisors. Future research could widen the range of outcome variables to areas such 
as pension planning (Alessie, Rooij, and Lusardi 2011) and stock market participation (Van 
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011b). 
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Appendix 14 Questions Intellectual Virtue Scale and Financial 
Literacy 
 
Deficit Virtue Excess 
Love of Knowledge or curiosity is the disposition to actively and purposefully seek 
knowledge and understanding.  
L1 I am not very interested in 
understanding things. 
I want to understand 
things. 
I am excessively 
interested in 
understanding things. 
L2 I am not so interested in 
the reasons why. 
I want to know the 
reasons why. 
I am excessively 
interested in 
understanding the reasons 
why. 
L3 I am not particularly 
curious to learn new 
things. 
I am curious to learn new 
things. 
I get lost in learning new 
things. 
L4 I do not much enjoy 
gaining knowledge. 
I enjoy gaining 
knowledge. 
I unduly enjoy gaining 
knowledge. 
Open-mindedness in gathering information is the disposition to take up different 
standpoints and perspectives in seeking out evidence and being impartial in appraising the 
reliability of sources of information. 
O1 I usually get one or at 
best a few different 
perspectives on any given 
topic. 
I get a number of 
different perspectives on 
a given topic. 
I often get more different 
perspectives on a topic 
than I can handle. 
O2 I pay less attention to the 
views of people I disagree 
with. 
I consider the views of 
people I disagree with. 
I consider the views of 
people I disagree with 
extensively even when 
their views have little 
merit. 
O3 Loyalty to one's ideas is 









perspectives is more 
important than getting to 
the truth efficiently. 
O4 I am not very open-
minded towards 
viewpoints different from 
my own. 
I am open-minded 
towards viewpoints 
different from my own. 
I am excessively open-
minded towards 
viewpoints different from 
my own. 
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Conscientiousness in evaluating information is the disposition to evaluate evidence 
methodically, thoroughly, and carefully.  
C1 I tend not to think things 
through at great length. 
I think things through. I sometimes mull over 
things until it is too late. 
C2 I make up my mind 
without much fuss about 
the many factors that may 
affect an issue. 
I think through the 
relevant factors before 
making up my mind. 
I think through so many 
factors that might affect 
an issue that I sometimes 
struggle to make up my 
mind. 
C3 I do not dwell on the pros 
and the cons when I make 
up my mind. 
I weigh the pros and the 
cons when I make up my 
mind. 
I often get stuck weighing 
the pros and cons when I 
make up my mind. 
C4 I tend to take important 
decisions on the spot. 
I reason carefully and 
critically before taking 
important decisions. 
I cannot take important 
decisions unless I am 
100% sure. 
Humility in belief formation is the disposition to acknowledge you may be wrong, and to 
proportion the strength of your beliefs to the strength of your evidence.  
H1 I know I am right about 
most things. 
I could be wrong about 
many things. 
I suspect I am wrong 
about most things. 
H2 I tend to be overconfident 
in my opinions. 
I have a realistic sense of 
what I know. 
I lack confidence in what 
I know. 
H3 I have strong opinions 
about issues I know little 
about. 
The more I know about 
an issue, the more 
confident I become of my 
opinions. 
I often lack confidence in 
my opinions even on 
issues I know a lot about. 
H4 I hold my beliefs firmly 
even in areas I know little 
about. 
I proportion the strength 
of my beliefs to the 
strength of my evidence. 
I hardly have any strong 
beliefs even in areas I 
know a lot about. 
Intellectual Courage is the disposition to pursue knowledge and understanding even if this 
may negatively affect your wellbeing.  
I1 I am afraid to hold an 
unpopular opinion. 
I am not afraid to adopt 
an unpopular opinion. 
I enjoy holding unpopular 
opinions for the sake of it. 
I2 I am afraid to ask 
questions that could make 
me look stupid. 
I am not afraid to ask 
questions that could make 
me look stupid. 
I often ask questions that 
could make me look 
stupid for the fun of it. 
I3 I tend to accept answers I 
do not understand in 
order not to appear stupid. 
If I do not understand an 
answer, I keep asking 
until I understand. 
I tend to keep on asking 
questions for the sake of 
it. 
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I4 I avoid asking questions 
that might reveal my 
ignorance. 
I ask questions even if 
they reveal my ignorance. 
I do not mind at all about 
how the questions I ask 
come across. 
 
Table 5.8: Basic Financial Literacy Questions 
# Question Answer 
B1 
Numeracy: Suppose you had €100 in a savings account 
and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, 
how much do you think you would have in the account 
if you left the money to grow? 
(i) More than €102; (ii) 
Exactly €102; (iii) Less 
than €102; (iv) Do not 
know.  
B2 
Interest compounding: Suppose you had €100 in a 
savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and 
you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 
5 years, how much would you have on this account in 
total? 
(i) More than €200; (ii) 
Exactly €200; (iii) Less 
than €200; (iv) Do not 
know.  
B3 
Inflation: Imagine that the interest rate on your savings 
account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. 
After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with 
the money in this account? 
(i) More than today; (ii) 
Exactly the same; (iii) 
Less than today; (iv) Do 
not know.  
B4 
Time value of money: Assume a friend inherits €10,000 
today and his sibling inherits €10,000 3 years from now. 
Who is richer because of the inheritance?  
(i) My friend; (ii) His 
sibling; (iii) They are 
equally rich; (iv) Do not 
know.  
B5 
Money illusion: Suppose that in the year 2010, your 
income has doubled and prices of all goods have 
doubled too. In 2010, how much will you be able to buy 
with your income?  
(i) More than today; (ii) 
The same; (iii) Less than 
today; (iv) Do not know. 
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Table 5.9: Advanced Financial Literacy Questions 
# Question Answer 
A1 Which of the following 
statements describes the 
main function of the stock 
market? 
(i) The stock market helps to predict stock earnings;  
(ii) The stock market results in an increase in the price 
of stocks; (iii) The stock market brings people who 
want to buy stocks together with those who want to sell 
stocks; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know.  
A2 Which of the following 
statements is correct? If 
somebody buys the stock 
of firm B in the stock 
market: 
(i) He owns a part of firm B; (ii) He has lent money to 
firm B; (iii) He is liable for firm B’s debts; (iv) None of 
the above; (v) Do not know.  
A3 Which of the following 
statements is correct?  
(i) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot 
withdraw the money in the first year; (ii) Mutual funds 
can invest in several assets, for example invest in both 
stocks and bonds; (iii) Mutual funds pay a guaranteed 
rate of return which depends on their past performance; 
(iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know.  
A4 Which of the following 
statements is correct? If 
somebody buys a bond of 
firm B 
(i) He owns a part of firm B; (ii) He has lent money to 
firm B; (iii) He is liable for firm B’s debts; (iv) None of 
the above; (v) Do not know.  
A5 Considering a long time 
period (for example 10 or 
20 years), which asset 
normally gives the highest 
return? 
(i) Savings accounts; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Stocks; (iv) Do 
not know.  
A6 Normally, which asset 
displays the highest 
fluctuations over time?  
(i) Savings accounts; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Stocks; (iv) Do 
not know.  
A7 When an investor spreads 
his money among 
different assets, does the 
risk of losing money 
(i) Increase; (ii) Decrease; (iii) Stay the same; (iv) Do 
not know.  
A8 If you buy a 10-year bond, 
it means you cannot sell it 
after 5 years without 
incurring a major penalty. 
True or false?  
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know.  
A9 Stocks are normally 
riskier than bonds. True or 
false? 
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know.  
A10 Buying a company stock 
usually provides a safer 
return than a stock mutual 
fund. True or false? 
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know.  
A11 If the interest rate falls, 
what should happen to 
bond prices? 
(i) Rise; (ii) Fall; (iii) Stay the same; (iv) None of the 
above; (v) Do not know; (vi) Refusal. 
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Table 5.10: Mortgage Literacy Questions 
# Question Answer 
M1 What is the advantage of fixing the 
interest rate of your mortgage for longer? 
(select all that apply) 
i) You will not run the risk that interest 
rates go up unexpectedly. 
ii) A longer fixing period is cheaper over 
the duration. 
iii) The interest rate is lower in a long 
interest period. 
iv) You repay less each month. 
v) I don't know 
M2 An annuity mortgage is a mortgage that 
keeps gross mortgage payments stable 
over the term of the mortgage. How does 
the share of interest you pay each month 
develop over the term of the annuity 
mortgage?  
i) The share of the interest decreases, 
and the share of your monthly repayment 
increases. 
ii) The share of the interest increases, and 
the share of your monthly repayment 
decreases. 
iii) The share of interest stays stable over 
the period. 
v) I don't know. 
M3 An annuity mortgage is a mortgage that 
keeps gross mortgage payments stable 
over the term of the mortgage. How does 
the amount that you can deduct from 
your income tax evolve over the term of 
the mortgage?  
i) You can deduct a higher amount at the 
beginning of the term. 
ii) You can deduct a higher amount at the 
end of the term. 
iii) The amount you can deduct stays 
stable during the term. 
iv) I don't know. 
M4 Suppose that you have a mortgage loan 
that consists of two parts: 
- an annuity mortgage loan part of € 
50,000; 
- an interest-only mortgage loan part of € 
150,000. 
You don't make any unscheduled 
repayments during the term. How big is 
your outstanding debt at the end of the 
term of your mortgage? 
i) 0 EUR 
ii) 50.000 EUR 
iii) 100.000 EUR 
iv) 150.000 EUR 
iv) 200.000 EUR 
v) I don't know. 
M5 During the term of the mortgage things 
can happen that lower your income. 
Think of disability or unemployment. 
Does the National Mortgage Guarantee 
scheme allow you to continue living in 
your house if you cannot pay the 
mortgage by yourself? 
i) Yes 
ii) No 
iii) I don't know. 
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M6 You live in your own house. Last year, 
you paid EUR 10.000 in interest for your 
mortgage. Your income tax rate in the 
relevant bracket is 42%. How much of 
your mortgage interest payments can you 
deduct from your taxable income?   
i) Less than 4.200 EUR 
ii) 4.200 EUR 
iii) 10.000 EUR 
iv) I don't know 
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Appendix 15 Validity tests Intellectual Virtue Scale 
In this section, we confirm dimensionality analysis and internal consistency analysis for the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale that we conducted in previous work with the new data from the 
household study. The results are overall in keeping with the results of the validation study in 
chapter 4.  
First, we tested whether the five-factor structure that we found in the validation study survived 
in the new sample. We conducted a principal factor analysis. Scree test and parallel analysis 
suggested again a five-factor solution, as illustrated by Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2: Parallel analysis for factor analysis 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the factor loadings for a principal factor analysis of the 20 target items after 
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Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
L1 0.77 
    
L2 0.76 
    
L3 0.68 
    
L4 0.67 
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0.38 
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0.51 
H3 
    
0.57 
H4 


















Figure 5.3: Factor loadings, blanks represent abs(loading)<.3 
 
With the exception of O1, all items load on the correct factor, with no significant cross-
loadings. We found that O1 loads on openness in the validation study. In this study, O1 loads 
instead on conscientiousness, contrary to our expectation, even if only with a loading of 0.34, 
below the 0.4 threshold. 
Except for O2, O4, and H1, all loadings are above the 0.4 threshold that is sometimes suggested 
as a cut-off point (Hinkin 1995). The loading of O1 on the wrong factor notwithstanding, the 
factor structure of the IVS holds up well in this analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy is 0.87, a high meritorious value, which is 0.08 higher than in the 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
Table 5.11 shows Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales and the scale as a whole, as well as the 
item-rest correlations of the individual items with the subscales. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
whole scale is 0.82, which falls well within the desirable range (DeVellis 2016). In the 
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validation study, Cronbach’s alpha for the whole scale was lower in the confirmatory factor 
analysis (0.72). The alphas for the subscales tend also to be slightly higher than in the validation 
study, between 0.62 for humility and open-mindedness, and 0.84 for love of knowledge.  
Table 5.11: Cronbach alphas and item-rest correlations for the items in the IVS 
Name Alpha/Item-Rest 

























Alpha whole scale 0.82 
 
In sum, we find that with the exception of O1, the factor structure of the exploratory factor 
analysis is well replicated in the factor analysis. The internal consistency values are all well 
within the acceptable range. 
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Appendix 16 Correlation Matrix  
 
Table 5.12: Correlation Matrix  
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Figure 5.4: Histograms of intellectual virtue scores for individual virtues overlaid with plot 
of normal distribution 
 
Table 5.13: Summary Statistics Basic Financial Literacy 
Panel A: Percentage of respondents who answered individual questions correctly / incorrectly / do not know 
 
  Question   
  1 2 3 4 5   
Correct 90% 81% 88% 63% 73%   
Incorrect 6% 16% 6% 29% 22%   
Don't know 4% 3% 6% 8% 5%   
              
Panel B: Percentage of respondents with respective number of correct / do not know answers 
 
  Number of questions 
 None 1 2 3 4 5 
Correct 2% 2% 6% 15% 33% 40% 
Do not know 85% 9% 1% 0% 0% 1% 
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Table 5.14: Summary Statistics Advanced Financial Literacy 





     Question                 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11   
Correct 69% 69% 64% 63% 50% 79% 77% 30% 69% 54% 27%   
Incorrect 10% 19% 13% 14% 29% 9% 13% 28% 9% 12% 38%   
                          
Panel B: Percentage of respondents with respective number of correct / do not know answers   
   
Number of questions 
  
  - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Correct 7% 3% 3% 6% 6% 9% 10% 13% 13% 12% 9% 9% 
Do not 
know 
11% 9% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Table 5.15: Summary Statistics Mortgage Literacy 
Panel A: Percentage of respondents who answered individual questions correctly / incorrectly / don't know 
  Questions 
  1 2 3 4 5 6   
Correct 77% 60% 55% 63% 35% 24%   
Incorrect 17% 21% 23% 14% 42% 43%   
Don't know 6% 19% 22% 23% 23% 33%   
                
Panel B: Percentage of respondents with respective number of correct / don't know answers 
  
  Number of questions 
 none 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Correct 11% 12% 14% 14% 22% 21% 7% 
Don't Know 5% 3% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 5.16: Statistics on self-awareness concerning financial literacy 
Basic Financial Literacy           
 Score N mean sd p25 p50 p75 iqr Underc Acc. Overc. 
1 11 2.82 1.40 2 3 3 1 8% 0% 92% 
2 53 2.96 1.06 2 3 4 2 7% 22% 70% 
3 188 3.23 1.12 3 3 4 1 23% 34% 43% 
4 465 3.74 1.26 3 4 5 2 36% 32% 32% 
5 565 4.45 0.79 4 5 5 1 39% 61% 0% 
Total 1282 3.94 1.17 3 4 5 2 34% 44% 22% 
Advanced Financial Literacy           
 Score N mean sd p25 p50 p75 iqr Underc Acc. Overc. 
0 87 1.39 3.12 0 0 1 1 0% 65% 35% 
1 35 1.09 1.29 0 1 2 2 40% 31% 29% 
2 39 2.79 2.41 1 2 4 3 26% 33% 41% 
3 76 3.49 2.08 2 3 5 3 38% 18% 43% 
4 74 4.28 2.08 3 4 6 3 35% 16% 49% 
5 111 4.74 2.16 3 5 6 3 45% 21% 34% 
6 130 5.35 1.98 4 5 7 3 55% 16% 29% 
7 165 6.18 2.01 5 6 8 3 54% 19% 27% 
8 166 7.14 1.81 6 7 8 2 54% 21% 25% 
9 158 8.15 1.79 7 8 9 2 51% 25% 23% 
10 121 8.77 1.64 8 9 10 2 64% 23% 12% 
11 115 9.77 1.55 9 10 11 2 57% 43% 0% 
Total 1277 6.07 3.14 4 6 9 5 47% 26% 27% 
Mortgage Literacy         
Score N mean sd p25 p50 p75 iqr Underc Acc. Overc. 
0 126 1.23 1.75 0 0 2 2 0% 50% 50% 
1 148 1.89 1.55 1 2 3 2 24% 20% 56% 
2 179 2.51 1.32 2 3 3 1 23% 27% 51% 
3 180 3.31 1.32 2 3 4 2 27% 28% 46% 
4 279 3.97 1.21 3 4 5 2 36% 29% 35% 
5 273 4.47 1.17 4 5 5 1 47% 32% 21% 
6 87 4.96 0.94 4 5 6 2 66% 34% 0% 
Total 1272 3.33 1.75 2 4 5 3 32% 31% 37% 
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Appendix 17 Demographic Analysis  
Table 5.17: Regression Results: Demographic characteristics on IVS score 
Variables (1) 
Male -0.0370 
  (0.0445) 
Age (18-24 omitted) 
25-34 years -0.7564* 
  (0.4363) 
35-44 years -0.7885* 
  (0.4363) 
45-54 years -0.7403* 
  (0.4361) 
55-64 years -0.7773* 
  (0.4351) 
older than 65 years -0.8096* 
  (0.4377) 
Education (School Degree omitted) 
Vocational Degree 0.1598*** 
  (0.0476) 
University Degree 0.2221*** 
  (0.0761) 
Log Net Household Income  0.0104 
  (0.0478) 
Log Wealth 0.0119* 
  (0.0072) 
Socioeconomic Status 0.0476* 
  (0.0248) 
Married  0.0775 
  (0.0478) 
Divorced  0.1668** 
  (0.0825) 
Number of Children -0.0258 
  (0.0257) 
Self-Employed  0.0157 
  (0.0882) 
Retired 0.0350 
  (0.0736) 
Unemployed -0.0930 
  (0.0805) 
Government Worker -0.0844 
  (0.0681) 
Risk-Proneness  0.0737*** 
  (0.0240) 
Constant 0.2900 
  (0.5410) 
Observations 1,062 
R-squared 0.0730 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0561 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 18 Robustness analysis: Financial Literacy and 
Financial Advisor Comparison 
In section 5.4.3, we showed that intellectual virtue is significantly positively related to whether 
people compare different financial advisors. Here we demonstrate that no such positive 
relationship exists between financial literacy and advisor comparison. Table 5.18 reports the 
results of probit analysis with a dummy for whether people compared advisors as dependent 
variable. In columns 1-3, basic financial literacy, advanced financial literacy, and mortgage 
literacy are included as independent variables, respectively. None of the coefficient for 
financial literacy is significant. In the case of basic financial literacy, the coefficient is negative, 
indicating that more financially literate respondents are less likely to compare financial 
advisors, not more likely to do so. Column 4 includes all three financial literacy measures, as 
well as the intellectual virtue score. Basic financial literacy remains negatively related, now 
significant at the 5% level. In keeping with the analysis in section 5.4.3, intellectual virtue is 
significantly positively related, at the 1% level. These results show that financial literacy scores 
are not positively related with the tendency to compare financial advisors.  
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Table 5.18: Regression Results: Financial Literacy on comparing financial advisors 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basic Financial Literacy -0.0918     -0.1304** 
  (0.0595)     (0.0623) 
Advanced Financial Literacy   0.0480   0.0308 
    (0.0708)   (0.0827) 
Mortgage Literacy     0.0600 0.0618 
      (0.0675) (0.0786) 
Intellectual Virtue Score       0.2767*** 
        (0.0672) 
Male 0.1970 0.1669 0.1778 0.1980 
  (0.1308) (0.1325) (0.1305) (0.1348) 
Log Net Household Income  0.0378 0.0171 0.0270 0.0454 
  (0.1573) (0.1574) (0.1563) (0.1599) 
Log Wealth -0.0437* -0.0502** -0.0502** -0.0560** 
  (0.0228) (0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0235) 
Socio-Economic Status 0.0577 0.0383 0.0359 0.0123 
  (0.0786) (0.0795) (0.0794) (0.0817) 
Married  -0.3277** -0.3263** -0.3354** -0.3545** 
  (0.1395) (0.1391) (0.1395) (0.1419) 
Divorced  -0.4412* -0.4588* -0.4712* -0.5259** 
  (0.2519) (0.2534) (0.2539) (0.2567) 
Number of Children 0.0084 0.0085 0.0077 0.0028 
  (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0664) 
Self-Employed  -0.3403 -0.3149 -0.3129 -0.3728 
  (0.2627) (0.2622) (0.2617) (0.2733) 
Retired -0.0768 -0.0934 -0.0920 -0.0582 
  (0.2417) (0.2417) (0.2415) (0.2437) 
Unemployed -0.0348 -0.0418 -0.0181 -0.0145 
  (0.2892) (0.2892) (0.2898) (0.2927) 
Government Worker 0.1538 0.1410 0.1429 0.1850 
  (0.1755) (0.1747) (0.1749) (0.1787) 
Risk-Proneness  0.0634 0.0408 0.0435 0.0350 
  (0.0713) (0.0727) (0.0715) (0.0738) 
Age (18-34 omitted)         
35-44 years 0.0404 0.0511 0.0522 0.0263 
  (0.2256) (0.2252) (0.2254) (0.2278) 
45-54 years -0.0892 -0.0867 -0.0802 -0.1678 
  (0.2255) (0.2251) (0.2254) (0.2286) 
55-64 years -0.0851 -0.0813 -0.0759 -0.1627 
  (0.2306) (0.2301) (0.2304) (0.2332) 
older than 65 years -0.2482 -0.2243 -0.2135 -0.3396 
  (0.3029) (0.3023) (0.3027) (0.3056) 
Education (School Degree omitted)         
Vocational Degree -0.0868 -0.0854 -0.0832 -0.0994 
  (0.1452) (0.1455) (0.1455) (0.1474) 
University Degree 0.0678 0.0542 0.0514 0.0340 
  (0.2220) (0.2220) (0.2220) (0.2256) 
Constant -0.5452 -0.2430 -0.3298 -0.2756 
  (1.2136) (1.2257) (1.2052) (1.2389) 
Observations 679 679 679 677 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0396 0.0371 0.0375 0.0652 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Summary 
The overarching research question of the thesis is whether and to what extent individual 
characteristics affect economic decision making. The chapters separately address the following 
research questions: 
Chapter 2: Does personality affect risk taking, investment decisions, and desire for credit? 
Chapter 3: Does knowledge about mortgages affect the riskiness of mortgages taken? 
Chapter 4: How can intellectual virtue be measured? 
Chapter 5: Does intellectual virtue improve knowledge about finance and financial diligence? 
In chapter 2, we investigate how personality influences economic decision making, with a lab-
in-the-field experiment as well as observational data from rural Kenya. Our sample is 
composed of smallholders with an income of less than $1 per day, from 40 farmer communities 
in Meru County. More than 90% are women. We find that particular personality profiles are 
associated with the risk propensity of farmers, their investment decisions, their desire for credit, 
and the amount of formal and informal credit they obtain. Interestingly, we find that other traits 
matter than those suggested by the existing literature. We find no correlation with the traits of 
neuroticism and extroversion, which have been identified as important in developed country 
studies. By contrast, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and intellect are significantly correlated 
with our outcome measures. These results shed new light on the relationship between 
personality traits and economic decisions, and contribute to the understanding of how 
personality shapes investment decisions and risk taking in a poor rural context. 
In chapter 3, we study the relationship between mortgage literacy and mortgage risks with a 
newly designed Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire using Dutch household data. The Mortgage 
Literacy Questionnaire evaluates the domain-specific knowledge of households about 
mortgages, including the legal and fiscal implications of different types of mortgages. We find 
that mortgage literacy is distinct from basic and advanced financial literacy. A significant 
number of households is financially literate but mortgage illiterate. We demonstrate that 
mortgage literacy is associated with lower perceived mortgage risk, and with how well 
households hedge mortgage risk. Our results suggest that knowledge about mortgage products 
and their legal and fiscal environment matters considerably for financial choices regarding 
mortgages.  
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In chapter 4, we develop and validate the Intellectual Virtue Scale, a new measure of 
intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are acquired character traits that support gaining 
knowledge and understanding. We develop a 20-item scale, measuring five intellectual virtues 
with four items each: love of knowledge, openness in gathering information, conscientiousness 
in processing information, humility in belief formation, and intellectual courage. The validation 
studies include an exploratory and a confirmatory factor analysis with almost 1,000 participants 
each, demonstrating that the Intellectual Virtue Scale has a stable factor structure and is 
internally reliable. We also demonstrate that intellectual virtue is distinct from related 
constructs such as personality, moral virtue, critical thinking, and professional scepticism. 
In chapter 5, we study the relationship between the Intellectual Virtue Scale and financial 
knowledge and diligent financial decision making. A substantial body of literature suggests 
that people who are more financially literate make better financial decisions. We study the 
intellectual qualities supporting financial literacy. In particular, we investigate whether 
intellectual virtue is associated with greater financial literacy and with a more reflective and 
conscientious approach to financial decision making. We measure the extent to which 
participants in a representative Dutch household panel display intellectual virtue using the 
Intellectual Virtue Scale. We find that intellectually virtuous people are more financially 
literate, display greater self-awareness about their financial knowledge, and are more likely to 
compare financial advisors. 
Each chapter deals with the problem of measurement, if in different ways. Chapter 2 uses an 
existing and well-studied measure of personality based on the Big Five personality traits, but 
applies it in a new context, namely a developing country. While we rely on an existing 
instrument, administering the instrument in a very different cultural context yields new 
insights. Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between knowledge and mortgage decisions 
through the lens of a newly developed instrument, the Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire. The 
Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire is the first instrument to measure financial literacy that 
includes questions on different mortgage types, including their fiscal and legal implications. 
Chapter 4 develops and validates the Intellectual Virtue Scale, a new instrument to measure 
intellectual virtue. In chapter 5, we use the Intellectual Virtue Scale to inquire into the 
associations of intellectual virtue with financial literacy, as well as diligent financial decision 
making. 
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While each chapter stands on its own, the crosscutting theme of the economic consequences of 
individual characteristics deserves attention. Individual characteristics were long neglected 
among the factors influencing economic decision making. The long dominant approach in 
economics regarded people as rational agents on a quest to maximize utility. People’s utility 
function was determined by a stable, complete, and transitive preference ordering over all 
available choices. It was not the place of economics to further inquire into the origin of these 
preferences. Within this paradigm, economists derived general predictions about economic 
behaviour based on given preferences and prices, which itself were the results of supply and 
demand on clearing markets. Individual characteristics such as personality, knowledge, and 
other cognitive characteristics were excluded from the analysis. This thesis contributes to 
putting these individual characteristics, always at play in economic decision making, into the 
study of economic decision making.  
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Samenvatting 
De hoofdvraag in dit proefschrift is of, en zo ja, in welke mate persoonlijke kenmerken 
economische besluitvorming beïnvloeden. De volgende deelvragen worden in afzonderlijke 
hoofdstukken behandeld: 
Hoofdstuk 2: Heeft persoonlijkheid invloed op het accepteren van risico’s, het nemen van 
investeringsbeslissingen, en de behoefte aan financiering? 
Hoofdstuk 3: Beïnvloedt kennis van zaken met betrekking tot hypotheken het risicogehalte 
van de hypothecaire lening die wordt aangegaan? 
Hoofdstuk 4: Hoe kan intellectuele deugd worden gemeten? 
Hoofdstuk 5: Heeft intellectuele deugd een gunstig effect op financiën en het verantwoord 
omgaan met geld? 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt op basis van veldonderzoek en een observatiestudie op het platteland van 
Kenia onderzocht hoe persoonlijkheid economische besluitvorming beïnvloedt. Onze 
steekproef bestaat uit kleine boerenbedrijven in 40 boerengemeenschappen in Meru County 
met een inkomen van minder dan $1 per dag. Negentig procent is hier vrouw. Wij zien dat er 
een relatie is tussen bepaalde persoonlijkheidsprofielen van de boeren en hun risicobereidheid, 
hun investeringsbeslissingen, hun financieringsbehoeften, en de hoeveelheid formeel en 
informeel krediet die zij krijgen. Interessant is dat hele andere kenmerken een rol blijken te 
spelen dan vooralsnog wordt gesuggereerd in de literatuur. Zo hebben wij geen correlaties 
gevonden met de kenmerken neuroticisme en extraversie, die in studies over ontwikkelde 
landen als belangrijke factoren worden aangewezen. Onze resultaten laten daarentegen zien dat 
eigenschappen zoals innemendheid, zorgvuldigheid en intellect van belang zijn. Deze 
bevinding werpt nieuw licht op de relatie tussen persoonlijkheidskenmerken en economische 
besluitvorming. En hiermee draagt zij bij aan het vergroten van het inzicht in de vraag hoe de 
persoonlijkheidsstructuur van mensen in arme landelijke gebieden hun beslissingen beïnvloedt 
met betrekking tot het doen van investeringen en het nemen van risico’s. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de relatie bestudeerd tussen hypotheek-geletterdheid en het risicogehalte 
van hypotheken. Hiervoor hebben wij een Hypotheek-Geletterdheid-Vragenlijst (Mortgage 
Literacy Questionnaire) ontworpen op basis van gegevens uit Nederlandse huishoudens. De 
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vragenlijst evalueert de domein-specifieke kennis die huishoudens hebben van hypotheken, 
met inbegrip van de wettelijke en fiscale consequenties van de verschillende typen hypotheken.   
Wij zien dat er een verschil bestaat tussen hypotheek-geletterdheid en financiële geletterdheid. 
Een groot aantal huishoudens is financieel geletterd, maar ongeletterd als het gaat om 
hypotheken. Onze studie toont aan dat hypotheek-geletterdheid gepaard gaat met een lagere 
inschatting van het risico van de hypotheek. Daarbij is er een verband tussen hypotheek-
geletterdheid en de manier waarop huishoudens hun hypotheek-risico afdekken. Onze 
resultaten suggereren dat de aanwezige kennis van hypotheekproducten in hun wettelijke en 
fiscale context aanzienlijk van invloed is op het maken van financiële keuzes op het gebied van 
hypotheken.  
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de ontwikkeling en validatie van een Intellectuele-Deugden-Schaal 
(Intellectual Virtue Scale), een nieuw instrument voor het meten van intellectuele deugd. 
Intellectuele deugden zijn aangeleerde karakter-kenmerken die het verwerven van kennis en 
inzicht stimuleren. Wij ontwikkelden een 20-eenheden-schaal die vijf intellectuele deugden 
meet, elk onderverdeeld in vier sub-eenheden: voorliefde voor kennis, openheid in het 
verzamelen van informatie, het nauwkeurig verwerken van informatie, bedachtzaamheid in het 
ontwikkelen van opvattingen, en intellectuele moed. De validatiestudies omvatten een 
explorerende en een bevestigende factor-analyse met elk zo’n 1000 deelnemers. Hiermee wordt 
aangetoond dat de eenhedenstructuur van de Intellectuele-Deugden-Schaal stabiel en intern 
betrouwbaar is. We tonen ook aan dat er een verschil is tussen intellectuele deugd en 
gerelateerde begrippen zoals persoonlijkheid, morele integriteit, kritisch denken, en 
professioneel scepticisme. 
Hoofdstuk 5 bestudeert de relatie tussen de Intellectuele-Deugden-Schaal enerzijds en 
financiële kennis en doordachte financiële besluitvorming anderzijds. Veel publicaties stellen 
dat mensen die financieel meer geletterd zijn betere financiële beslissingen maken. Deze studie 
onderzoekt welke intellectuele capaciteiten financiële geletterdheidstimuleren. Er wordt in het 
bijzonder gekeken of er een relatie is tussen intellectuele deugd en een hogere mate van 
geletterdheid in combinatie met een meer bedachtzame en nauwkeurige manier van financiële 
besluitvorming. Op basis van de Intellectuele-Deugden-Schaal meten wij de mate waarin leden 
van een representatief huishouden-panel intellectuele deugden tonen. Het blijkt dat personen 
met intellectuele deugden financieel geletterder zijn. Tevens zijn zij zelfbewuster wat betreft 
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hun financiële kennis, en meer geneigd om een vergelijking te maken tussen verschillende 
financiële adviseurs. 
Alle hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift zijn gericht op het meten van hypotheek-geletterdheid, zij 
het vanuit een andere invalshoek. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een bestaand en gevalideerd 
meetinstrument, gebaseerd op de Grote Vijf persoonlijkheidskenmerken, gebruikt in een 
nieuwe context, namelijk die van een ontwikkelingsland. Het toepassen van een bestaand 
instrument in een afwijkende culturele context levert nieuwe inzichten op. Hoofstuk 3 
onderzoekt de relatie tussen kennis en hypotheek-besluitvorming met behulp van een nieuw 
meetinstrument, de Hypotheek-Geletterdheid-Vragenlijst (Mortgage Literacy Questionnaire). 
Deze vragenlijst is de eerste die financiële geletterdheid meet op basis van vragen over 
verschillende hypotheek-typen en hun fiscale en juridische aspecten. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de 
ontwikkeling en validatie van de Intellectuele-Deugden-Schaal, een nieuw instrument voor het 
meten van intellectuele deugd. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de Intellectuele-Deugden-Schaal gebruikt 
om te onderzoeken of intellectuele deugden een relatie  met financiële geletterdheid en 
weloverwogen financiële besluitvorming hebben. 
Hoewel elk hoofdstuk op zichzelf staat, is het centrale thema in dit proefschrift de invloed van 
persoonlijke kenmerken op de economische besluitvorming van individuen. Als factoren die 
de economische besluitvorming beïnvloeden hebben persoonlijke kenmerken lange tijd geen 
aandacht gekregen in de literatuur. In de gangbare economische theorieën worden personen in 
het algemeen beschouwd als rationele agenten die streven naar nutsmaximalisatie. Volgens 
deze theorieën wordt de nutsfunctie van consumenten bepaald door een stabiele, volledige en 
transitieve ordening van aanwezige alternatieven op basis van voorkeuren. De achterliggende 
redenen voor deze voorkeuren worden echter niet beschouwd als een thema binnen het domein 
van de economie. Hier gelden vooral algemene voorspellingen over economisch gedrag op 
basis van voorkeuren en prijzen, die op zich weer het resultaat zijn van aanbod en vraag in een 
situatie van marktequilibrium. Individuele kenmerken zoals persoonlijkheid, kennis, en andere 
cognitieve eigenschappen worden hier niet bij betrokken.  
 
 
